Review security layer model v0.6 — assent, three findings
All three v0.4 findings landed in v0.5 (local outbox, machine-readable declaration, §14 arithmetic). §9.6's load-bearing/attributive split and §16's ruling on approval custody both improve on what audit-core raised. Findings, all correcting audit-core's own contribution: (1) the local outbox closes accidental omission, not the compromised-source case §9.6 opens with — a compromised emitter can decline the insert or drop the row before drain; §16 rests a ruling on that conflation. (2) cadence is the only control touching the residual and is a SHOULD, and rate-based detection is weakest for the rare negative events §9.6 says matter most — recommend positive reconciliation for load-bearing low-volume classes. (3) §3.3's Evidence row states an availability/independence trade as a property of evidence engines. Adds layer.yaml in ops-warden's reference form, per §11. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WpeL68AWHqtqPQZEXY5kFe Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 4040362@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 4fd0fd24-2ee8-4413-bd67-43bd79ca73f1
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layer.yaml
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layer.yaml
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# audit-core — NetKingdom security layer declaration
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#
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# Framework: net-kingdom/canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.6.md
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# Assent: AUDIT-IN-0001 (audit-core's own voice, per §11 "who must declare")
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# history/2026-08-28-approval-evidence-assent.md
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# history/2026-08-29-security-layer-model-v0.6-review.md
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#
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# Reference form offered by ops-warden and adopted here, so §11's declaration
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# check is mechanical rather than a reader's judgment about prose. audit-core
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# raised that defect; adopting the form is the other half of raising it.
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schema_version: "0.1"
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framework: netkingdom-security-layer-model
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standard_version: "0.6"
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repository: audit-core
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layer: engine
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role: evidence # §3.3 engine typing
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declared_by: intakes/intakes.md AUDIT-IN-0001
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declared_at: "2026-08-29"
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# §3.3: an Evidence engine records what happened and proves integrity of what
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# it holds. It is explicitly not a decision point (§6, §9.4).
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decision_surfaces_exposed: none
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# §9.4 — normative and permanent. audit-core exposes no verdict on whether an
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# approval is still valid; a consumer branching on such an answer would route an
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# authorization decision through the audit fabric.
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approval_validity_query: forbidden
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# §5 applies to Staff. audit-core is an Engine and holds no Tooling contact
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# requiring a §5.1/§5.2/§5.3 declaration. Its PostgreSQL custody is its own
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# operational store, not a §4 Tooling row.
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tooling_contacts: []
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# §9.6 — the bound audit-core delivers, stated so no doctrine rests on more.
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evidence_bound:
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proves:
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- records held were not altered after arrival
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- records held were not truncated after arrival
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does_not_prove:
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- that a record was ever sent
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- absence of a record as evidence of non-occurrence
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conditional_on:
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- external chain-head attestation stored outside platform-pg
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contract: docs/integrity.md
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not_claimed: [WORM, object-lock, archival-custody]
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