// Package taskexecution contains task input validation, not policy evaluation.
// The human component remains source-only. The B1 service HTTP path can emit
// only signed DENY and grants no executable admission.
package taskexecution

import (
	"bytes"
	"crypto"
	"crypto/rsa"
	"crypto/sha256"
	"encoding/base64"
	"encoding/json"
	"errors"
	"strings"
	"time"
)

var ErrIdentity = errors.New("task execution initiating identity refused")

// IssuerPins must come from reviewed owner configuration, never CheckRequest.
// No production pins or default issuer/client are supplied by this package.
type IssuerPins struct {
	Issuer, Audience string
	Keys             map[string]*rsa.PublicKey
}

// Initiator has no exported constructor or mutable fields. Verification proves
// identity only, not membership, representation, approval or policy allowance.
type Initiator struct {
	subject string
	expires time.Time
}

func (i Initiator) Subject() string    { return i.subject }
func (i Initiator) Expires() time.Time { return i.expires }

// strictObject rejects duplicate names (including nested ones), trailing JSON
// and excessive depth. JWT claims are never copied to logs or CheckRequest.
func strictObject(raw []byte, out any) error {
	d := json.NewDecoder(bytes.NewReader(raw))
	depth := 0
	var walk func() error
	walk = func() error {
		depth++
		defer func() { depth-- }()
		if depth > 16 {
			return ErrIdentity
		}
		t, e := d.Token()
		if e != nil {
			return ErrIdentity
		}
		delim, ok := t.(json.Delim)
		if !ok {
			return nil
		}
		switch delim {
		case '{':
			seen := map[string]bool{}
			for d.More() {
				k, e := d.Token()
				s, ok := k.(string)
				if e != nil || !ok || seen[s] {
					return ErrIdentity
				}
				seen[s] = true
				if walk() != nil {
					return ErrIdentity
				}
			}
		case '[':
			for d.More() {
				if walk() != nil {
					return ErrIdentity
				}
			}
		default:
			return ErrIdentity
		}
		_, e = d.Token()
		return e
	}
	if walk() != nil {
		return ErrIdentity
	}
	if _, e := d.Token(); e == nil {
		return ErrIdentity
	}
	if json.Unmarshal(raw, out) != nil {
		return ErrIdentity
	}
	return nil
}

// VerifyKeyCapeHuman reuses KeyCape's RS256 access-token claim contract. Pins
// and trusted time are server inputs. No URL/key discovery from token headers.
func VerifyKeyCapeHuman(token string, pins IssuerPins, now time.Time) (Initiator, error) {
	refuse := func() (Initiator, error) { return Initiator{}, ErrIdentity }
	if len(token) > 16384 || len(token) == 0 || pins.Issuer == "" || pins.Audience == "" || now.IsZero() {
		return refuse()
	}
	parts := strings.Split(token, ".")
	if len(parts) != 3 {
		return refuse()
	}
	decode := func(s string) ([]byte, error) { return base64.RawURLEncoding.Strict().DecodeString(s) }
	header, e := decode(parts[0])
	if e != nil {
		return refuse()
	}
	payload, e := decode(parts[1])
	if e != nil {
		return refuse()
	}
	signature, e := decode(parts[2])
	if e != nil {
		return refuse()
	}
	var h map[string]any
	if strictObject(header, &h) != nil || h["alg"] != "RS256" {
		return refuse()
	}
	kid, ok := h["kid"].(string)
	if !ok {
		return refuse()
	}
	for k := range h {
		if k != "alg" && k != "kid" && k != "typ" {
			return refuse()
		}
	}
	key := pins.Keys[kid]
	if key == nil || key.N == nil || key.N.BitLen() < 2048 || key.E < 3 {
		return refuse()
	}
	digest := sha256.Sum256([]byte(parts[0] + "." + parts[1]))
	if rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(key, crypto.SHA256, digest[:], signature) != nil {
		return refuse()
	}
	var c struct {
		Issuer       string          `json:"iss"`
		Audience     json.RawMessage `json:"aud"`
		Subject      string          `json:"sub"`
		Principal    string          `json:"principal_type"`
		Tenant       string          `json:"tenant"`
		TenantSource string          `json:"tenant_source"`
		Expires      int64           `json:"exp"`
		Issued       int64           `json:"iat"`
		NotBefore    int64           `json:"nbf"`
		Assurance    struct {
			Level  string `json:"level"`
			MFA    bool   `json:"mfa"`
			Source string `json:"source"`
			At     int64  `json:"at"`
		} `json:"assurance"`
	}
	if strictObject(payload, &c) != nil {
		return refuse()
	}
	var aud string
	if json.Unmarshal(c.Audience, &aud) != nil || aud != pins.Audience {
		return refuse()
	}
	n := now.Unix()
	if c.Issuer != pins.Issuer || c.Subject == "" || len(c.Subject) > 512 || strings.ContainsAny(c.Subject, "\r\n") || c.Principal != "human" || c.Tenant != "tenant:platform" || c.TenantSource != "directory" || c.Expires <= n || c.Issued > n || c.Issued <= 0 || c.NotBefore > n || c.Expires <= c.Issued || c.Assurance.Level != "aal2" || !c.Assurance.MFA || c.Assurance.Source != "key-cape" || c.Assurance.At <= 0 || c.Assurance.At > n || n-c.Assurance.At > 300 {
		return refuse()
	}
	return Initiator{subject: c.Subject, expires: time.Unix(c.Expires, 0)}, nil
}