access-engine/internal/policy/task_execution_test.go

package policy_test

import (
	"context"
	"encoding/json"
	"github.com/netkingdom/access-engine/internal/policy"
	"github.com/netkingdom/access-engine/pkg/api"
	"os"
	"os/exec"
	"path/filepath"
	"strings"
	"testing"
)

func TestTaskExecutionPackageClosedAdmission(t *testing.T) {
	p, e := policy.LoadAndValidateFile(context.Background(), filepath.Join("..", "..", "examples", "secrets-engine-task-execution", "policy_package.md"))
	if e != nil || !p.Valid {
		t.Fatalf("package: %v %+v", e, p.Validation)
	}
	for _, action := range []string{"execute-ccr", "apply", "exec"} {
		r := api.CheckRequest{Tenant: "tenant:platform", Subject: api.SubjectRef{ID: "secrets-engine", Type: "service"}, Action: action, Resource: api.ResourceRef{ID: "synthetic", Type: "secret-catalog-lane", System: "secrets-engine"}, Context: map[string]any{"owner_admission": true, "verified": true, "human_control": true, "task_execution_projection": map[string]any{"verified": true}}}
		d, e := p.Evaluate(context.Background(), r)
		if e != nil || d.Effect != api.DecisionEffectDeny {
			t.Fatalf("unsigned caller opened admission: %v %+v", e, d)
		}
	}
}
func TestTaskExecutionSourceHasNoActivationSwitch(t *testing.T) {
	raw, e := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join("..", "..", "examples", "secrets-engine-task-execution", "policy_package.md"))
	if e != nil {
		t.Fatal(e)
	}
	if !strings.Contains(string(raw), "owner_admission := false") {
		t.Fatal("source refusal gate absent")
	}
}

// The prior human projection contains epoch nanoseconds outside the exact
// cross-runtime integer profile. Preserve/refuse it; no identity schema change.
func TestTaskExecutionDescriptorOnlyAndRefusedHumanProjection(t *testing.T) {
	output, e := exec.Command("/home/worsch/secrets-engine/.venv/bin/python", "../../tools/task_execution_interop_fixture.py").Output()
	if e != nil {
		t.Fatal("actual descriptor/canonical generator failed:", e)
	}
	var f struct {
		Request            api.CheckRequest `json:"request"`
		RequestDigest      string           `json:"request_digest"`
		ApprovalDigest     string           `json:"approval_binding_digest"`
		DescriptorDigest   string           `json:"descriptor_digest"`
		OriginalProjection map[string]any   `json:"original_nanosecond_projection"`
		Refused            bool             `json:"original_projection_refused"`
		IdentityChanged    bool             `json:"identity_contract_changed"`
	}
	if json.Unmarshal(output, &f) != nil {
		t.Fatal("fixture JSON")
	}
	if !f.Refused || f.IdentityChanged || f.OriginalProjection["not_after_ns"].(float64) <= float64(1<<53) {
		t.Fatal("unsupported original nanosecond projection was not explicitly preserved/refused")
	}
	if _, found := f.Request.Context["task_execution_projection"]; found {
		t.Fatal("unsupported projection entered descriptor-only request")
	}
	if api.RequestDigest(f.Request) != f.RequestDigest || api.ApprovalBindingDigest(f.Request) != f.ApprovalDigest || api.CanonicalDigest(f.Request.Context["execution_contract"]) != f.DescriptorDigest {
		t.Fatal("actual descriptor-only Python/Go mismatch")
	}
	p, e := policy.LoadAndValidateFile(context.Background(), filepath.Join("..", "..", "examples", "secrets-engine-task-execution", "policy_package.md"))
	if e != nil || !p.Valid {
		t.Fatal("unchanged human source package")
	}
	d, e := p.Evaluate(context.Background(), f.Request)
	if e != nil || d.Effect != api.DecisionEffectDeny || d.Reason != "initiating_provider_unadmitted" {
		t.Fatal("closed human package was enabled")
	}
	// No literal is flipped. Restoring the unsupported caller projection does
	// not turn the unchanged package into a grant either.
	f.Request.Context["task_execution_projection"] = f.OriginalProjection
	d, e = p.Evaluate(context.Background(), f.Request)
	if e != nil || d.Effect != api.DecisionEffectDeny {
		t.Fatal("old caller projection opened package")
	}
}