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Bind service task HTTP input to authenticated caller before evaluation
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Assistant: codex
Assistant-Model: gpt-6-astra
Assistant-Session: 01a140c4-354a-7823-8f0d-8f717397f786
This commit is contained in:
tegwick 2026-10-16 16:25:55 +02:00
parent 919ce25a37
commit 4f6946bbb3
8 changed files with 590 additions and 9 deletions
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13
workplans/FLEX-WP-0024-decision-envelope-authenticity.md
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@ -170,6 +170,7 @@ that observation applied to the artifact the standard regulates.
id: FLEX-WP-0024-T05
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "cfe4d275-9f02-5090-8391-06eea59d45c5"
```
2026-10-16 source follow-through: NetKingdom target Secrets Engine R2 owner review
@ -186,6 +187,7 @@ This is source preparation only, not signer admission or deployed acceptance.
id: FLEX-WP-0024-T06
status: progress
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "7f785b52-bf62-5884-8d34-670d70bc9023"
```
Wait on Platform/OpenBao key custody, independent public-key and issuer/policy-pin
@ -226,3 +228,14 @@ revision, and adds offline native signer receipt verification using the existing
Secrets verifier. No key, trust, image publication or live activation is admitted.
The managed workload's missing rapp declaration remains explicit migration debt;
this source binding does not fabricate a package declaration or raise its grade.
2026-10-16 separate B1 source follow-through wires ServicePilotInputs through actual
HTTP/TokenReview into a signed-DENY-only engine entry. Generic `execute-ccr` calls
refuse across every policy, including the old separately named positive fixture;
that proof stays pinned to ec21518e. Original context/submitted digest stay unchanged.
Actual disposable serve/TLS TokenReview/HTTP signed-DENY and bypass/refusal tests are
source evidence only. B2 depends on independently reviewed Approval fact contract
and canonical vectors; B3 additionally needs exact source/normalization numeric
representation and full trusted provider joins. No current policy false gate,
production trust, native deployment or protected effect is enabled by B1.