AUDIT-WP-0018-T04: align seed with settled CCR-2026-0063 (railiance-platform f3b0c4f)
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- sso delivery is ExternalSecret/Secret sso/bounded-executor-tokens key
  audit-core (the Secret the rapp run Job already mounts), not
  nk-bind-executor-audit/audit-token.
- CCR check now also pins the new reader shape (audience openbao, explicit
  max TTL 15m, token_self_lifecycle) and that the CCR names this script as
  its custody procedure and the bounded-executor-tokens delivery.
- Docs/workplan: this script is the single seeder; railiance-platform
  fences the boundary (nk_bind_executor_custody.py fence) and owns
  manifests/nk-bind-executor-eso.yaml.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 523928@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 6c737afb-9c14-4152-9f02-477214b9c350
This commit is contained in:
tegwick 2026-11-04 02:05:18 +01:00
parent 5e0f496caf
commit 3157454b84
4 changed files with 56 additions and 20 deletions

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@ -266,8 +266,9 @@ How the token reaches both sides. One founder-run process,
- tenant `tenant:platform` gets 403;
- another source gets 403.
An unknown bearer gets 401.
7. It force-syncs `sso/nk-bind-executor-audit` and compares `audit-token` by
hash, but only if that ExternalSecret exists.
7. It force-syncs `sso/bounded-executor-tokens` and compares key `audit-core`
by hash, but only if that ExternalSecret exists. That is the Secret the
rapp run Job already mounts.
The script is silent. The receipt holds versions, booleans and a 12-hex
fingerprint. A rerun reuses its own custody and writes nothing new. It refuses
@ -277,24 +278,30 @@ collision and a concurrent registry write. Tests:
The script refuses before any write unless all of the following hold:
- CCR-2026-0063 is `approved` or later, with all three owner reviews;
- CCR-2026-0063 is `approved` or later, with all three owner reviews. Its
reader shape must be audience `openbao`, explicit max TTL and token self-lifecycle.
Its delivery must be `sso/bounded-executor-tokens` key `audit-core`, and it must
name this script as its custody procedure;
- the cluster is railiance01 (kube-system UID);
- the receiver runs the pinned image;
- the live scope ConfigMap matches;
- the ingress policy exists;
- the coding-agent boundary already denies the custody data and metadata paths.
It does not create the reader policy, the role or the boundary
(railiance-platform). It also does not create the `sso` ClusterSecretStore and
ExternalSecret, which belong to the rapp-bounded-executor package (CCR-2026-0063
`delivery.target`).
CCR-2026-0063 (railiance-platform f3b0c4f) names this script as its single
seeder. The script does not create the reader policy, the role or the boundary.
railiance-platform owns those: its credential-change applier creates the
policy and role, and `scripts/nk_bind_executor_custody.py fence` creates the
boundary. Nor does it create ClusterSecretStore `openbao-nk-bind-executor-audit`
or ExternalSecret `sso/bounded-executor-tokens`, which are railiance-platform's
`manifests/nk-bind-executor-eso.yaml`.
## Founder runbook — nk-bounded-executor sender
Run these in order. Steps 1 and 2 can run now. Step 3 depends on CCR-2026-0063:
railiance-platform must have it approved by platform-owner, audit-core-owner and
net-kingdom-owner, and must have applied its reader policy, role and
coding-agent boundary entries.
net-kingdom-owner, must have applied its reader policy and role, and must have
run `nk_bind_executor_custody.py fence` for the coding-agent boundary entries.
**1. Ingress (NK-WP-0056-T16).** This applies exactly one object. Run the server
dry-run first, then the apply:
@ -335,8 +342,9 @@ KUBECONFIG=/home/worsch/.kube/config-railiance01 kubectl -n audit-core get netwo
```
The expected status is `seeded_pending_sso_delivery`, or `seeded_and_delivered`
once the rapp package's ExternalSecret exists. The expected probe is
once railiance-platform's ExternalSecret `sso/bounded-executor-tokens` exists. The expected probe is
`{"read": 403, "own_tenant": 200, "other_tenant": 403, "other_source": 403}`.
After the rapp package applies `sso/nk-bind-executor-audit`, rerun step 3 with
If railiance-platform applies `manifests/nk-bind-executor-eso.yaml` after the
seed, rerun step 3 with
`-r2.json`. It writes no custody or registry and confirms the `sso` copy by
hash.