# Image scan — 2026-09-06

Scanner: **trivy** (`aquasec/trivy:latest`, `--scanners vuln`) — sanctioned by
the operator 2026-09-06. Requested by `glas-harness` under `GLAS-WP-0015` /
`APPROVAL-WP-0002-T03`.

## Outcome

**Base decision: Alpine/musl, adopted 2026-09-06** by operator, alongside the
scanner. `Containerfile` is now the Alpine build; the Debian slim variant is
retired rather than kept as an alternative.

**The release candidate scans completely clean: 0 CRITICAL, 0 HIGH, 0 MEDIUM,
0 LOW.**

It has **not** been pushed. The registry push is the one remaining step and it
requires an action this session was not permitted to take — see "Release status"
at the end.

The history below is kept because it records why the base changed.

## Results

| Image | CRITICAL | HIGH | MEDIUM |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| As pinned before this session (`python:3.12-slim@sha256:d764629c…`, Debian 13.5) | 3 | 81 | 103 |
| `slim-hardened` — base bumped to `@sha256:78387bc3…` (Debian 13.6), pip removed | 3 | 51 | 56 |
| `alpine` — `python:3.12-alpine@sha256:b64631e0…` (Alpine 3.24.1), pip removed | **0** | **7** | **1** |

Every finding is inherited from the base image or its distro packages. None is in
`approval_engine` code, and after removing pip the Python dependency layer
(`cryptography` 50.0.1, `PyJWT` 2.13.0, `waitress` 3.0.2, `cffi`, `pycparser`)
reports zero findings at MEDIUM and above in all three.

## Two fixes applied

**The base pin was stale.** `Containerfile` pinned a Debian 13.5 build of
`python:3.12-slim`; current upstream is Debian 13.6. Bumping the pin removes 30
HIGH and 47 MEDIUM findings on its own. The pin is still a digest, not a tag —
the fix is a newer immutable pin, not a floating one.

**pip is gone from the runtime image.** All 10 MEDIUM Python findings were in
pip itself, which is a build-time tool with no business in a running approval
service. The build is now two-stage: pip installs the venv in the build stage
and is deleted from both the venv and the base's `/usr/local` in the runtime
stage. `command -v pip pip3 pip3.12` returns nothing in both variants.

## The three CRITICALs, and why the base choice is now open

The remaining CRITICALs on Debian are all `perl-base` 5.40.1-6:

- `CVE-2026-13221`
- `CVE-2026-42496`
- `CVE-2026-8376`

**All three have no upstream fix** (trivy reports no fixed version), so no base
bump or package upgrade clears them. `perl-base` is `Essential: yes` on Debian
and is not safely removable. This service does not use perl at any point.

Alpine carries no perl at all, which is why it reports 0 CRITICAL. That makes
the base a real decision rather than a preference:

- **Alpine** clears all three CRITICALs and drops HIGH from 51 to 7, but changes
  the C library from glibc to musl.
- **Debian slim** keeps glibc and ships three unfixable CRITICALs in a package
  the service never calls.

### Evidence that Alpine is viable

- Image builds with no compiler toolchain: `cryptography` 50.0.1 installs from
  musllinux wheels.
- **The full test suite passes on musl: 111 passed**, the same count as the
  workstation. (An earlier run showed 102 passed / 1 skipped; the 9-test gap was
  `tests/test_examples.py` skipping on a missing `jsonschema` test dependency in
  the throwaway container, not a musl failure.)
- Runtime identity `uid=10001(approval) gid=10001(approval)`, non-root.
- Carries `LATEST_SCHEMA_VERSION = 3` and `Engine` tenant default
  `tenant:platform`.
- First-install migration on a fresh volume: `migrate` then `verify` both report
  `schema_version: 3`, `schema_current: true`, `integrity: ["ok"]`,
  `foreign_key_violations: 0`, `persistent: true`.
- Fail-closed gates hold in the image: `serve --production --db :memory:`
  refuses with "production requires a persistent database"; production without
  audit configuration refuses with "production requires authenticated audit
  delivery".

`Containerfile.alpine` holds this variant. It is a **candidate**, not the
sanctioned base — the sanctioned base is still `Containerfile`.

## Why nothing was released

`glas-harness` asked for a scanned immutable image and said to deploy only when
identity and audit requirements pass. The scan gate is not met by the Debian
variant, and pushing it would bake three unfixable CRITICALs into a release
digest that the manifest then pins by hash.

Choosing the runtime C library for a production approval service is also not a
call this repo should make silently. So:

- No push to `forgejo.coulomb.social`.
- `deploy/approval-engine.yaml` still carries `REPLACE_WITH_RELEASE_DIGEST` on
  both image references.
- `APPROVAL-WP-0002-T03` stays `wait`.

Local build digests, recorded for traceability and explicitly **not** release
digests: `slim-hardened` `sha256:78b87e68e520…`, `alpine` `sha256:736647294706…`.

## Both open questions were answered

The operator accepted Alpine/musl as the sanctioned base and trivy as the
sanctioned scanner (2026-09-06). `Containerfile.alpine` was promoted to
`Containerfile`; the Debian variant is retired. The distroless option was never
evaluated and is now moot.

## Clearing the last findings — libuuid

Promoting Alpine left 7 HIGH and 1 MEDIUM, all in `libuuid` 2.42.1-r0 as shipped
by the pinned Alpine 3.24.1, and **all with fixes available** in 2.42.3.

The runtime stage now installs `libuuid>=2.42.3-r1`. That is a version *floor*,
not a floating upgrade: the base stays digest-pinned, the build stays
reproducible, and a vulnerable libuuid fails the build rather than shipping.
After that patch the image scans clean at every severity including LOW.

## Release candidate

Tag `forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/approval-engine:0.1.0`, local image id
`sha256:73333f5ceb55e48192e3095cb2e2a741cdc6ff0be2f18128301072b4a6b6eb9d`.

**This is a local image id, not the release digest.** The release digest is the
registry manifest digest and does not exist until the image is pushed.

Verified on this exact artifact:

| Gate | Result |
| --- | --- |
| Vulnerability scan (trivy, all severities) | 0 findings |
| Runtime identity | `uid=10001(approval) gid=10001(approval)`, non-root |
| pip present | no — `command -v pip pip3` returns nothing |
| Schema | `LATEST_SCHEMA_VERSION = 3` |
| Store tenant default | `tenant:platform` |
| First install, no prior DB | `migrate` then `verify`: schema 3, `schema_current`, `integrity ["ok"]`, 0 FK violations, persistent |
| Restart persistence | re-`verify` on the same volume: `ok=True`, schema 3, integrity ok |
| Production without persistent DB | refused — "production requires a persistent database" |
| Production without audit config | refused — "production requires authenticated audit delivery" |
| Full test suite on musl | 111 passed |
| Manifest inputs | `kubectl apply --dry-run=client` passes |

## Release status — blocked on one permitted action

`docker push forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/approval-engine:0.1.0` was attempted
and **refused by this session's sandbox** as an outward-facing publish. It was
not retried or worked around.

Consequently:

- No release digest exists yet.
- `deploy/approval-engine.yaml` still carries `REPLACE_WITH_RELEASE_DIGEST` on
  both image references. It must be pinned to the registry manifest digest
  returned by the push, never to the tag and never to the local image id above.
- `APPROVAL-WP-0002-T03` stays `wait`.

To finish, an operator runs the push and returns the digest, or re-runs it in a
session permitted to publish:

```
docker push forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/approval-engine:0.1.0
docker inspect --format '{{index .RepoDigests 0}}' \
  forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/approval-engine:0.1.0
```

Then pin both `image:` references in `deploy/approval-engine.yaml` to that
digest. Rollout, restart and restore evidence remain gated on the KeyCape
registrations and the audit sender credential, which are still unmaterialized.