Close AUDIT-WP-0007 after live chain attestation.

Migration 0006 applied on railiance01. Verify-against the dated
chain-head evidence is intact for 30 events.

SCOPE.md

@@ -31,12 +31,13 @@ audit-core exists to provide the capability described in INTENT.md.
 - Status: production
 - Production receiver on railiance01 (`namespace audit-core`), Postgres
   operational custody on `platform-pg`, sender `user-engine`.
-- Recovery is the platform `data.backup` window (30 days, RESOURCE-WP-0002
+- Recovery is the platform `data.backup` window (30 days). Live `/readyz`
-  live). Live `/readyz` reports `custody_class=operational` and
+  reports `custody_class=operational`, `tamper_evidence=true`,
-  `recoverable_days=30` (image `sha256:05fe1c06…`, 2026-08-16 cutover).
+  `recoverable_days=30` (image `sha256:7febc28e…`).
-- ITC-CAP case: `data/capability/audit-core-operational.json`.
+- Hash chain verified on 30 live events
-  `data.archive` is an unmet requirement. `tamper_evidence` is still false.
+  (`docs/evidence/chain-head-20260816.json`).
-- Open workplan: `workplans/AUDIT-WP-0007-integrity-verification.md`.
+- ITC-CAP case: `data/capability/audit-core-operational.json` at D4.
+  `data.archive` is an unmet requirement.
 
 ## Getting Oriented
 

deploy/README.md

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ the server port or export a copy before applying.
 Apply order is documented in `docs/operator-runbook.md`. Do not apply the
 Deployment until:
 
-1. The image digest is pinned (currently `sha256:05fe1c06…` from commit `40dcadd`).
+1. The image digest is pinned (currently `sha256:7febc28e…` from commit `5fd04e2`).
 2. Secrets `audit-core-database`, `audit-core-database-migrate`, and
    `audit-core-senders` exist. ConfigMap `audit-core-senders-scope` is
    applied (`deploy/senders-scope.yaml`) before the Deployment mounts it.

deploy/audit-core.yaml

@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ metadata:
     audit-core.railiance.io/rollback-note: >-
       Migrations 0001-0006 are additive. 0006 adds chain_hash/chain_prev and
       then NOT NULL. An image that does not write those columns cannot accept
-      events after 0006. Do not roll back past sha256:05fe1c06… to a pre-0007
+      events after 0006. Do not roll back past sha256:7febc28e… to a pre-0007
       writer. A future migration that drops or narrows a column must state
       its own rollback position before it is released.
 spec:
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ spec:
         - name: audit-core
           # REPLACE at release time with the built digest. A mutable tag is not
           # an immutable image, and `:latest` must never be the only reference.
-          image: forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/audit-core@sha256:05fe1c06f809be29309695c397025da755bfe82afed81a7f9b8771e0b9200c17
+          image: forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/audit-core@sha256:7febc28e8a828dbc245144a38e5728e0fbf496b594dd7591170b450a1265fb10
           imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
           ports:
             - name: http

deploy/migrate-job.yaml

@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ spec:
           type: RuntimeDefault
       containers:
         - name: migrate
-          image: forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/audit-core@sha256:05fe1c06f809be29309695c397025da755bfe82afed81a7f9b8771e0b9200c17
+          image: forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/audit-core@sha256:7febc28e8a828dbc245144a38e5728e0fbf496b594dd7591170b450a1265fb10
           imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
           command: ["python", "-m", "audit_core", "migrate"]
           env:

docs/evidence/chain-head-20260816.json

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+{
+  "accepted_at": "2026-08-13T15:38:37+00:00",
+  "chain_hash": "03fd1773c1954e2c39548b0ba297359b9edd739a94ff9b2dcc9529dcd5cf1fcc",
+  "event_count": 30,
+  "event_id": "evt_69aad81d75bb49c9b988be7650a5360d",
+  "genesis": "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
+  "observed_at": "2026-08-15T23:23:34+00:00",
+  "schema": "audit-core.chain-head.v1"
+}

tests/test_capability_case.py

@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ def test_capability_record_exists_and_joins_operations_audit():
     unknown = [row for row in audit["consumes"] if row["basis"] == "unknown"]
     assert unknown
     assert all(row["quantity"]["value"] is None and row.get("gap") for row in unknown)
+    hooks = {item["hook"]: item["basis"] for item in audit["evidence"]}
+    assert hooks["integrity_verification"] == "measured"
 
 
 def test_capability_review_against_live_catalog():

workplans/AUDIT-WP-0007-integrity-verification.md

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ type: workplan
 title: "Integrity verification for operational custody"
 domain: infotech
 repo: audit-core
-status: active
+status: finished
 owner: grok
 topic_slug: railiance
 created: "2026-08-16"
@@ -89,11 +89,14 @@ Write a short contract in `docs/audit-backend-contract.md` (or a sibling
 
 Done when the contract is written and the tests to be added are named.
 
+Done 2026-08-16: `docs/integrity.md` names the chain, genesis, proof bound,
+and the six tests.
+
 ## T02 — Persist the chain on accept
 
 ```task
 id: AUDIT-WP-0007-T02
-status: todo
+status: done
 priority: high
 state_hub_task_id: "5830bb1a-27b7-4eed-b09f-75ba8cc9f7f1"
 ```
@@ -112,11 +115,14 @@ suite. Mock file backend stays `tamper_evidence=False`.
 Done when conformance tests show: first accept sets genesis; second
 links; duplicate does not fork; verify is clean on a fresh store.
 
+Done 2026-08-16: migration 0006 plus backfill; SQLite and Postgres accept
+write the next link under a lock. Conformance + `tests/test_integrity.py`.
+
 ## T03 — Verify surface
 
 ```task
 id: AUDIT-WP-0007-T03
-status: todo
+status: done
 priority: high
 state_hub_task_id: "fee1f93c-dcac-4fc3-9e41-17bb4436e8d6"
 ```
@@ -133,11 +139,14 @@ alone never gave us.
 Done when CLI and HTTP agree, and the broken-row test is red-then-green
 as a detector, not as a repair.
 
+Done 2026-08-16: `verify-chain` CLI, `GET /v1/integrity`, SQLite rewrite
+test and Postgres superuser rewrite test both fail verify.
+
 ## T04 — Attest the chain head outside platform-pg
 
 ```task
 id: AUDIT-WP-0007-T04
-status: todo
+status: done
 priority: medium
 state_hub_task_id: "b6d03d6a-0605-4982-a9a3-e18c89319ba9"
 ```
@@ -158,11 +167,17 @@ and report mismatch as a break.
 Done when one production walk produces an attestation file in
 `docs/evidence/` and verify-against-attestation is tested.
 
+Done 2026-08-16: live walk 30 events, intact, head
+`03fd1773…`. Evidence
+`docs/evidence/chain-head-20260816.json`. Verify-against matched.
+Do not copy this file into the Barman prefix; a second copy may follow
+RESOURCE-WP-0002-T06 logical-offsite.
+
 ## T05 — Declare tamper_evidence only as far as the proof
 
 ```task
 id: AUDIT-WP-0007-T05
-status: todo
+status: done
 priority: medium
 state_hub_task_id: "9fd70d3c-5a64-4b26-967f-4ef45394d81c"
 ```
@@ -182,6 +197,10 @@ After T03 and T04:
 Done when capability-review still `ok` and the hook is no longer
 `unknown`.
 
+Done 2026-08-16: Postgres `tamper_evidence=True`; live `/readyz` reports
+it; capability-review `ok`; `integrity_verification` is `measured`.
+Maturity stays D4. `data.archive` stays unmet.
+
 ## Acceptance
 
 - A rewritten stored payload makes `verify` fail.