# audit-core — NetKingdom security layer declaration
#
# Framework: net-kingdom/canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.6.md
# Assent:    AUDIT-IN-0001 (audit-core's own voice, per §11 "who must declare")
#            history/2026-08-28-approval-evidence-assent.md
#            history/2026-08-29-security-layer-model-v0.6-review.md
#
# Reference form offered by ops-warden and adopted here, so §11's declaration
# check is mechanical rather than a reader's judgment about prose. audit-core
# raised that defect; adopting the form is the other half of raising it.

schema_version: "0.1"
framework: netkingdom-security-layer-model
standard_version: "0.6"
repository: audit-core
layer: engine
role: evidence                        # §3.3 engine typing
declared_by: intakes/intakes.md AUDIT-IN-0001
declared_at: "2026-08-29"

# §3.3: an Evidence engine records what happened and proves integrity of what
# it holds. It is explicitly not a decision point (§6, §9.4).
decision_surfaces_exposed: none

# §9.4 — normative and permanent. audit-core exposes no verdict on whether an
# approval is still valid; a consumer branching on such an answer would route an
# authorization decision through the audit fabric.
approval_validity_query: forbidden

# §5 applies to Staff. audit-core is an Engine and holds no Tooling contact
# requiring a §5.1/§5.2/§5.3 declaration. Its PostgreSQL custody is its own
# operational store, not a §4 Tooling row.
tooling_contacts: []

# §9.6 — the bound audit-core delivers, stated so no doctrine rests on more.
evidence_bound:
  proves:
    - records held were not altered after arrival
    - records held were not truncated after arrival
  does_not_prove:
    - that a record was ever sent
    - absence of a record as evidence of non-occurrence
  conditional_on:
    - external chain-head attestation stored outside platform-pg
  contract: docs/integrity.md
  not_claimed: [WORM, object-lock, archival-custody]