diff --git a/deploy/networkpolicies.yaml b/deploy/networkpolicies.yaml
index 7a74919..99624ca 100644
--- a/deploy/networkpolicies.yaml
+++ b/deploy/networkpolicies.yaml
@@ -37,6 +37,32 @@ spec:
 ---
 apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
 kind: NetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: audit-core-whitehat-ingress
+  namespace: audit-core
+spec:
+  podSelector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app.kubernetes.io/name: audit-core
+  policyTypes: [Ingress]
+  ingress:
+    # Governed E2 evidence plane. Both selectors belong to one peer and are
+    # therefore ANDed: only the registered audit-core probe in the dedicated
+    # whitehat namespace reaches this port. Application sender authentication
+    # and tenant scope remain the inner boundary.
+    - from:
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: whitehat
+          podSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              whitehat.security/plane: "true"
+              whitehat.security/target: audit-core
+      ports:
+        - {protocol: TCP, port: 8080}
+---
+apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: NetworkPolicy
 metadata:
   name: audit-core-operator-ingress
   namespace: audit-core
diff --git a/docs/operator-runbook.md b/docs/operator-runbook.md
index ae87b82..3506bf0 100644
--- a/docs/operator-runbook.md
+++ b/docs/operator-runbook.md
@@ -118,6 +118,21 @@ custody defect: stop and investigate.
 
 ## Sender credential rotation
 
+### Governed E2 evidence identities
+
+The `whitehat` test plane has a dedicated ingress policy. It admits only pods
+in namespace `whitehat` carrying both `whitehat.security/plane: "true"` and
+`whitehat.security/target: audit-core`; bearer authentication and sender scope
+still apply to every request. The policy is connectivity, not authorization.
+
+A dated `live-e2` engagement may request exactly two temporary identities. Each
+identity is bound to `source=whitehat-security`, one named synthetic tenant,
+`may_write=true`, and `may_read=true`. Provision token values only through the
+sanctioned sender-registry custody lane and the plane's mount-only credential
+projection. Never reuse the production `user-engine` identity. Revoke both
+identities and remove their registry entries when the plane lease ends; an
+engagement is incomplete until that cleanup is evidenced.
+
 OpenBao path `platform/workloads/audit-core/senders` is the authority for
 ExternalSecret `audit-core-senders`. The initial in-cluster registry was
 wrap-migrated on 2026-08-14 without printing or staging its values; do not
diff --git a/tests/test_networkpolicies.py b/tests/test_networkpolicies.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cc192de
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/test_networkpolicies.py
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+from pathlib import Path
+
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).parents[1]
+
+
+def test_whitehat_ingress_is_bound_to_namespace_and_target_labels():
+    documents = (ROOT / "deploy" / "networkpolicies.yaml").read_text().split("\n---\n")
+    policy = next(
+        document
+        for document in documents
+        if "name: audit-core-whitehat-ingress" in document
+    )
+
+    # Both selectors must remain in the same `from` peer. Splitting them into
+    # two list items changes AND to OR and would admit every pod in either set.
+    expected_peer = """        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: whitehat
+          podSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              whitehat.security/plane: \"true\"
+              whitehat.security/target: audit-core"""
+    assert expected_peer in policy
+    assert policy.count("        - namespaceSelector:") == 1
+    assert "        - {protocol: TCP, port: 8080}" in policy
diff --git a/workplans/AUDIT-WP-0008-tenancy-posture-alignment.md b/workplans/AUDIT-WP-0008-tenancy-posture-alignment.md
index c628dc0..9fd3d14 100644
--- a/workplans/AUDIT-WP-0008-tenancy-posture-alignment.md
+++ b/workplans/AUDIT-WP-0008-tenancy-posture-alignment.md
@@ -393,17 +393,20 @@ minute, and requires two temporary read-enabled identities each scoped to one
 fixture tenant. The production `user-engine` identity remains unchanged and is
 not a test credential.
 
-Whitehat supplied a production engagement record at `3770b41` and a bounded
-adapter at `7396fe7`. Target review found that the adapter omits audit-core's
-required `Idempotency-Key` header on POST, so it would abort fixture seeding
-with `idempotency_key_mismatch` and cannot yet produce evidence. Review reply
-`74b815ea-341f-455d-8fdb-2333f5753f76` accepted the two-identity fixture shape
-in principle and requested that fix plus corrected production-approval and
-owner-acknowledgement provenance before formal acknowledgement.
+Whitehat supplied and corrected a bounded adapter, including audit-core's
+required `Idempotency-Key` and deterministic retry payloads. The original
+production engagement was then cancelled at the session cutoff with zero
+target requests and its identifier is terminal. Whitehat subsequently added
+the governed test-plane contract and fail-closed admission at `95129d7`.
 
-This is progress, not evidence and not live authorization. T05 becomes `done`
-only when the corrected engagement is acknowledged, the bounded run completes,
-and its sanitized target report has been routed to `risk-nexus`.
+Audit-core now declares a dedicated ingress peer for that plane: only a pod in
+namespace `whitehat` carrying both the plane and `target=audit-core` labels can
+reach port 8080 through it. Authentication and tenant scope remain mandatory.
+The operator runbook records the exact two-identity fixture shape and cleanup
+obligation. This is readiness, not evidence or live authorization. T05 becomes
+`done` only after a new engagement is approved and owner-acknowledged, the
+cluster plane and value-safe custody broker are provisioned, the bounded run
+completes, and its sanitized target report reaches `risk-nexus`.
 
 ```task
 id: AUDIT-WP-0008-T06