audit-core/tenancy.yaml

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# audit-core tenancy posture
#
# Declared per NetKingdom Tenancy Posture v0.1 (draft-8),
# net-kingdom/canon/standards/tenancy-posture_v0.1.md.
# Location and schema per Decision 5.4; per-path detail per Decision 5.2;
# provider block per Decision 5.5.
#
# Conformance is accuracy, not altitude (§6). Nothing here is claimed above
# what this repo can evidence today. E is deliberately declared lower than the
# mechanism in place because the adversarial artifact is still absent.
schema_version: "0.1"
framework: netkingdom-tenancy-posture
service: audit-core
role: tenant-audit-service
tenancy:
reviewed: "2026-08-17"
review_due: "2027-02-17"
service_class: batch # §8.3.2. Co-resident with latency-critical
# tenant-engine on platform-pg; the mixture is
# reported by the platform, not hidden.
current: { I: 1, A: 2, E: 1, P: 1, R: 2, V: 0 }
implemented: { E: 2 }
target: { I: 1, A: 2, E: 3, P: 1, R: 2, V: 1 }
# §5.2 — declare per path, quote the minimum. The quoted E above is the
# minimum across paths. As of AUDIT-WP-0008-T04 both paths carry the same
# mechanism; the quoted level stays at 1 for the evidence reason in gap.E,
# not because a path is weaker.
paths:
E:
write: 2 # Sender credential bound to the sources and tenants it may
# claim; checked at one choke point (audit_core/ingestion.py).
read: 2 # Event reads filtered to permitted tenants; surfaces with no
# tenant key require full scope. Cross-tenant fetch returns
# 404, not 403, so the surface is not an existence oracle.
placement_exceptions: [] # No tenant is on dedicated substrate. All
# tenants share database audit_core on
# platform-pg.
gap:
I: >-
I1 is accurate and is not currently a target. Senders authenticate with
bearer tokens and the tenant arrives in the request body, checked against
an allowlist bound to the credential (§4.1 places request-supplied tenant
identifiers at I1 however canonical the string). The allowlist is a real
control, but it is an A-axis control; it does not make the identity
verified. Moving to I2 means senders carrying a verified token with a
tenant claim, which is a change to every sender and not audit-core's to
make alone. Recorded as accurate, not as ambition.
A: >-
A2 is accurate. Authorization is a single local boundary — permitted
sources, permitted tenants, may_write, may_read — bound once and centrally.
No flex-auth delegation. A3 is not a near-term target: flex-auth is itself
at A0 on its own self-report (/v1/check authenticates no caller), so
delegating to it today would lower this service's assurance, not raise it.
E: >-
The E2 mechanism is in place on both paths as of AUDIT-WP-0008-T04, and
the quoted level is still 1. This is deliberate. §13.2 states that a
passing CI run is not E2 evidence: the E2 artifact is adversarial, needs
separate tenant contexts compared against each other, and carries a review
date rather than a green build. The repo's cross-tenant tests are
mechanical. Under §13.1 the level is not claimable until that artifact
exists, so E stays at 1 until AUDIT-WP-0008-T05 produces it with
whitehat-security. Declaring E2 on the strength of unit tests would be the
overclaim §6 prohibits, and the read-path defect this repo just fixed was
found precisely by refusing that kind of reasoning.
E_target: >-
E3 (row-level security per rapp-postgres ADR-0003) targeted 2027-03-31.
Blocked behind the E2 artifact — §4.3 requires E2 evidence alongside any
E3 claim — and needs the EXPLAIN comparison first, since RLS disables
functional indexes built on non-leakproof functions. E4 is unreachable at
P1 by the §3.2 coupling and is not a target.
R_ceiling: >-
R4 is unreachable under the current design and is not a target. Per
Decision 4.5.3 — which this repo found — the hash chain commits to a
SHA-256 of the cleartext record, which survives key destruction as a
confirmation oracle over low-entropy fields. A fleet R4 target must exempt
this service explicitly. See docs/erasure-and-audit.md (AUDIT-WP-0008-T03).
credentials: >-
Stated gap against Decision 9.2 rather than a silent exclusion. Database
credentials comply with 9.1: dynamic leases re-read from a mounted Secret
at connection time, no restart on rotation. Ingest credentials do not:
they are static long-lived bearer tokens, rotated overlap-first by
publishing a replacement alongside the incumbent and then dropping the
predecessor. audit-core raised this omission during review and is not
exempting itself from the rule it asked for. No dated remedy yet; leasing
consumer-facing credentials needs a broker path that does not exist.
retention_placement: >-
audit-core's INTENT wants unbounded WORM archive. That is data.archive in
ITC-CAP terms, recorded as an unmet requirement in
data/capability/audit-core-operational.json, and it is deliberately not a
backup-window question: a 30-day WAL window is not an archive, is not
searchable, and restores instance-wide. Reviewed 2026-12-31. If no
data.archive provision is procured by then, audit-core reopens placement
under the §4.5 retention trigger, with P2 as the fallback — a worse answer
than archive, named now so it is not improvised later.
V: >-
No exercise establishes restart recovery for the complete audit path.
V1 is the target; replica count or Kubernetes restart policy is not
treated as evidence.
provider:
capability: operations.audit
profile: administrative
axes:
E:
available: 2
maximum: 3
conditions:
- "E3 requires rapp-postgres ADR-0003 applied to audit_core and its EXPLAIN probe."
- "E4 is unreachable at P1 with one runtime credential."
evidence:
- "audit_core/ingestion.py"
- "tests/test_ingestion.py"
R:
available: 2
maximum: 2
conditions:
- "R4 is unreachable while the integrity chain commits to cleartext hashes."
evidence:
- "rapp-postgres/consumers/audit-core.yaml"
- "audit_core/interface.py"
V:
available: 0
maximum: 1
conditions:
- "Exercise restart recovery across audit-core, platform-pg and OpenBao."
evidence:
A2:
- "audit_core/ingestion.py"
- "tests/test_ingestion.py"
E1:
- "audit_core/postgres_backend.py"
- "tests/test_backend_conformance.py"
P1: "rapp-postgres/docs/evidence/isolation-2026-08-10.md"
R2:
- "rapp-postgres/consumers/audit-core.yaml"
- "tests/test_interface.py"