docs(admission): resolve approval audit tenant and redaction inputs

Assistant: codex
Assistant-Model: gpt-5.6-luna
Assistant-Session: 01a07ff8-19d0-7820-b4d0-1353833cb7fc

docs/audit-source-registration.md

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+# Platform approval audit sender
+
+Source return for `APPROVAL-WP-0002-T01/T04` and `AUDIT-WP-0009-T09`,
+2026-09-08. This records the existing platform store's required registration;
+it neither provisions a credential nor admits another tenant.
+
+| Field | Required value |
+| --- | --- |
+| Sender and permitted source | `approval-engine` (exact) |
+| Tenants | `["tenant:platform"]` (exact) |
+| Write / read | `true` / `false` |
+| Evidence kind | `load-bearing` |
+| Completeness trade | none |
+| Secret policy | `redact` |
+| Consumer mount | Secret `approval-engine/approval-engine-audit`, key `audit-token` |
+
+The accepted platform tenant decision is already implemented in the Engine
+default, production CLI and deployment arguments. The audit envelope carries
+that same store tenant without normalization. This is the tenant list Audit
+Core requested; neither `platform`, `tenant:coulomb`, nor `*` is required.
+A future store serving another tenant needs a separate registration review.
+
+Choose `redact` explicitly: the receiver should retain a legitimate revocation
+record with an accidentally secret-shaped field removed, rather than reject
+the event and leave its delivery pending. Approval payloads must still contain
+no credentials. Redaction findings do not excuse a producer defect.
+Audit Core's scope overlay does not set this field; the protected sender
+registry entry must explicitly carry `secret_policy: redact` when provisioned.
+
+The transactional outbox emits issuance, use, supersession and revocation;
+heartbeat uses the same durable drain. Its atomicity and retry contract remain
+in [outbox-contract.md](outbox-contract.md). Receiver identity/scope/ingress and
+credential admission precede live drain proof. Attestation freshness, omission
+detection and reconciliation retain their separate AUDIT-WP-0009-T02/T04/T06
+owners and bounds; this registration does not claim their completion.
+
+First provisioning still requires the platform-owned custody record linking
+the receiver's protected sender registry and this mounted credential. No
+credential value belongs in this document, Git, Hub or a rollout receipt.

docs/outbox-contract.md

@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ emitted class. The validity window is already on the object.
   "schema_version": "audit-core.event.v1alpha1",
   "event_id": "<same as outbox.event_id>",
   "observed_at": "<created_at>",
-  "tenant": "platform",
+  "tenant": "tenant:platform",
   "scope": "netkingdom-approvals",
   "source": "approval-engine",
   "actor": "<actor or null for heartbeat>",

tests/test_audit.py

@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ def test_audit_sender_adapts_envelope_and_rereads_token(tmp_path):
     assert body["id"] == body["correlation_id"] or body["correlation_id"]
     assert body["type"] == "approval.issuance"
     assert body["source"] == "approval-engine"
+    assert body["tenant"] == "tenant:platform"
     engine.close()
 
 

workplans/APPROVAL-WP-0002-production-readiness-and-consumer-adoption.md

@@ -332,6 +332,14 @@ urllib `HTTPError` 503 as pending. Waiting on the audit-core sender
 registration/ingress and receiver-owned reconciliation work
 (`AUDIT-WP-0009-T04/T06/T09`).
 
+2026-09-08 critical-path return: `docs/audit-source-registration.md` resolves
+Audit Core's tenant and redaction questions from the existing sanctioned store
+contract: exact `tenant:platform`, source `approval-engine`, write-only,
+load-bearing, explicit `redact`. The outbox example and envelope test now pin
+the same tenant. This closes those source-input waits, not live registration.
+Platform still owes linked receiver/sender custody and the protected token;
+T04 stays wait for admission and live drain/reconciliation evidence.
+
 ## Prove one live PEP consumption path
 
 ```task