Registration: attributive, with the declared completeness_trade recorded on the receiver side rather than only in the emitter, per §9.6's requirement that the trade travel with the trail. tenants ["*"] is justified rather than inherited — tenant-engine's events carry the affected tenant, the set is every tenant including ones created later, and an explicit list would fail closed at exactly the moment a tenant is provisioned, dead-lettering the creation evidence of the tenant whose creation it is. source stays pinned exactly. Ingress ANDs namespace and pod label; a weaker evidence class is not a reason for a wider network rule. All inert until the token exists. Then the finding T04 existed to find: tenant-engine cannot deliver a single event today. envelope_for sends five required fields under other names — event_id, action, resource, observed_at, details — and omits correlation_id entirely, so normalize() raises invalid_event. Verified by running the real envelope through the real function, not by reading. Worse than an ordinary integration bug. The drain treats 400 as terminal, so the outbox row is marked handled while audit-core holds only a dead letter, which is not chained and is not custody. Lost on both sides, and since the drain is non-blocking and attributive, nothing fails loudly — a silent total loss of the stream presenting as a working integration. Taking the correction the intake invited rather than accepting a lossy record. normalize() is NOT relaxed to accept the alternate spellings: a receiver that guesses which sender key means which stored field has made the mapping its own, and the record stops being the sender's assertion. correlation_id cannot be synthesized at all — an invented one ties an event to an operation audit-core never observed. Root cause is ours. The accepted envelope was published nowhere a sender could read it; audit-backend-contract.md describes the stored record, and a sender reading it would reasonably infer exactly the names tenant-engine used. schema_version audit-core.event.v1alpha1 selects nothing here and gave a false impression of a negotiated contract. Published docs/event-envelope.md as the wire contract, including the point that a 400 means the event is not in the archive and must be treated as a defect to fix rather than a delivery outcome. T05 moved to wait: nothing to prove end to end until an event can be accepted. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Nb7Q6ZmXppNDkTWytfYqfv Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 2069992@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 167dd7f8-2a25-4be1-aa46-3b6f1a5f94c6
197 lines
6.2 KiB
YAML
197 lines
6.2 KiB
YAML
# Default-deny plus the narrowest set of exceptions (AUDIT-WP-0005-T03).
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#
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# The receiver holds the audit trail, so reachability is part of its threat
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# model: only the declared sender may write, and only the declared operator
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# path may read.
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---
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apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
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kind: NetworkPolicy
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metadata:
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name: audit-core-default-deny
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namespace: audit-core
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spec:
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podSelector: {}
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policyTypes: [Ingress, Egress]
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# No rules: everything not permitted below is denied.
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---
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apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
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kind: NetworkPolicy
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metadata:
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name: audit-core-sender-ingress
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namespace: audit-core
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spec:
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podSelector:
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matchLabels:
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app.kubernetes.io/name: audit-core
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policyTypes: [Ingress]
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ingress:
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# user-engine is the only sender. A second sender is a deliberate change
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# here and a matching entry in AUDIT_CORE_SENDERS — the network rule and
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# the credential binding must move together.
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- from:
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- namespaceSelector:
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matchLabels:
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kubernetes.io/metadata.name: user-engine
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ports:
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- {protocol: TCP, port: 8080}
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---
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apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
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kind: NetworkPolicy
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metadata:
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name: audit-core-tenant-engine-ingress
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namespace: audit-core
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spec:
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podSelector:
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matchLabels:
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app.kubernetes.io/name: audit-core
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policyTypes: [Ingress]
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ingress:
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# AUDIT-WP-0010-T03 / AUDIT-IN-0002. Attributive mutation evidence.
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# Both selectors belong to one peer and are therefore ANDed. Attributive
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# rather than load-bearing changes what may be claimed of the stream, not
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# how narrow its reachability should be — a weaker evidence class is not a
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# reason for a wider network rule.
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- from:
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- namespaceSelector:
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matchLabels:
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kubernetes.io/metadata.name: tenant-engine
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podSelector:
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matchLabels:
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app.kubernetes.io/name: tenant-engine
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ports:
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- {protocol: TCP, port: 8080}
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---
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apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
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kind: NetworkPolicy
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metadata:
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name: audit-core-whitehat-ingress
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namespace: audit-core
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spec:
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podSelector:
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matchLabels:
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app.kubernetes.io/name: audit-core
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policyTypes: [Ingress]
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ingress:
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# Governed E2 evidence plane. Both selectors belong to one peer and are
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# therefore ANDed: only the registered audit-core probe in the dedicated
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# whitehat namespace reaches this port. Application sender authentication
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# and tenant scope remain the inner boundary.
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- from:
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- namespaceSelector:
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matchLabels:
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kubernetes.io/metadata.name: whitehat
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podSelector:
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matchLabels:
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whitehat.security/plane: "true"
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whitehat.security/target: audit-core
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ports:
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- {protocol: TCP, port: 8080}
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---
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apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
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kind: NetworkPolicy
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metadata:
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name: audit-core-approval-engine-ingress
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namespace: audit-core
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spec:
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podSelector:
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matchLabels:
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app.kubernetes.io/name: audit-core
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policyTypes: [Ingress]
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ingress:
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# AUDIT-WP-0009-T09 / AUDIT-IN-0001. Load-bearing approval evidence
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# (§9.4). Both selectors belong to one peer and are therefore ANDed:
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# only the approval-engine workload in its own namespace reaches this
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# port. Splitting them into two list items would turn AND into OR and
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# admit every pod in either set.
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#
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# Narrower than user-engine's namespace-only rule on purpose: this is a
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# new sender, and a new rule should not inherit an older rule's breadth.
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# user-engine's policy is deliberately left unchanged.
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- from:
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- namespaceSelector:
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matchLabels:
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kubernetes.io/metadata.name: approval-engine
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podSelector:
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matchLabels:
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app.kubernetes.io/name: approval-engine
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ports:
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- {protocol: TCP, port: 8080}
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---
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apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
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kind: NetworkPolicy
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metadata:
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name: audit-core-informed-decision-ingress
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namespace: audit-core
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spec:
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podSelector:
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matchLabels:
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app.kubernetes.io/name: audit-core
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policyTypes: [Ingress]
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ingress:
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# AUDIT-WP-0009-T11 / AUDIT-IN-0003. Load-bearing presentation evidence
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# under GH-DEC-2026-012 limit 3 and GH-DEC-2026-014. Both selectors belong
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# to one peer and are therefore ANDed, following the approval-engine rule
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# rather than user-engine's older namespace-only breadth.
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#
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# Note what this rule does NOT create: no egress from audit-core to
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# informed-decision. The commitment-only record's custody declaration is
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# carried, never dereferenced from here — audit-core makes no retrieval
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# call, and the egress policy below is the proof.
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- from:
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- namespaceSelector:
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matchLabels:
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kubernetes.io/metadata.name: informed-decision
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podSelector:
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matchLabels:
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app.kubernetes.io/name: informed-decision
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ports:
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- {protocol: TCP, port: 8080}
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---
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apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
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kind: NetworkPolicy
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metadata:
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name: audit-core-operator-ingress
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namespace: audit-core
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spec:
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podSelector:
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matchLabels:
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app.kubernetes.io/name: audit-core
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policyTypes: [Ingress]
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ingress:
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# Operator read path: lookup, dead letters, secret findings, stats.
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# Namespace-scoped rather than open, and still gated on a credential
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# carrying may_read — the network rule is the outer of two checks, not the
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# only one.
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- from:
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- namespaceSelector:
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matchLabels:
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railiance.io/audit-core-reader: "true"
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ports:
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- {protocol: TCP, port: 8080}
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---
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apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
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kind: NetworkPolicy
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metadata:
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name: audit-core-egress
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namespace: audit-core
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spec:
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podSelector:
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matchLabels:
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app.kubernetes.io/name: audit-core
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policyTypes: [Egress]
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egress:
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# PostgreSQL custody store. This is the only destination the receiver needs;
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# it calls no other service.
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- to:
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- namespaceSelector:
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matchLabels:
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kubernetes.io/metadata.name: databases
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ports:
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- {protocol: TCP, port: 5432}
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- to:
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- namespaceSelector:
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matchLabels:
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kubernetes.io/metadata.name: kube-system
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ports:
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- {protocol: UDP, port: 53}
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- {protocol: TCP, port: 53}
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