audit-core/deploy/networkpolicies.yaml

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Add deployment manifests, custody-class guard and request counters AUDIT-WP-0005-T03 (progress). Manifests validated --dry-run=server --validate=strict against railiance01; not applied, since deployment is gated on RAPP-POSTGRES-WP-0002 and T02 credentials. Nothing here mutates the cluster. Conventions read off the deployed user-engine workload rather than invented: digest-pinned image from forgejo.coulomb.social, runAsNonRoot with RuntimeDefault seccomp, no privilege escalation, all capabilities dropped, readOnlyRootFilesystem, probes on a named http port, same resource envelope. The namespace carries railiance.io/postgres-client: platform-pg, which is what platform-pg-consumer-ingress in rapp-postgres admits; without that label the pod cannot reach the database at all. NetworkPolicies default-deny both directions, then permit ingress from the user-engine namespace only, a separately labelled operator read path, and egress to PostgreSQL in databases plus DNS. Three decisions worth naming. Liveness is /healthz while readiness is /readyz, so a database outage drops the pod from the Service rather than restarting it in a loop. readOnlyRootFilesystem enforces the empty-filesystem property rather than trusting it, so the SQLite fallback physically cannot accumulate audit records on ephemeral storage. AUDIT_CORE_REQUIRE_CUSTODY_CLASS=archive makes a missing database URL a startup failure instead of a silent downgrade to the development store. Counters deferred from WP-0004-T06 are exposed as JSON at /v1/stats behind the read privilege, not as Prometheus exposition format: the cluster runs no Prometheus, no ServiceMonitor CRD and no other scrape target, so an exposition endpoint would target a scrape path that does not exist. Usable with curl now and a small step from /metrics later. Tests 77 -> 80. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-10 17:42:43 +02:00
# Default-deny plus the narrowest set of exceptions (AUDIT-WP-0005-T03).
#
# The receiver holds the audit trail, so reachability is part of its threat
# model: only the declared sender may write, and only the declared operator
# path may read.
---
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: audit-core-default-deny
namespace: audit-core
spec:
podSelector: {}
policyTypes: [Ingress, Egress]
# No rules: everything not permitted below is denied.
---
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: audit-core-sender-ingress
namespace: audit-core
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: audit-core
policyTypes: [Ingress]
ingress:
# user-engine is the only sender. A second sender is a deliberate change
# here and a matching entry in AUDIT_CORE_SENDERS — the network rule and
# the credential binding must move together.
- from:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
kubernetes.io/metadata.name: user-engine
ports:
- {protocol: TCP, port: 8080}
---
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: audit-core-operator-ingress
namespace: audit-core
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: audit-core
policyTypes: [Ingress]
ingress:
# Operator read path: lookup, dead letters, secret findings, stats.
# Namespace-scoped rather than open, and still gated on a credential
# carrying may_read — the network rule is the outer of two checks, not the
# only one.
- from:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
railiance.io/audit-core-reader: "true"
ports:
- {protocol: TCP, port: 8080}
---
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: audit-core-egress
namespace: audit-core
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: audit-core
policyTypes: [Egress]
egress:
# PostgreSQL custody store. This is the only destination the receiver needs;
# it calls no other service.
- to:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
kubernetes.io/metadata.name: databases
ports:
- {protocol: TCP, port: 5432}
- to:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
kubernetes.io/metadata.name: kube-system
ports:
- {protocol: UDP, port: 53}
- {protocol: TCP, port: 53}