Answer flex-auth B3: the emitter is the section 4 source, not the archive

AUDIT-IN-0005. flex-auth produces the decision record, declares no §11
emission guarantee, and declined to take the reading that moves the
obligation to audit-core. audit-core declines it too, on its own authority:
class, cadence and detection surface are properties of emitting; audit-core
cannot detect non-production; the obligations already sit on each sender
registration; archive-as-source would make §11's check vacuous; and no
access-engine sender is registered at all.

Binds audit-core, does not rule §11 — gate-house still owns that, so
flex-auth's G2 stays open.

Reflexive half: audit-core's own chain-head attestation emission is now
declared in layer.yaml rather than only in docs/integrity.md prose, and
asserted against the CronJob and the contract by test.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 63291@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 8bd77868-ca68-4f49-bb1e-d539ecc0d703

layer.yaml

@@ -81,3 +81,53 @@ evidence_bound:
     - external chain-head attestation stored outside platform-pg
   contract: docs/integrity.md
   not_claimed: [WORM, object-lock, archival-custody]
+
+# §11 emission guarantee — AUDIT-IN-0005, docs/section-4-source-of-evidence.md
+#
+# §11 requires the declaration from a repository catalogued in §4 as a SOURCE of
+# evidence. audit-core is catalogued as the Evidence engine — the custody and
+# detection half — and emits no event into another repository's custody. The
+# emission guarantee for an event belongs to the repository that emits it; that
+# is audit-core's standing boundary (AUDIT-IN-0001, AUDIT-WP-0009 non-goals) and
+# the reason audit-core declines the source role for access-engine's decision
+# record.
+#
+# The one artifact audit-core does produce on its own behalf is declared anyway,
+# in the same spirit as uncatalogued_infrastructure above: stated so the check is
+# total rather than vacuous, not because §11 is read to compel it. Prose in
+# docs/integrity.md is not a machine-readable declaration — the defect audit-core
+# raised against another repository, so not one it leaves standing in its own.
+source_of_evidence: false
+source_of_evidence_note: >-
+  audit-core holds custody and the detection surface. Emission class, cadence and
+  detection obligations sit on each sender's registration
+  (deploy/senders-scope.{json,yaml}, heartbeat_classes per class), never on the
+  archive. audit-core cannot detect non-production by a source and claims no
+  ability to — AUDIT-IN-0003, GH-DEC-2026-014 limit 3.
+
+emission_guarantee:
+  - id: chain-head-attestation
+    emits: external chain-head attestation for the audit event chain
+    class: load-bearing
+    rarity: rare                      # one scheduled artifact per day, never volume
+    rate_monitoring: forbidden        # §11 / emission-cadence profile, rare class
+    cadence:
+      form: scheduled
+      interval: daily
+      schedule: "17 3 * * *"          # UTC, deploy/attest-cronjob.yaml
+      producer: CronJob audit-core-attest-chain, its own ServiceAccount
+      published_to: ConfigMap audit-core-chain-head
+    detection_surface:
+      form: freshness-window
+      window_hours: 168               # 7x the cadence; widens, never removes
+      on_absence: >-
+        tamper_evidence degrades to False with the reason recorded, and a missing,
+        unreadable, undated or stale attestation is treated the same as absent.
+        Non-production is detected deterministically at read time by the consumer
+        of the claim, not inferred from a rate.
+      surfaces: ["GET /v1/integrity", "GET /readyz (last-known, no chain walk)"]
+      contract: docs/integrity.md
+    bound: >-
+      The attestation proves the head it cites; it is not WORM and does not prove
+      any record was ever sent. An operator-run offsite copy is a separate lane
+      and is not claimed as part of this guarantee.