Answer flex-auth B3: the emitter is the section 4 source, not the archive
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AUDIT-IN-0005. flex-auth produces the decision record, declares no §11
emission guarantee, and declined to take the reading that moves the
obligation to audit-core. audit-core declines it too, on its own authority:
class, cadence and detection surface are properties of emitting; audit-core
cannot detect non-production; the obligations already sit on each sender
registration; archive-as-source would make §11's check vacuous; and no
access-engine sender is registered at all.

Binds audit-core, does not rule §11 — gate-house still owns that, so
flex-auth's G2 stays open.

Reflexive half: audit-core's own chain-head attestation emission is now
declared in layer.yaml rather than only in docs/integrity.md prose, and
asserted against the CronJob and the contract by test.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 63291@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 8bd77868-ca68-4f49-bb1e-d539ecc0d703
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# Who is the §4 source of evidence
`AUDIT-IN-0005`. Statute: `net-kingdom` security layer model §4, §9.6, §11, §17,
companion profile `emission-cadence-security-profile_v0.1.md`.
This document is **not derived**. It states audit-core's own boundary in
audit-core's own voice, which is the only form §11 accepts for a declaration.
## The question
§11 requires every repository catalogued in §4 **as a source of evidence** to
declare an emission guarantee — class, cadence, and the detection surface the
governing cadence profile requires — in its machine-readable layer declaration,
and says a source declaring none is not conforming.
`access-engine` (the repository still answering to `flex-auth`) produces the
decision record, declares no emission guarantee, and raised the ambiguity itself
as B3 / G2: either it is a §4 source and is non-conformant today, or audit-core
is the source and `access-engine` is merely the producer of an artifact
audit-core is the source *of*. It declined to pick the second — the reading that
favours it — and asked audit-core which side of the line audit-core holds.
## The answer
**audit-core is not the source of evidence for the decision record. The emitter
is. For the decision record that emitter is `access-engine`.**
audit-core holds the custody half and the detection surface. It does not hold,
and will not accept, the emission guarantee for an event another repository
produces.
## Why, from audit-core's own record rather than from preference
**1. All three declared things are properties of emitting, not of holding.**
Class, cadence, and detection surface each describe the act of producing an
event. audit-core can declare none of them for an event it does not produce: it
cannot classify a stream it does not generate, cannot promise a rate or an
interval for it, and — stated to gate-house in `AUDIT-IN-0003` against
`GH-DEC-2026-014` limit 3, before this question existed — it **cannot detect
non-production**. audit-core performs no retrieval; its egress permits Postgres
and DNS only. A declaration audit-core made here would be a promise about
behaviour audit-core cannot observe, which is the same defect as an event
claiming an occurrence nobody watched.
**2. It is already audit-core's stated doctrine, twice, in writing.**
`AUDIT-IN-0001`: *"completeness at the boundary is the emitter's property, not
the archive's"*, and emission atomicity is *"a requirement on approval-engine,
not a task audit-core can discharge for it."* `AUDIT-WP-0009` lists *"emission
atomicity at the source, which is the emitter's obligation (§9.6)"* among its
non-goals. Taking the source role now would reverse a boundary audit-core has
held against gate-house and against approval-engine, for the one repository that
asked.
**3. The estate's operative shape already assigns it that way.** Every
obligation §11 names is carried on the **sender registration**, per source:
`evidence_kind` in `deploy/senders-scope.{json,yaml}`, and `heartbeat_classes`
per class rather than per source (`docs/stream-completeness.md`). Four sources
are registered today — `user-engine`, `tenant-engine` (attributive, with its
declared `completeness_trade`), `approval-engine` and `informed-decision` (both
load-bearing) — and each carries its own classification because §11 and the
cadence profile both say the classification is the **source's** published one and
MUST NOT be inferred by the observer. Reading `access-engine` out of that set
would make it the only producer in the estate whose emission obligation was held
by the archive.
**4. The archive-as-source reading makes §11 vacuous.** If custody conferred
source status, every emission obligation in the estate would land on the single
repository that can observe no emission, and no source could ever be
non-conforming under §11. A rule that assigns an obligation the holder cannot
discharge is the §9.1 defect §11 says it has now corrected four times; applying
it here would make the fifth.
**5. As a matter of fact, audit-core does not hold the record.** There is no
registered sender named `access-engine` or `flex-auth`, no token, no ingress and
no scope row. The decision record does not reach audit-core custody at all. A
repository cannot be the source of evidence it has never received, and could not
have been the source of it for the period in which the ambiguity stood.
## What audit-core does owe, and it is not nothing
The surface exists and is not a promise. §11 requires a **rare** load-bearing
class to carry a heartbeat **and** reconciliation and forbids rate monitoring
alone. audit-core built both, and built them in the shape a decision record
needs:
| Owed by the source | Owed by audit-core |
| --- | --- |
| The published class — load-bearing, and rare or volume | Accepting that classification as supplied and never inferring it |
| The cadence, per class | `heartbeat_classes` on the registration; `POST /v1/events` class `audit-core.heartbeat` |
| Reconciliation of its own counts | `GET /v1/reconciliation`, scoped to the caller's own sources, counts and never payloads |
| — | `GET /v1/stream-findings`, and the `means` field on every finding |
`access-engine`'s expectation — heartbeat plus reconciliation rather than rate,
because a decision record is bursty and a quiet period is normal traffic — is
correct and is the form already implemented. Registration goes through an intake
(`AUDIT-IN-0002`, `AUDIT-IN-0003` are the worked examples) and needs a token
lane, not a doctrine change.
**The bound, stated so no conformance argument rests on more.** Heartbeat and
reconciliation cover loss, outage, drain failure and accident. Neither covers a
compromised source suppressing an event and its own count together. §16 placed
the independent observer outside audit-core's scope. Nothing in this document
may be read as audit-core detecting adversarial omission by a source.
## What this ruling does not do
It binds audit-core. It does not rule §11.
§11 is `net-kingdom` canon authored by `gate-house`, and whether `access-engine`
is a §4 source is on gate-house's list along with five other §11 questions
(custodian survey, `the-custodian/docs/assessments/2026-09-21-layer-declaration-boundaries.md`,
2026-09-21). audit-core has removed the only alternative reading by declining it
on its own authority; the ruling itself is still gate-house's to make.
So `access-engine`'s **G2 does not close on this document alone.** flex-auth
holds it open until gate-house rules *and* audit-core confirms; this is the
second of those two and not the first. audit-core's position is that with the
alternative reading withdrawn by its holder, the remaining ruling has one
defensible outcome — but saying so is a prediction about gate-house, not a
substitute for it.
## audit-core's own emission
Asked which side of the line it holds, audit-core owes the same answer about
itself. audit-core is catalogued in §4 as the Evidence engine, not as a source,
and it emits no event into anyone else's custody. It does produce one artifact
others rely on: the **chain-head attestation**. Its class, cadence and detection
surface are now stated in `layer.yaml` under `emission_guarantee` rather than
only in `docs/integrity.md`, because a guarantee legible only by following a
document trail is the exact defect audit-core raised against flex-auth's
declaration in §11 — and leaving it in prose while charging another repository
with declaring theirs would be the flattering reading of an unruled boundary,
which is the thing both repositories keep objecting to.

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@ -1,5 +1,78 @@
# Intake records
## AUDIT-IN-0005 — Which repository is the §4 source of evidence for the decision record
```yaml
id: AUDIT-IN-0005
kind: intake
title: 'Which repository is the §4 source of evidence for the decision record
(flex-auth B3 / declared gap G2)'
status: closed
origin: cross-repo
origin_ref: FLEX-WP-0030 B3 / flex-auth conformance gap G2
priority: high
owner: audit-core
requested_by: flex-auth
description: >
§11 requires every repository catalogued in §4 as a source of evidence to
declare its emission guarantee — class, cadence and the detection surface the
governing cadence profile requires — in its machine-readable layer
declaration, and says a source declaring none is not conforming.
flex-auth (access-engine) produces the decision record and declares none. Two
readings are defensible from the text: flex-auth is a §4 source and is
non-conformant today, or audit-core is the source and flex-auth is merely the
producer of an artifact audit-core is the source of. flex-auth declined to
pick the second — the reading that favours it — and asked audit-core to say
which side of the line audit-core holds. The custodian confirmed audit-core
can answer without waiting on gate-house, and that answering does not close
G2. Estate-wide view: the-custodian/docs/assessments/2026-09-21-layer-declaration-boundaries.md.
created: '2026-09-21'
updated: '2026-09-21'
outcome: declined-with-the-surface-offered
closed: '2026-09-21'
resolution: 'audit-core is NOT the §4 source of evidence for the decision
record. The emitter is, and for the decision record the emitter is
access-engine. Five reasons, none of them preference. (1) Class, cadence and
detection surface are all properties of the act of emitting; audit-core
produces no decision record, and told gate-house before this question existed
that it cannot detect non-production at all — AUDIT-IN-0003 against
GH-DEC-2026-014 limit 3. A declaration here would promise behaviour audit-core
cannot observe. (2) It is audit-core''s standing doctrine in writing:
completeness at the boundary is the emitter''s property, not the archive''s
(AUDIT-IN-0001), and emission atomicity at the source is an AUDIT-WP-0009
non-goal. Taking the role now would reverse for the asking repository a
boundary held against gate-house and approval-engine. (3) The operative shape
already assigns it: evidence_kind and heartbeat_classes sit on each SENDER
registration, per source and per class, for all four registered sources,
because §11 and the cadence profile both make the classification the source''s
published one. (4) Archive-as-source makes §11 vacuous — every emission
obligation would land on the one repository that can observe no emission, and
no source could ever be non-conforming. That is the §9.1 defect §11 says it has
corrected four times. (5) As fact: no sender named access-engine or flex-auth
is registered, no token, no ingress, no scope row — the decision record never
reaches audit-core custody, and a repository cannot be the source of evidence
it has never received. WHAT AUDIT-CORE OWES INSTEAD, and it is not nothing: the
rare load-bearing form access-engine expects — heartbeat per class plus
reconciliation, never rate — is built and registerable through an intake, with
the standing bound that neither control covers a source suppressing an event
and its own count together (§16). WHAT THIS DOES NOT DO: it binds audit-core,
it does not rule §11. gate-house authors §11 and still owns the ruling, so G2
does not close on this record alone — this is audit-core''s confirmation, not
gate-house''s ruling. REFLEXIVE HALF: asked which side of the line it holds,
audit-core answered about itself too. It emits no event into another
repository''s custody, but it does produce the chain-head attestation, whose
class, cadence and detection surface were stated only in docs/integrity.md
prose. They are now declared in layer.yaml under emission_guarantee
(load-bearing, rare, daily 17 3 * * *, 168h freshness window degrading
tamper_evidence to False with the reason recorded) and asserted by
tests/test_layer_conformance.py against the CronJob and the contract. Leaving
it in prose while charging another repository with declaring theirs would have
been the flattering reading of an unruled boundary.'
recorded_in: docs/section-4-source-of-evidence.md
work: AUDIT-WP-0009-T13
```
## AUDIT-IN-0003 — Register informed-decision as a load-bearing sender; commitment-only payload doctrine
```yaml

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@ -81,3 +81,53 @@ evidence_bound:
- external chain-head attestation stored outside platform-pg
contract: docs/integrity.md
not_claimed: [WORM, object-lock, archival-custody]
# §11 emission guarantee — AUDIT-IN-0005, docs/section-4-source-of-evidence.md
#
# §11 requires the declaration from a repository catalogued in §4 as a SOURCE of
# evidence. audit-core is catalogued as the Evidence engine — the custody and
# detection half — and emits no event into another repository's custody. The
# emission guarantee for an event belongs to the repository that emits it; that
# is audit-core's standing boundary (AUDIT-IN-0001, AUDIT-WP-0009 non-goals) and
# the reason audit-core declines the source role for access-engine's decision
# record.
#
# The one artifact audit-core does produce on its own behalf is declared anyway,
# in the same spirit as uncatalogued_infrastructure above: stated so the check is
# total rather than vacuous, not because §11 is read to compel it. Prose in
# docs/integrity.md is not a machine-readable declaration — the defect audit-core
# raised against another repository, so not one it leaves standing in its own.
source_of_evidence: false
source_of_evidence_note: >-
audit-core holds custody and the detection surface. Emission class, cadence and
detection obligations sit on each sender's registration
(deploy/senders-scope.{json,yaml}, heartbeat_classes per class), never on the
archive. audit-core cannot detect non-production by a source and claims no
ability to — AUDIT-IN-0003, GH-DEC-2026-014 limit 3.
emission_guarantee:
- id: chain-head-attestation
emits: external chain-head attestation for the audit event chain
class: load-bearing
rarity: rare # one scheduled artifact per day, never volume
rate_monitoring: forbidden # §11 / emission-cadence profile, rare class
cadence:
form: scheduled
interval: daily
schedule: "17 3 * * *" # UTC, deploy/attest-cronjob.yaml
producer: CronJob audit-core-attest-chain, its own ServiceAccount
published_to: ConfigMap audit-core-chain-head
detection_surface:
form: freshness-window
window_hours: 168 # 7x the cadence; widens, never removes
on_absence: >-
tamper_evidence degrades to False with the reason recorded, and a missing,
unreadable, undated or stale attestation is treated the same as absent.
Non-production is detected deterministically at read time by the consumer
of the claim, not inferred from a rate.
surfaces: ["GET /v1/integrity", "GET /readyz (last-known, no chain walk)"]
contract: docs/integrity.md
bound: >-
The attestation proves the head it cites; it is not WORM and does not prove
any record was ever sent. An operator-run offsite copy is a separate lane
and is not claimed as part of this guarantee.

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@ -100,3 +100,49 @@ def test_the_receiver_has_no_api_server_egress():
assert "443" in attest
assert "6443" not in receiver
assert "443" not in receiver
# AUDIT-IN-0005 — §11's emission-guarantee check, made mechanical for audit-core's
# own declaration. The ruling itself lives in docs/section-4-source-of-evidence.md;
# these assert that the declaration keeps saying what the ruling says.
def test_audit_core_declines_the_source_of_evidence_role():
"""The archive is not the source. AUDIT-IN-0001, AUDIT-IN-0005."""
assert LAYER["source_of_evidence"] is False
note = LAYER["source_of_evidence_note"].lower()
assert "non-production" in note
assert "sender" in note
def test_the_attestation_emission_is_declared_and_not_rate_monitored():
"""A rare load-bearing class may not rest on rate monitoring (§11)."""
rows = {row["id"]: row for row in LAYER["emission_guarantee"]}
attestation = rows["chain-head-attestation"]
assert attestation["class"] == "load-bearing"
assert attestation["rarity"] == "rare"
assert attestation["rate_monitoring"] == "forbidden"
# All three things §11 asks a source to state.
assert attestation["cadence"]["interval"] == "daily"
assert attestation["detection_surface"]["form"] == "freshness-window"
def test_the_declared_cadence_matches_the_deployed_schedule():
"""Declared against the manifest, so drift fails here rather than at review."""
cronjob = (ROOT / "deploy" / "attest-cronjob.yaml").read_text()
declared = next(
row for row in LAYER["emission_guarantee"]
if row["id"] == "chain-head-attestation"
)["cadence"]
assert declared["schedule"] in cronjob
assert declared["published_to"].split()[-1] in cronjob
def test_the_declared_freshness_window_matches_the_contract():
surface = next(
row for row in LAYER["emission_guarantee"]
if row["id"] == "chain-head-attestation"
)["detection_surface"]
assert surface["window_hours"] == 168
contract = (ROOT / surface["contract"]).read_text()
assert "168 hours" in contract

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@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ flavor: implementation
owner: claude
topic_slug: railiance
created: "2026-08-29"
updated: "2026-09-15"
updated: "2026-09-21"
depends_on:
- AUDIT-WP-0007
state_hub_workstream_id: "46a96b03-bc08-53b5-9c93-4071adabf734"
@ -672,3 +672,38 @@ Service/domain-transaction/human and factory runtime/spend admission remain
separate; factory attempts and paid model calls remain zero.
Receipt: [native readback](../docs/evidence/2026-09-11-factory-native-readback.json).
## Answer flex-auth's B3: which repository is the §4 source of evidence
```task
id: AUDIT-WP-0009-T13
status: done
priority: high
```
`AUDIT-IN-0005`. flex-auth (access-engine) produces the decision record,
declares no §11 emission guarantee, and raised B3 / G2 rather than take the
reading that puts the obligation on audit-core. Answered 2026-09-21:
**audit-core is not the source; the emitter is.** Class, cadence and detection
surface are properties of emitting, audit-core cannot detect non-production
(`AUDIT-IN-0003`, `GH-DEC-2026-014` limit 3), the obligations already sit on
each sender registration, archive-as-source would make §11's check vacuous, and
no `access-engine` sender is registered — the record never reaches this custody.
Ruling: `docs/section-4-source-of-evidence.md`. It binds audit-core and does not
rule §11; gate-house still owns that, so **G2 stays open** on flex-auth's list.
Reflexive half, taken rather than avoided: audit-core's own chain-head
attestation had its class, cadence and detection surface stated only in
`docs/integrity.md` prose. Now declared in `layer.yaml` under
`emission_guarantee` — load-bearing, rare, rate monitoring forbidden, daily
`17 3 * * *`, 168h freshness window degrading `tamper_evidence` to `False` with
the reason recorded — and asserted against the CronJob and the contract by
`tests/test_layer_conformance.py`, so the declaration cannot drift from what is
deployed.
Not done here: the INTENT.md `Engine` versus layer.yaml `engine` split
(flex-auth's corrected B1). Precedence and case-sensitivity are gate-house's to
rule, and aligning on a guess would be authoring a declaration §11 says only
this repository may author.