Register informed-decision.memo.posed for the platform tenant.

Accept the retained pose envelope and refuse packet, brief, and secret
content. Heartbeat and reconciliation follow the existing load-bearing
class pattern. This does not connect the sink or claim runtime readiness.

Assistant: grok
Assistant-Session: 01a10329-31cb-78d3-b7a3-787a69c89d54

audit_core/ingestion.py

@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ from audit_core.redaction import (
     SecretFieldRejection,
     apply_policy,
     finding_from_path,
+    scan,
 )
 from audit_core.senders import WILDCARD, SenderIdentity, SenderRegistry, development_registry
 from audit_core.sqlite_backend import SQLiteAuditBackend
@@ -552,11 +553,71 @@ class IngestionApplication:
         return [body]
 
 
+# Local registration of informed-decision.memo.posed (intake dependency T07).
+# The retained envelope is the one informed-decision already queues: the eight
+# wire fields, with data limited to the six ids and digests below. Packet,
+# brief, and secret-shaped keys are refused before any other error so a later
+# invalid_event cannot write that body into the dead-letter store.
+POSED_EVENT_TYPE = "informed-decision.memo.posed"
+POSED_SOURCE = "informed-decision"
+POSED_TENANT = "tenant:platform"
+POSED_DATA_KEYS = frozenset({
+    "memo_id",
+    "approval_id",
+    "approval_binding_digest",
+    "submitter",
+    "memo_class",
+    "submission_digest",
+})
+CONTENT_REFUSED = "content_refused"
+_POSED_CONTENT_KEYS = frozenset({"packet", "brief"})
+
+
+def _has_posed_content_key(value: Any) -> bool:
+    if isinstance(value, dict):
+        for key, item in value.items():
+            if str(key).lower() in _POSED_CONTENT_KEYS or _has_posed_content_key(item):
+                return True
+    elif isinstance(value, list):
+        return any(_has_posed_content_key(item) for item in value)
+    return False
+
+
+def _refuse_posed_content(payload: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+    """Refuse packet, brief, and secret-shaped keys on this class only.
+
+    Other event types keep the sender's secret_policy. This class does not:
+    the dependency says refuse, and redacting would still accept the event.
+    """
+    findings = scan(payload)
+    if findings:
+        raise SecretFieldRejection(findings)
+    if _has_posed_content_key(payload):
+        raise ValueError(CONTENT_REFUSED)
+
+
+def _require_posed_envelope(payload: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+    """Accept only the locally retained field set, for this source and tenant."""
+    if str(payload.get("source") or "") != POSED_SOURCE:
+        raise ValueError("source_not_allowed")
+    if str(payload.get("tenant") or "") != POSED_TENANT:
+        raise ValueError("tenant_not_allowed")
+    data = payload.get("data")
+    if (
+        not isinstance(data, dict)
+        or set(data) != POSED_DATA_KEYS
+        or any(type(data[key]) is not str or not data[key].strip() for key in POSED_DATA_KEYS)
+    ):
+        raise ValueError("invalid_event")
+
+
 def normalize(
     payload: dict[str, Any],
     idempotency_key: str | None,
     identity: SenderIdentity | None = None,
 ) -> AuditEvent:
+    if isinstance(payload, dict) and payload.get("type") == POSED_EVENT_TYPE:
+        _refuse_posed_content(payload)
     required = (
         "id", "type", "source", "subject", "tenant", "correlation_id", "occurred_at", "data",
     )
@@ -575,6 +636,8 @@ def normalize(
             raise ValueError("tenant_not_allowed")
     elif source != "user-engine":
         raise ValueError("source_not_allowed")
+    if payload.get("type") == POSED_EVENT_TYPE:
+        _require_posed_envelope(payload)
     observed_at = _normalize_timestamp(payload["occurred_at"])
     policy = identity.secret_policy if identity is not None else POLICY_REDACT
     # Raises SecretFieldRejection under the reject policy; that exception

audit_core/postgres_backend.py

@@ -166,10 +166,10 @@ MIGRATIONS: list[tuple[str, str]] = [
     ),
 ]
 
-# Rejection reasons whose payload must never be persisted — storing the body of
-# an event rejected *for carrying secret-shaped material* would write that
-# material into the audit store.
-WITHHOLD_PAYLOAD_REASONS = frozenset({"secret_shaped_field"})
+# Rejection reasons whose payload must never be persisted. Storing the body of
+# an event rejected for secret-shaped material, or for packet/brief content,
+# would write that material into the audit store.
+WITHHOLD_PAYLOAD_REASONS = frozenset({"secret_shaped_field", "content_refused"})
 
 
 class PostgresAuditBackend:

audit_core/sqlite_backend.py

@@ -74,9 +74,9 @@ CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS secret_findings (
 """
 
 # Rejection reasons whose payload must never be persisted. Storing the body of
-# an event rejected *for containing secret-shaped material* would write that
-# material into the audit store — the precise outcome the rejection prevents.
-WITHHOLD_PAYLOAD_REASONS = frozenset({"secret_shaped_field"})
+# an event rejected for secret-shaped material, or for packet/brief content,
+# would write that material into the audit store.
+WITHHOLD_PAYLOAD_REASONS = frozenset({"secret_shaped_field", "content_refused"})
 
 
 class SQLiteAuditBackend: