tegwick
de9e3abe5f
T02. deploy/attest-cronjob.yaml: daily at 03:17 UTC against the 168h window, its own ServiceAccount, and a Role reaching exactly one named ConfigMap — get/update/patch, no create, no list. audit_core/attest_publish.py does the publish in stdlib; the image carries no kubectl, and adding one to an audit receiver's image to write a single file is the worse trade. Three refusals, all deliberate: The producer is not the receiver. A receiver that could rewrite its own attestation could forge it. audit-core-egress is now scoped to component: receiver and a separate audit-core-attest-egress carries the 6443 rule, so the receiver never gains API-server reach. Asserted by test. It refuses to publish over a broken chain. A fresh head written over a break replaces an honest chain_break with a fresh-looking attestation. Stale degrades the claim visibly; false does not. Mounted as a directory, not subPath. Found while writing the manifest: a subPath ConfigMap mount is resolved once at pod start and never updates, so the daily attestation would land in the ConfigMap and never reach the running receiver — tamper_evidence would age out to false while the job reported success every night, silent in both directions. The offsite copy stays an operator step. audit-core holds no Nextcloud credential and should not acquire one to publish a hash, so docs/integrity.md states the bound plainly: until that copy exists the delivered control defends against a database owner, not a cluster owner, and no stronger claim may be made from it. T10. layer.yaml lists four infrastructure contacts — platform-pg, state-hub, kube-apiserver, the container registry — each with its role and whether another layer reads it. tooling_contacts stays [], which is true under §5 as written; the companion's totality request is met by the uncatalogued list rather than by inventing a Tooling row. tests/test_layer_conformance.py derives the egress destinations from the manifests and the registry from the pinned digests, so a new contact appearing in deploy/ without a row fails the test rather than waiting for a reviewer to notice. Applying the manifests remains an operator action; nothing here was applied. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Nb7Q6ZmXppNDkTWytfYqfv Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 2069992@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 167dd7f8-2a25-4be1-aa46-3b6f1a5f94c6
83 lines
3.8 KiB
YAML
83 lines
3.8 KiB
YAML
# audit-core — NetKingdom security layer declaration
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#
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# Framework: net-kingdom/canon/standards/security-layer-model_v0.7.md
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# Assent: AUDIT-IN-0001 (audit-core's own voice, per §11 "who must declare")
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# history/2026-08-28-approval-evidence-assent.md
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# history/2026-08-29-security-layer-model-v0.6-review.md
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# history/2026-08-29-v0.7-alignment-and-scope-assessment.md
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#
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# Reference form offered by ops-warden and adopted here, so §11's declaration
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# check is mechanical rather than a reader's judgment about prose. audit-core
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# raised that defect; adopting the form is the other half of raising it.
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schema_version: "0.1"
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framework: netkingdom-security-layer-model
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standard_version: "0.7"
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repository: audit-core
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layer: engine
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role: evidence # §3.3 engine typing
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declared_by: intakes/intakes.md AUDIT-IN-0001
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declared_at: "2026-08-29"
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# §3.3: an Evidence engine records what happened and proves integrity of what
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# it holds. It is explicitly not a decision point (§6, §9.4).
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decision_surfaces_exposed: none
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# §9.4 — normative and permanent. audit-core exposes no verdict on whether an
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# approval is still valid; a consumer branching on such an answer would route an
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# authorization decision through the audit fabric.
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approval_validity_query: forbidden
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# §5 applies to Staff. audit-core is an Engine and holds no §4 Tooling contact
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# (key-cape, OpenBao). Companion §4 asks that UNCATALOGUED infrastructure be
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# listed anyway so the check is total rather than vacuous, and that carve-out
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# sunsets within two review intervals for a store another layer reads.
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#
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# Completed 2026-09-10 (AUDIT-WP-0009-T10). The list below is asserted total by
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# `tests/test_layer_conformance.py`, which fails when a new infrastructure
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# contact appears in `deploy/` without a row here — the check is mechanical
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# rather than a promise to remember.
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tooling_contacts: []
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uncatalogued_infrastructure:
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- id: platform-pg
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system: CNPG PostgreSQL on railiance01
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role: audit-core's own operational custody store
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read_by_other_layers: true # subject to the companion §4 sunset
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note: >-
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Not a §4 Tooling row. Listed for totality, not as a declared gap.
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- id: state-hub
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system: Custodian State Hub
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role: >-
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Work coordination only. Reads and writes workplans, tasks, intakes and
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progress events. Carries no audit event, no sender credential and no
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custody role, and audit-core's runtime does not contact it — this is a
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development-time contact, listed because §5 totality does not distinguish.
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read_by_other_layers: false
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- id: kube-apiserver
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system: k3s API server on railiance01
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role: >-
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Written by the audit-core-attest CronJob to publish the chain-head
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attestation into one named ConfigMap (AUDIT-WP-0009-T02). The receiver
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has no API-server egress: a receiver able to rewrite its own attestation
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could forge it, so the reach belongs to the attest workload alone.
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read_by_other_layers: false
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- id: forgejo.coulomb.social
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system: Container registry
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role: >-
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Image source, pinned by digest in deploy/. Build-time contact; no runtime
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call. Listed because a registry that can change what runs is an
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infrastructure contact whether or not §5 catalogues it.
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read_by_other_layers: false
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# §9.6 — the bound audit-core delivers, stated so no doctrine rests on more.
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evidence_bound:
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proves:
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- records held were not altered after arrival
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- records held were not truncated after arrival
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does_not_prove:
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- that a record was ever sent
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- absence of a record as evidence of non-occurrence
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conditional_on:
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- external chain-head attestation stored outside platform-pg
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contract: docs/integrity.md
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not_claimed: [WORM, object-lock, archival-custody]
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