166 lines
8.5 KiB
Markdown
166 lines
8.5 KiB
Markdown
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# Bounded-executor execution-attribution receipts — owner answer
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Answers NetKingdom NK-WP-0056-T02 (owner request
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`net-kingdom/docs/proposals/2026-10-31-nk56-t02-owner-requests.md`, section
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"audit-core"; hub message `755cbeed-ecbd-46d9-883e-958fbd88378b`). Reviewed
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2026-10-31 against `net-kingdom/canon/standards/bounded-execution-admission_v0.1.md`
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section 6 and `playbook-capability-contract_v0.2.md` "Execution Attribution
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Receipt (proposed)". Work: AUDIT-WP-0018. Canonical receipt validation remains
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AUDIT-WP-0014-T02.
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This is an owner proposal. It activates nothing: registration, ingress and the
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sender bearer require the owner deliveries and the approved live change listed
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at the end.
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## Answer 1 — will audit-core hold the receipts?
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Yes. Audit-core accepts the evidence-holder role for the bounded executor's
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receipts, as it already did for NK-WP-0040 (`docs/cross-repo-evidence-admission.md`,
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"Execution-attribution receipts"). What changes is the emitter: no longer a
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Railiance component but the NetKingdom-written executor, deployed by the new
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`rapp-*` package, running as `service:nk-bind-executor` in namespace `sso`.
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Holding means what it means for every other sender (`docs/event-envelope.md`):
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audit-core authenticates the sender, checks source and tenant against the
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registered identity, stores the event verbatim, and chains it. It records that
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the executor *said* the run happened this way. It does not decide whether the
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`decision_refs` authorized the run, and it does not authenticate the initiator
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chain. That check belongs to the independent verifier in BEA section 6
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("Verify"), which reads the receipt from audit-core and compares it with the
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carrier record.
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Until AUDIT-WP-0014-T02 ships canonical schema validation, an accepted receipt
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is generic JSON custody, not a schema-validated receipt. Audit-core will not
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describe it otherwise.
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## Answer 2 — one event, or separate events by `run_id`?
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Both, in a fixed shape: **one receipt event per run carries all per-step detail**,
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plus **one `started` event** emitted when the executor has consumed the approval and
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before it takes its first step. Do not split steps into separate events.
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Why the steps stay inside the receipt:
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- The envelope stores `data` verbatim as one object (`docs/event-envelope.md`).
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Per-step outcomes, check results, revert yes/no and budget used are the
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sender's claims. They belong in `data`, where they read as claims. The stored
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`outcome` is always `recorded` and `actor` is always `null`
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(`docs/event-envelope.md`, "What the receiver derives").
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- One receipt is the retained evidence unit. BEA section 6 says the receipt is
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"kept by hash". If steps were split into separate events, nobody could tell
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whether a step event was missing without a declared count. The receipt would
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then become a reconstruction, not a record.
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- The validator then sees one document, so `decision_refs`, budget and step
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list are checked together.
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Why a separate `started` event is still needed: a receipt is emitted at the end
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of a run. If the executor crashes mid-run after it has consumed its single
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approval, it emits nothing. Without a second event, a run that partly executed
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leaves no record in custody. With a `started` event, a `started` that has no
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matching receipt after the admission window is detectable. Both events share the
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`run_id`.
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## Event mapping (proposal)
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Both events use the existing eight-field envelope. No envelope change is needed.
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| Envelope field | `started` event | Receipt event |
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| --- | --- | --- |
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| `type` | `execution.run.started` | `execution.attribution.receipt` |
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| `id` / `Idempotency-Key` | `run:<run_id>:started` | `run:<run_id>:receipt` |
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| `source` | `net-kingdom.bounded-executor` (exact; emitter confirms) | same |
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| `subject` | `admission:<spec.id>` | same |
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| `tenant` | the admission's tenant, exact string (owner-bound, never inferred from namespace) | same; must equal `data.tenant` |
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| `correlation_id` | `<run_id>` | `<run_id>` |
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| `occurred_at` | consume time, offset-aware | `time_interval.end`, offset-aware |
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| `data` | `run_id`, `admission_id`, `admission_digest`, `approval_ref`, `executing_workload`, `runtime_principal`, `plan_digest`, `steps_planned` | the canonical receipt (below) |
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Each `id` is derived deterministically from `run_id`. A retry is therefore a
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`200` duplicate. A second, different body under the same id is a `409` conflict
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(`audit_core/ingestion.py` response table), which exposes reuse of a run id.
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Proposed receipt `data`. The schema belongs to NetKingdom (NK-WP-0040-T02);
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this lists what audit-core needs to see in it:
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```json
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{
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"receipt_version": "<canonical schema version>",
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"run_id": "…",
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"initiator": {"iss": "…", "sub": "admin"},
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"executing_workload": "service:nk-bind-executor",
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"runtime_principal": "system:serviceaccount:sso:<sa>",
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"tenant": "…",
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"environment": "…",
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"source_commit": "<plan.source.commit>",
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"artifact_digest": "<plan_digest>",
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"target": "<admission-level target>",
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"action": "bounded-execution",
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"decision_refs": [
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{"kind": "admission", "id": "<spec.id>"},
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{"kind": "admission_digest", "id": "sha256:…"},
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{"kind": "approval", "id": "<carrier approval reference>"}
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],
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"time_interval": {"start": "…+00:00", "end": "…+00:00", "clock_source": "…"},
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"steps": [
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{"index": 1, "operation": "…", "target": "…", "action": "…",
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"outcome": "succeeded|failed|skipped",
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"checks": [{"id": "…", "result": "pass|fail|unknown"}]}
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],
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"reverted": false,
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"budget": {"limit": {"…": 0}, "used": {"…": 0}},
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"outcome": "succeeded|failed|reverted"
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}
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```
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The points that fit the existing model and need NetKingdom to decide:
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1. **`target`/`action` are singular in the canonical field list but per-step in
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BEA section 6.** Proposal: the receipt-level `target` is the admission's
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target and the receipt-level `action` is `bounded-execution`. Each step's
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target and action go in `steps[]`. Audit-core needs one answer in the schema.
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It will not pick one.
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2. **`decision_refs` must be typed.** The admission id, the admission digest and
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the approval reference are three different things. An untyped list cannot
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be checked against the carrier.
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3. **`delegation` stays absent** when there is none. `time_interval.bound` stays
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absent when no bound is established. Unknown attribution stays the explicit
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`unknown`. This is unchanged from `docs/cross-repo-evidence-admission.md`.
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4. **Check results carry an id and a result only.** They carry no response
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bodies, tokens, password values or LLDAP/OpenBao payloads.
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## Registration (proposal)
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| Registry field | Proposed value | Reason |
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| --- | --- | --- |
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| `name` | `nk-bounded-executor` | one identity per executor deployment |
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| `sources` | `["net-kingdom.bounded-executor"]` | exact, no wildcard |
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| `tenants` | the exact admission tenant(s) | not `*`; the executor acts for named tenants only |
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| `may_write` / `may_read` | `true` / `false` | the verifier reads with its own read identity |
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| `secret_policy` | `reject` | a receipt is kept by hash. If audit-core redacted it silently, the stored body would no longer match the hash the executor computed, so a secret-shaped field must refuse the event (`400 secret_shaped_field`). The executor treats that as a defect |
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| `evidence_kind` | `load-bearing`, if the `started` + receipt pair is adopted. Otherwise `attributive` with an explicit `completeness_trade` | the pair is what makes a missing receipt detectable |
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Ingress: a new NetworkPolicy in `deploy/networkpolicies.yaml` admitting
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namespace `sso` and the executor's exact pod labels, following
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`audit-core-tenant-engine-ingress`. Do not admit the whole `sso` namespace,
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because Authelia, LLDAP and KeyCape run there too. The bearer is
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ESO-projected by railiance-platform, like the other in-cluster senders. No token
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value appears in this repository.
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## What audit-core needs back
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- **NetKingdom (NK-WP-0040-T02 / NK-WP-0056):**
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- the versioned receipt schema, validator, path and digest, with positive and
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negative fixtures, covering `steps`, `reverted`, `budget` and the typed
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`decision_refs`;
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- an answer to point 1;
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- the exact `source` and event types;
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- the tenant binding;
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- a decision on the `started` event and the emission guarantee.
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- **The rapp-\* package owner:** the exact pod labels and ServiceAccount, and
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the image revision that emits.
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- **railiance-platform:** the ESO projection of the sender bearer
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(catalog/route via `warden route`), and the attended seed of the registry
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entry.
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- **Founder:** the live registry entry and NetworkPolicy rollout are an approved
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live change. Audit-core prepares them; the founder runs them.
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