Assent to AUDIT-IN-0001 — approval evidence half, with conditions
gate-house proposed (security layer model v0.3 §9.4) that audit-core own the tamper-evident record of approvals while approval-engine owns the operative state. Assented, with two corrections and one condition. Correction 1: INTENT principle 6 overstated the delivered guarantee. docs/integrity.md is authoritative — an in-database chain does not withstand a database owner without the external chain-head attestation, and even then it is not WORM. Principle 6 now points at that bound. Correction 2: the chain proves alteration and truncation, not omission at source. A suppressed revocation leaves the chain intact. Condition: approval-engine must guarantee emission atomicity, so an approval cannot change state without the event being durably queued in the same transaction. Not a task audit-core can discharge for it. Boundary: no approval-validity query will be exposed — that would be deciding early under §6.1. Also declares audit-core's layer (Engine, not a decision point), which §11 requires and INTENT.md was missing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WpeL68AWHqtqPQZEXY5kFe Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 4040362@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 4fd0fd24-2ee8-4413-bd67-43bd79ca73f1
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@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ id: AUDIT-IN-0001
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kind: intake
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title: 'Proposed: audit-core takes the approval evidence half (security layer model
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v0.3 §9.4)'
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status: open
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status: closed
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origin: cross-repo
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origin_ref: net-kingdom security-layer-model_v0.3 §9.4
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priority: medium
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@ -30,5 +30,26 @@ description: 'gate-house proposes that audit-core own the tamper-evident record
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approval events as a distinct source, say so and gate-house will record the evidence
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half as unowned rather than assume it.'
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created: '2026-08-28T20:35:09.148892Z'
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updated: '2026-08-28T20:35:09.148892Z'
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updated: '2026-08-28T21:10:00Z'
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outcome: assent-with-conditions
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closed: '2026-08-28T21:10:00Z'
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resolution: 'Assent. The split is right: approval-engine owns the operative state,
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audit-core owns the tamper-evident record of issuance, use, supersession, and
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revocation as a distinct source. Two corrections to the rationale and one
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condition. (1) INTENT principle 6 overstates the delivered guarantee;
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docs/integrity.md is authoritative — an in-database chain does not withstand a
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database owner without the external chain-head attestation, and even then it is
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not WORM. Approval events get exactly the guarantee every other source gets,
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no more; anything stronger is an engine gap to declare under §5.3. (2) The chain
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proves alteration and truncation, not omission at source. A suppressed
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revocation leaves the chain intact and verify reports intact; completeness at
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the boundary is the emitter''s property, not the archive''s. CONDITION:
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approval-engine must guarantee emission atomicity (transactional outbox or
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equivalent) so an approval cannot change state without the event being durably
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queued in the same transaction — a requirement on approval-engine, not a task
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audit-core can discharge for it. Boundary stated: no approval-validity query
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will ever be exposed; a verdict surface would be deciding early under §6.1.
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Also raised: audit-core declared no layer, contrary to §11 — now declared Engine
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layer, explicitly not a decision point.'
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recorded_in: history/2026-08-28-approval-evidence-assent.md
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```
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