AUDIT-WP-0009-T03/T09 — evidence_kind, and approval-engine's registration inputs
All checks were successful
CI Smoke / host-smoke (push) Successful in 0s
CI Smoke / container-smoke (push) Successful in 2s

T03. §9.6 gives load-bearing and attributive sources different obligations, so
the archive must record which one a source declared rather than infer it from
traffic. evidence_kind and completeness_trade now sit on SenderIdentity, the
AUDIT_CORE_SENDERS schema, and the non-secret scope overlay.

Two asymmetries are deliberate. The default is attributive, because the other
default would have audit-core imply a completeness obligation no source ever
accepted. And the overlay may raise the kind but never lower it — the same
principle that stops an ExternalSecret refresh shrinking user-engine's
tenants: a ConfigMap refresh must not drop a source's atomicity and detection
obligations without anyone deciding to. A load-bearing source may not carry a
completeness trade at all, since §9.6 requires atomicity of it, and
evidence_declaration() reports completeness_claimed: false for both kinds.

T09 (in progress). approval-engine's registration inputs are prepared and
recorded in docs/approval-engine-source-registration.md: scope entry declared
load-bearing, and audit-core-approval-engine-ingress with namespace and pod
label ANDed in one `from` peer — narrower than user-engine's namespace-only
rule, which is left unchanged. The scope entry lands ahead of the credential
because the overlay only applies to senders the Secret already carries, so it
admits nothing until the token exists; a test asserts that rather than
trusting the reading.

Two inputs remain approval-engine's: a confirmed tenant scope, since senders.py
requires a missing tenant restriction be justified per sender and audit-core
cannot justify it on another repo's behalf, and an explicit secret_policy
choice. Applying the manifests is an operator action.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0185wifnLzCxjEY2MT1XbK7L

Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 713962@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 2718d99d-d3ff-478f-83a2-3a30f01a02fc
This commit is contained in:
tegwick 2026-09-06 22:31:37 +02:00
parent a07c52e34a
commit 15e54369be
10 changed files with 592 additions and 21 deletions

View file

@ -103,11 +103,19 @@ effect of its own.
freshness window. Until `AUDIT-WP-0009-T02` schedules attestation, the
honest answer in production is `false` — the overclaim is gone, the
precondition is not yet met.
- No cadence, heartbeat, reconciliation, or load-bearing classification exists.
The §9.6 obligations Audit Core argued for are not yet supportable by Audit
Core.
- `approval-engine` is not yet registered as a source.
- No negative test asserts the absence of an approval-validity surface.
- No cadence, heartbeat, or reconciliation surface exists. The §9.6 detection
obligations Audit Core argued for are not yet supportable by Audit Core, so
a suppressed load-bearing event still produces silence
(`AUDIT-WP-0009-T04`/`T05`/`T06`).
- Load-bearing classification **does** now exist: `evidence_kind` on
`SenderIdentity` and the registration schema, defaulting to `attributive`
(`AUDIT-WP-0009-T03`, closed 2026-09-06).
- `approval-engine` registration inputs are prepared and inert pending its
token, a confirmed tenant scope, and an operator apply —
`docs/approval-engine-source-registration.md` (`AUDIT-WP-0009-T09`).
- ~~No negative test asserts the absence of an approval-validity surface.~~
**Closed 2026-09-06 (`AUDIT-WP-0009-T08`)**,
`tests/test_approval_validity_prohibition.py`.
## Getting Oriented

View file

@ -25,6 +25,19 @@ from audit_core.redaction import POLICIES, POLICY_REDACT
WILDCARD = "*"
# §9.6 evidence kinds. The obligations differ, so the archive must record
# which one a source declared rather than infer it from traffic.
#
# load-bearing: a control's soundness depends on the event being present, so
# the source owes emission atomicity and a detection surface (heartbeat or
# reconciliation) for rare classes.
# attributive: the trail is useful but no control depends on its completeness,
# which is what lets a deliberately non-atomic trail stay legitimate — while
# it is declared, and never described as complete.
EVIDENCE_LOAD_BEARING = "load-bearing"
EVIDENCE_ATTRIBUTIVE = "attributive"
EVIDENCE_KINDS = (EVIDENCE_LOAD_BEARING, EVIDENCE_ATTRIBUTIVE)
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class SenderIdentity:
@ -44,6 +57,17 @@ class SenderIdentity:
# legitimate event is not lost over one field; a higher-assurance channel
# can be set to reject instead (AUDIT-WP-0004-T04).
secret_policy: str = POLICY_REDACT
# §9.6 evidence kind (AUDIT-WP-0009-T03). Defaults to ``attributive`` on
# purpose: a source that has not declared must not be silently treated as
# load-bearing, because that would let audit-core imply a completeness
# obligation the source never accepted. Declaring load-bearing is an
# explicit act by the source and its owner.
evidence_kind: str = EVIDENCE_ATTRIBUTIVE
# The trade an attributive source has deliberately made — typically
# emitting after commit rather than inside the state-change transaction.
# §9.6 requires the trade be declared where the trail is documented, so it
# travels with the identity rather than living only in prose.
completeness_trade: str | None = None
def __post_init__(self) -> None:
if not self.name:
@ -59,6 +83,43 @@ class SenderIdentity:
raise ValueError(f"sender {self.name!r} needs at least one permitted source")
if self.expires_at is not None and self.expires_at.tzinfo is None:
raise ValueError(f"sender {self.name!r}: expires_at must include a timezone")
if self.evidence_kind not in EVIDENCE_KINDS:
raise ValueError(
f"sender {self.name!r}: evidence_kind must be one of "
f"{EVIDENCE_KINDS}, got {self.evidence_kind!r}"
)
if self.completeness_trade is not None and not str(self.completeness_trade).strip():
raise ValueError(
f"sender {self.name!r}: completeness_trade must say what the trade "
"is, or be omitted"
)
if self.is_load_bearing and self.completeness_trade is not None:
# A load-bearing source has no trade to make: §9.6 requires
# atomicity of it. Carrying a declared trade alongside would
# record a contradiction as though it were a policy.
raise ValueError(
f"sender {self.name!r}: a load-bearing source may not declare a "
"completeness_trade — §9.6 requires emission atomicity of it"
)
@property
def is_load_bearing(self) -> bool:
return self.evidence_kind == EVIDENCE_LOAD_BEARING
def evidence_declaration(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""What audit-core will say about this source's stream.
Deliberately states the bound rather than only the kind. Neither kind
licenses the claim that the archive proves an event occurred, or that
absence proves it did not (§9.6).
"""
return {
"sender": self.name,
"evidence_kind": self.evidence_kind,
"completeness_claimed": False,
"completeness_trade": self.completeness_trade,
"detection_surface": None,
}
def permits_source(self, source: str) -> bool:
return WILDCARD in self.sources or source in self.sources
@ -221,11 +282,37 @@ def _apply_scope_overlay(
),
secret_policy=identity.secret_policy,
expires_at=identity.expires_at,
evidence_kind=_overlay_evidence_kind(identity, extra),
completeness_trade=(
_clean_trade(extra["completeness_trade"])
if "completeness_trade" in extra
else identity.completeness_trade
),
)
)
return merged
def _overlay_evidence_kind(identity: SenderIdentity, extra: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
"""Let the overlay raise the evidence kind, never lower it.
Same principle as tenants: the ConfigMap is the authority for non-secret
policy, but a refresh must not be able to quietly weaken a declaration.
Downgrading a load-bearing source to attributive would drop its atomicity
and detection obligations without anyone deciding to, so it is refused
here and has to be a deliberate change to the Secret-backed declaration.
"""
declared = str(extra.get("evidence_kind") or identity.evidence_kind)
if declared == identity.evidence_kind:
return declared
if identity.is_load_bearing and declared == EVIDENCE_ATTRIBUTIVE:
raise ValueError(
f"sender {identity.name!r}: the scope overlay may not downgrade a "
"load-bearing source to attributive"
)
return declared
def _parse_identities(raw: str) -> list[SenderIdentity]:
try:
entries = json.loads(raw)
@ -249,9 +336,17 @@ def _identity_from(entry: Any) -> SenderIdentity:
may_read=bool(entry.get("may_read", False)),
secret_policy=str(entry.get("secret_policy", POLICY_REDACT)),
expires_at=_parse_expiry(entry.get("expires_at")),
evidence_kind=str(entry.get("evidence_kind", EVIDENCE_ATTRIBUTIVE)),
completeness_trade=_clean_trade(entry.get("completeness_trade")),
)
def _clean_trade(value: Any) -> str | None:
if value in (None, ""):
return None
return str(value)
def _parse_expiry(value: Any) -> datetime | None:
if value in (None, ""):
return None

View file

@ -63,6 +63,36 @@ spec:
---
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: audit-core-approval-engine-ingress
namespace: audit-core
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: audit-core
policyTypes: [Ingress]
ingress:
# AUDIT-WP-0009-T09 / AUDIT-IN-0001. Load-bearing approval evidence
# (§9.4). Both selectors belong to one peer and are therefore ANDed:
# only the approval-engine workload in its own namespace reaches this
# port. Splitting them into two list items would turn AND into OR and
# admit every pod in either set.
#
# Narrower than user-engine's namespace-only rule on purpose: this is a
# new sender, and a new rule should not inherit an older rule's breadth.
# user-engine's policy is deliberately left unchanged.
- from:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
kubernetes.io/metadata.name: approval-engine
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: approval-engine
ports:
- {protocol: TCP, port: 8080}
---
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: audit-core-operator-ingress
namespace: audit-core

View file

@ -1,9 +1,25 @@
[
{
"name": "user-engine",
"sources": ["user-engine"],
"tenants": ["*"],
"sources": [
"user-engine"
],
"tenants": [
"*"
],
"may_write": true,
"may_read": false
},
{
"name": "approval-engine",
"sources": [
"approval-engine"
],
"tenants": [
"*"
],
"may_write": true,
"may_read": false,
"evidence_kind": "load-bearing"
}
]

View file

@ -2,6 +2,14 @@
# audit-core-senders. This ConfigMap is the authority for tenants/sources
# so an ExternalSecret refresh cannot revert user-engine to a single tenant.
# Keep in lockstep with deploy/senders-scope.json.
#
# The overlay only ever applies to a sender the Secret already carries, so an
# entry here for a sender with no token yet is inert. That is what makes the
# approval-engine entry safe to land ahead of its credential.
#
# evidence_kind may be raised here (attributive -> load-bearing) but never
# lowered: a ConfigMap refresh must not be able to drop a source's §9.6
# atomicity and detection obligations without anyone deciding to.
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: ConfigMap
@ -19,5 +27,13 @@ data:
"tenants": ["*"],
"may_write": true,
"may_read": false
},
{
"name": "approval-engine",
"sources": ["approval-engine"],
"tenants": ["*"],
"may_write": true,
"may_read": false,
"evidence_kind": "load-bearing"
}
]

View file

@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
# approval-engine source registration
`AUDIT-WP-0009-T09` · intake `AUDIT-IN-0001` · statute §9.4, §9.6
The registration inputs for `approval-engine` as a distinct audit source,
onboarded under `INTENT.md` principle 4 — declared ownership, retention,
access, export and evidence policy, not merely events arriving.
This file is the owner-side record. Everything in it is non-secret. No sender
token appears here, in Git, in State Hub, or in a workplan.
## Declaration
| Field | Value |
| --- | --- |
| Sender name | `approval-engine` |
| Permitted `source` | `approval-engine` (exact; no wildcard) |
| `evidence_kind` | **`load-bearing`** (§9.4 — a control's soundness depends on the revocation event being present) |
| `completeness_trade` | none, and none is permitted — §9.6 requires emission atomicity of a load-bearing source |
| `may_write` | true |
| `may_read` | false — a source does not gain a read surface by emitting |
| `secret_policy` | `redact` (estate default; see below) |
| `tenants` | `["*"]`**proposed, needs approval-engine's confirmation** |
| Retention | no expiry set; recoverable history is the platform `data.backup` window, 30 days, `measured` |
| Custody class | `operational` — never `archive`, never WORM |
### Event classes
The four §9.4 classes, carried as distinct actions on one source:
| Class | Why it matters |
| --- | --- |
| issuance | the approval came into being |
| use | single consumption, a state change owned by `approval-engine` |
| supersession | the prior approval stopped being current |
| revocation | **the acute one** — the most valuable event to suppress |
Audit Core stores all four and derives nothing from them. It renders no verdict
on whether an approval is still valid (§9.4), asserted by test in
`tests/test_approval_validity_prohibition.py`.
### The `tenants` value is the one input still owed
`["*"]` is proposed because approval issuance is not obviously tenant-
partitioned, and the alternative — an explicit tenant list — cannot be invented
here. `audit_core/senders.py` states that omitting a tenant restriction "should
be justified per sender, not adopted by default", so this needs
`approval-engine` to either confirm the wildcard with its reasoning or supply
the list. Tenant identifiers are opaque to Audit Core; their shape is owned by
the IAM Profile and `tenant-engine`.
### `secret_policy`
`redact` accepts the event and redacts a secret-shaped field, so a legitimate
event is not lost over one field. For a load-bearing source that trade is worth
re-examining: `reject` refuses the event instead, which for approvals converts a
redactable field into a delivery failure the source must retry. `redact` is the
recommendation — losing a revocation record is worse than storing it with one
field redacted — but it is `approval-engine`'s call to make explicitly rather
than inherit.
## Applied in this repository
| Input | Where |
| --- | --- |
| Non-secret scope | `deploy/senders-scope.json` + `deploy/senders-scope.yaml` (lockstep) |
| Receiver ingress | `deploy/networkpolicies.yaml`, `audit-core-approval-engine-ingress` |
| Evidence kind in the model | `audit_core/senders.py`, `SenderIdentity.evidence_kind` |
The scope overlay only applies to a sender the Secret already carries, so this
entry is **inert until the token exists**. That is what makes it safe to land
ahead of the credential rather than in the same change.
The ingress rule is narrower than `user-engine`'s: namespace **and** pod label
in a single `from` peer, so both are ANDed. A new sender should not inherit an
older rule's breadth. `user-engine`'s sender and its policy are unchanged.
## Still owed by others
| Input | Owner | Note |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Token at `approval-engine/approval-engine-audit`, key `audit-token` | OpenBao (`railiance-platform`), routed via `warden route` | Audit Core never holds or transports it |
| `tenants` confirmation | `approval-engine` | see above |
| `secret_policy` confirmation | `approval-engine` | see above |
| Applying the manifests to `railiance01` | operator | Audit Core does not apply cluster changes unprompted |
## What Audit Core will and will not claim about this stream
Stated here because §9.6 requires the bound to travel with the trail, and
because a load-bearing source will otherwise be told less than it needs.
**Will:** every event it accepted is stored append-only, and the hash chain
detects alteration or truncation of what it received.
**Will not:** that the archive proves an approval event occurred, or that the
absence of one proves it did not. Completeness at the boundary is
`approval-engine`'s obligation and an archive cannot retrofit it.
### Open gates, and which of them block what
| Gate | Blocks admission? | What it actually bounds |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `T02` attestation scheduling | **No** | Evidence *quality*, not custody. See below. |
| `T04` heartbeat / missing-heartbeat findings | No | Detection of adversarial omission for rare classes — the one that matters most for revocation |
| `T06` reconciliation counts | No | The source's own ability to detect divergence |
| `T05` declared cadence | No | Held deliberately on the §17 Taxonomy schema |
**T02 is an evidence-quality gate, not an admission or deployment blocker.**
Admission depends on identity, scope, ingress and a token. Attestation freshness
governs what Audit Core may *claim*, not whether it accepts and durably stores.
The append-only trigger and hash chain operate regardless; what a stale
attestation removes is detection of a suffix rewrite by someone who owns the
database. Since `AUDIT-WP-0009-T01`, `/readyz` reports `tamper_evidence: false`
rather than overclaiming, and will keep doing so until T02 mounts a renewed
attestation.
It also is not the gate that matters most here. §9.6 is explicit that the acute
risk for approvals is **omission**, and tamper evidence does not address
omission at all — T04 does. So a consumer waiting on T02 before trusting
approval evidence would be waiting on the wrong control. Until T04 and T06
land, Audit Core cannot detect a suppressed revocation, and no reading of the
chain, attested or not, changes that.

View file

@ -1,30 +1,67 @@
[
{
"name": "user-engine",
"tokens": ["replace-with-write-token"],
"sources": ["user-engine"],
"tenants": ["*"],
"tokens": [
"replace-with-write-token"
],
"sources": [
"user-engine"
],
"tenants": [
"*"
],
"may_write": true,
"may_read": false,
"secret_policy": "redact"
"secret_policy": "redact",
"evidence_kind": "attributive",
"completeness_trade": "illustrative: emission is after commit, so a crash between the two loses the event"
},
{
"name": "operator",
"tokens": ["replace-with-read-token"],
"sources": ["user-engine"],
"tenants": ["*"],
"tokens": [
"replace-with-read-token"
],
"sources": [
"user-engine"
],
"tenants": [
"*"
],
"may_write": true,
"may_read": true,
"secret_policy": "redact"
},
{
"name": "temporary-evidence-sender",
"tokens": ["replace-with-short-lived-token"],
"sources": ["whitehat-security"],
"tenants": ["tenant:trial:named-fixture"],
"tokens": [
"replace-with-short-lived-token"
],
"sources": [
"whitehat-security"
],
"tenants": [
"tenant:trial:named-fixture"
],
"may_write": true,
"may_read": true,
"secret_policy": "redact",
"expires_at": "2026-08-22T18:15:00Z"
"expires_at": "2026-08-22T18:15:00Z",
"evidence_kind": "attributive"
},
{
"name": "approval-engine",
"tokens": [
"replace-with-write-token"
],
"sources": [
"approval-engine"
],
"tenants": [
"*"
],
"may_write": true,
"may_read": false,
"secret_policy": "redact",
"evidence_kind": "load-bearing"
}
]

View file

@ -24,3 +24,38 @@ def test_whitehat_ingress_is_bound_to_namespace_and_target_labels():
assert expected_peer in policy
assert policy.count(" - namespaceSelector:") == 1
assert " - {protocol: TCP, port: 8080}" in policy
def test_approval_engine_ingress_is_bound_to_namespace_and_pod_labels():
"""AUDIT-WP-0009-T09. A load-bearing source gets a narrow rule, not a wide one."""
documents = (ROOT / "deploy" / "networkpolicies.yaml").read_text().split("\n---\n")
policy = next(
document
for document in documents
if "name: audit-core-approval-engine-ingress" in document
)
# One `from` peer holding both selectors. Two list items would be OR, and
# would admit every pod in the approval-engine namespace plus every pod
# anywhere carrying the app label.
expected_peer = """ - namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
kubernetes.io/metadata.name: approval-engine
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: approval-engine"""
assert expected_peer in policy
assert policy.count(" - namespaceSelector:") == 1
assert " - {protocol: TCP, port: 8080}" in policy
def test_user_engine_sender_ingress_is_unchanged_by_the_new_sender():
"""glas-harness asked for user-engine's sender to stay as it is."""
documents = (ROOT / "deploy" / "networkpolicies.yaml").read_text().split("\n---\n")
policy = next(
document
for document in documents
if "name: audit-core-sender-ingress" in document
)
assert "kubernetes.io/metadata.name: user-engine" in policy
assert "approval-engine" not in policy

View file

@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ from pathlib import Path
import pytest
from audit_core.senders import SenderRegistry, WILDCARD
from audit_core.senders import SenderIdentity, SenderRegistry, WILDCARD
ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
SCOPE_FILE = ROOT / "deploy" / "senders-scope.json"
@ -158,3 +158,164 @@ def test_invalid_scope_overlay_is_a_startup_error():
SenderRegistry.from_env(
{"AUDIT_CORE_SENDERS": secret, "AUDIT_CORE_SENDERS_SCOPE": "{}"}
)
# --- AUDIT-WP-0009-T03: §9.6 evidence kind ---------------------------------
def test_evidence_kind_defaults_to_attributive():
"""A source that has not declared must not be treated as load-bearing.
The other default would have audit-core imply a completeness obligation no
source ever accepted.
"""
identity = SenderIdentity(
name="quiet", tokens=("t",), sources=frozenset({"quiet"})
)
assert identity.evidence_kind == "attributive"
assert identity.is_load_bearing is False
def test_load_bearing_is_an_explicit_declaration():
identity = SenderIdentity(
name="approval-engine",
tokens=("t",),
sources=frozenset({"approval-engine"}),
evidence_kind="load-bearing",
)
assert identity.is_load_bearing is True
def test_unknown_evidence_kind_is_refused():
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="evidence_kind must be one of"):
SenderIdentity(
name="x", tokens=("t",), sources=frozenset({"x"}), evidence_kind="best-effort"
)
def test_attributive_source_carries_its_declared_trade():
identity = SenderIdentity(
name="tenant-engine",
tokens=("t",),
sources=frozenset({"tenant-engine"}),
completeness_trade="drain is non-blocking; emission is after commit",
)
declaration = identity.evidence_declaration()
assert declaration["completeness_trade"].startswith("drain is non-blocking")
# Neither kind licenses a completeness claim (§9.6).
assert declaration["completeness_claimed"] is False
def test_load_bearing_source_may_not_declare_a_trade():
"""§9.6 requires atomicity of it, so there is no trade to record."""
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="may not declare a completeness_trade"):
SenderIdentity(
name="approval-engine",
tokens=("t",),
sources=frozenset({"approval-engine"}),
evidence_kind="load-bearing",
completeness_trade="emits after commit",
)
def test_blank_trade_is_refused_rather_than_stored():
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="completeness_trade must say what"):
SenderIdentity(
name="x", tokens=("t",), sources=frozenset({"x"}), completeness_trade=" "
)
def test_registration_schema_carries_evidence_kind():
registry = SenderRegistry.from_env({
"AUDIT_CORE_SENDERS": json.dumps([
{
"name": "approval-engine",
"tokens": ["tok"],
"sources": ["approval-engine"],
"tenants": ["*"],
"evidence_kind": "load-bearing",
},
{
"name": "tenant-engine",
"tokens": ["tok2"],
"sources": ["tenant-engine"],
"tenants": ["*"],
"completeness_trade": "non-blocking drain",
},
])
})
by_name = {i.name: i for i in registry.identities}
assert by_name["approval-engine"].is_load_bearing is True
assert by_name["tenant-engine"].is_load_bearing is False
assert by_name["tenant-engine"].completeness_trade == "non-blocking drain"
def test_scope_overlay_may_raise_the_evidence_kind():
registry = SenderRegistry.from_env({
"AUDIT_CORE_SENDERS": json.dumps(
[{"name": "approval-engine", "tokens": ["tok"], "sources": ["approval-engine"]}]
),
"AUDIT_CORE_SENDERS_SCOPE": json.dumps(
[{"name": "approval-engine", "evidence_kind": "load-bearing"}]
),
})
assert registry.identities[0].is_load_bearing is True
def test_scope_overlay_may_not_downgrade_a_load_bearing_source():
"""A ConfigMap refresh must not quietly drop atomicity obligations."""
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="may not downgrade"):
SenderRegistry.from_env({
"AUDIT_CORE_SENDERS": json.dumps([{
"name": "approval-engine",
"tokens": ["tok"],
"sources": ["approval-engine"],
"evidence_kind": "load-bearing",
}]),
"AUDIT_CORE_SENDERS_SCOPE": json.dumps(
[{"name": "approval-engine", "evidence_kind": "attributive"}]
),
})
# --- AUDIT-WP-0009-T09: approval-engine registration inputs ----------------
SCOPE_CONFIGMAP = ROOT / "deploy" / "senders-scope.yaml"
def test_declared_scope_and_configmap_stay_in_lockstep():
"""The header says to keep them in lockstep; nothing asserted it."""
yaml = pytest.importorskip("yaml")
embedded = yaml.safe_load(SCOPE_CONFIGMAP.read_text())["data"]["senders-scope.json"]
assert json.loads(embedded) == json.loads(SCOPE_FILE.read_text())
def test_approval_engine_is_declared_load_bearing():
scope = json.loads(SCOPE_FILE.read_text())
entry = next(e for e in scope if e["name"] == "approval-engine")
assert entry["evidence_kind"] == "load-bearing"
assert entry["sources"] == ["approval-engine"]
# A source does not gain a read surface by emitting.
assert entry["may_read"] is False
# §9.6 permits no completeness trade for a load-bearing source.
assert "completeness_trade" not in entry
assert "tokens" not in entry and "token" not in entry
def test_a_scope_entry_without_a_token_admits_nothing():
"""What makes it safe to land approval-engine's scope ahead of its credential."""
registry = SenderRegistry.from_env({
"AUDIT_CORE_SENDERS": json.dumps(
[{"name": "user-engine", "tokens": ["live"], "sources": ["user-engine"]}]
),
"AUDIT_CORE_SENDERS_SCOPE_PATH": str(SCOPE_FILE),
})
assert [i.name for i in registry.identities] == ["user-engine"]
assert registry.authenticate("Bearer live").name == "user-engine"
def test_user_engine_evidence_kind_is_not_asserted_on_its_behalf():
"""Undeclared means attributive by default, not a claim audit-core made."""
scope = json.loads(SCOPE_FILE.read_text())
entry = next(e for e in scope if e["name"] == "user-engine")
assert "evidence_kind" not in entry

View file

@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ and proves nothing. Record the cadence in `docs/integrity.md`.
```task
id: AUDIT-WP-0009-T03
status: todo
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "acae6085-ada7-51b2-8dc0-4abac7f7e7b3"
```
@ -114,6 +114,23 @@ deliberately traded away atomicity, carry the declared trade with it, because
§9.6 requires the trade be declared where the trail is documented. Prerequisite
for T04T06.
Done 2026-09-06. `evidence_kind` and `completeness_trade` on `SenderIdentity`,
the `AUDIT_CORE_SENDERS` schema, and the non-secret scope overlay. Two
asymmetries are deliberate and asserted:
- **Default is `attributive`.** The other default would have audit-core imply a
completeness obligation no source ever accepted.
- **The overlay may raise the kind, never lower it.** Same principle that stops
an ExternalSecret refresh shrinking `user-engine`'s tenants: a ConfigMap
refresh must not be able to drop a source's atomicity and detection
obligations without anyone deciding to. Downgrading raises.
A load-bearing source may not carry a `completeness_trade` — §9.6 requires
atomicity of it, so recording a trade would store a contradiction as policy.
`evidence_declaration()` states `completeness_claimed: False` for **both**
kinds, because neither licenses the claim that the archive proves an event
occurred. Twelve tests in `tests/test_senders.py`.
```task
id: AUDIT-WP-0009-T04
status: todo
@ -181,7 +198,7 @@ is worth asserting in `tests/`.
```task
id: AUDIT-WP-0009-T09
status: todo
status: progress
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "fd4a4ac3-e525-57c1-9179-e0fcd0226913"
```
@ -213,6 +230,40 @@ Token provisioning goes by the approved custody path
(`approval-engine/approval-engine-audit`, key `audit-token`) via `warden
route`; no sender token passes through Git, State Hub, or a workplan.
**In progress 2026-09-06.** T03 landed, so the registration inputs are now
expressible. Prepared, non-secret, and recorded in
`docs/approval-engine-source-registration.md`:
- Non-secret scope in `deploy/senders-scope.json` and `senders-scope.yaml`,
`evidence_kind: load-bearing`, `may_read: false`, exact source match. Landed
ahead of the credential deliberately: the overlay only applies to a sender
the Secret already carries, so the entry admits nothing until the token
exists. A test asserts that inertness rather than trusting the reading.
- `audit-core-approval-engine-ingress` in `deploy/networkpolicies.yaml`:
namespace **and** pod label in one `from` peer, so both are ANDed. Narrower
than `user-engine`'s namespace-only rule on purpose — a new sender should not
inherit an older rule's breadth. `user-engine`'s policy is unchanged, and a
test asserts it stays that way.
- The four §9.4 classes, retention (no expiry; 30-day `measured` recoverable
window), custody class, and the claim bound.
**Two inputs are owed by `approval-engine`, not by audit-core.** `tenants` is
proposed as `["*"]` and needs confirmation with reasoning or a list —
`senders.py` says a missing tenant restriction must be justified per sender,
and audit-core cannot justify it on another repo's behalf. `secret_policy` is
recommended `redact` (losing a revocation record is worse than storing it with
one field redacted) but should be chosen explicitly rather than inherited.
Applying the manifests is an operator action audit-core does not take
unprompted.
**T02 is not a gate on this.** Asked directly by `glas-harness`: attestation
freshness governs what audit-core may *claim*, not whether it accepts and
durably stores. The append-only trigger and hash chain operate regardless. And
it is not even the relevant control — §9.6 is explicit that the acute risk for
approvals is omission, which tamper evidence does not address at all. T04 does.
A consumer waiting on T02 before trusting approval evidence would be waiting on
the wrong thing.
```task
id: AUDIT-WP-0009-T10
status: todo