audit-core/deploy/networkpolicies.yaml
tegwick 3c2cdcdf79 AUDIT-WP-0010 T01/T03/T04 — admit tenant-engine, and the envelope does not match
Registration: attributive, with the declared completeness_trade recorded on the
receiver side rather than only in the emitter, per §9.6's requirement that the
trade travel with the trail. tenants ["*"] is justified rather than inherited —
tenant-engine's events carry the affected tenant, the set is every tenant
including ones created later, and an explicit list would fail closed at exactly
the moment a tenant is provisioned, dead-lettering the creation evidence of the
tenant whose creation it is. source stays pinned exactly. Ingress ANDs namespace
and pod label; a weaker evidence class is not a reason for a wider network rule.
All inert until the token exists.

Then the finding T04 existed to find: tenant-engine cannot deliver a single
event today. envelope_for sends five required fields under other names —
event_id, action, resource, observed_at, details — and omits correlation_id
entirely, so normalize() raises invalid_event. Verified by running the real
envelope through the real function, not by reading.

Worse than an ordinary integration bug. The drain treats 400 as terminal, so the
outbox row is marked handled while audit-core holds only a dead letter, which is
not chained and is not custody. Lost on both sides, and since the drain is
non-blocking and attributive, nothing fails loudly — a silent total loss of the
stream presenting as a working integration.

Taking the correction the intake invited rather than accepting a lossy record.
normalize() is NOT relaxed to accept the alternate spellings: a receiver that
guesses which sender key means which stored field has made the mapping its own,
and the record stops being the sender's assertion. correlation_id cannot be
synthesized at all — an invented one ties an event to an operation audit-core
never observed.

Root cause is ours. The accepted envelope was published nowhere a sender could
read it; audit-backend-contract.md describes the stored record, and a sender
reading it would reasonably infer exactly the names tenant-engine used.
schema_version audit-core.event.v1alpha1 selects nothing here and gave a false
impression of a negotiated contract. Published docs/event-envelope.md as the
wire contract, including the point that a 400 means the event is not in the
archive and must be treated as a defect to fix rather than a delivery outcome.

T05 moved to wait: nothing to prove end to end until an event can be accepted.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Nb7Q6ZmXppNDkTWytfYqfv

Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 2069992@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 167dd7f8-2a25-4be1-aa46-3b6f1a5f94c6
2026-09-10 16:34:45 +02:00

197 lines
6.2 KiB
YAML

# Default-deny plus the narrowest set of exceptions (AUDIT-WP-0005-T03).
#
# The receiver holds the audit trail, so reachability is part of its threat
# model: only the declared sender may write, and only the declared operator
# path may read.
---
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: audit-core-default-deny
namespace: audit-core
spec:
podSelector: {}
policyTypes: [Ingress, Egress]
# No rules: everything not permitted below is denied.
---
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: audit-core-sender-ingress
namespace: audit-core
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: audit-core
policyTypes: [Ingress]
ingress:
# user-engine is the only sender. A second sender is a deliberate change
# here and a matching entry in AUDIT_CORE_SENDERS — the network rule and
# the credential binding must move together.
- from:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
kubernetes.io/metadata.name: user-engine
ports:
- {protocol: TCP, port: 8080}
---
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: audit-core-tenant-engine-ingress
namespace: audit-core
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: audit-core
policyTypes: [Ingress]
ingress:
# AUDIT-WP-0010-T03 / AUDIT-IN-0002. Attributive mutation evidence.
# Both selectors belong to one peer and are therefore ANDed. Attributive
# rather than load-bearing changes what may be claimed of the stream, not
# how narrow its reachability should be — a weaker evidence class is not a
# reason for a wider network rule.
- from:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
kubernetes.io/metadata.name: tenant-engine
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: tenant-engine
ports:
- {protocol: TCP, port: 8080}
---
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: audit-core-whitehat-ingress
namespace: audit-core
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: audit-core
policyTypes: [Ingress]
ingress:
# Governed E2 evidence plane. Both selectors belong to one peer and are
# therefore ANDed: only the registered audit-core probe in the dedicated
# whitehat namespace reaches this port. Application sender authentication
# and tenant scope remain the inner boundary.
- from:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
kubernetes.io/metadata.name: whitehat
podSelector:
matchLabels:
whitehat.security/plane: "true"
whitehat.security/target: audit-core
ports:
- {protocol: TCP, port: 8080}
---
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: audit-core-approval-engine-ingress
namespace: audit-core
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: audit-core
policyTypes: [Ingress]
ingress:
# AUDIT-WP-0009-T09 / AUDIT-IN-0001. Load-bearing approval evidence
# (§9.4). Both selectors belong to one peer and are therefore ANDed:
# only the approval-engine workload in its own namespace reaches this
# port. Splitting them into two list items would turn AND into OR and
# admit every pod in either set.
#
# Narrower than user-engine's namespace-only rule on purpose: this is a
# new sender, and a new rule should not inherit an older rule's breadth.
# user-engine's policy is deliberately left unchanged.
- from:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
kubernetes.io/metadata.name: approval-engine
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: approval-engine
ports:
- {protocol: TCP, port: 8080}
---
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: audit-core-informed-decision-ingress
namespace: audit-core
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: audit-core
policyTypes: [Ingress]
ingress:
# AUDIT-WP-0009-T11 / AUDIT-IN-0003. Load-bearing presentation evidence
# under GH-DEC-2026-012 limit 3 and GH-DEC-2026-014. Both selectors belong
# to one peer and are therefore ANDed, following the approval-engine rule
# rather than user-engine's older namespace-only breadth.
#
# Note what this rule does NOT create: no egress from audit-core to
# informed-decision. The commitment-only record's custody declaration is
# carried, never dereferenced from here — audit-core makes no retrieval
# call, and the egress policy below is the proof.
- from:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
kubernetes.io/metadata.name: informed-decision
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: informed-decision
ports:
- {protocol: TCP, port: 8080}
---
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: audit-core-operator-ingress
namespace: audit-core
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: audit-core
policyTypes: [Ingress]
ingress:
# Operator read path: lookup, dead letters, secret findings, stats.
# Namespace-scoped rather than open, and still gated on a credential
# carrying may_read — the network rule is the outer of two checks, not the
# only one.
- from:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
railiance.io/audit-core-reader: "true"
ports:
- {protocol: TCP, port: 8080}
---
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: audit-core-egress
namespace: audit-core
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: audit-core
policyTypes: [Egress]
egress:
# PostgreSQL custody store. This is the only destination the receiver needs;
# it calls no other service.
- to:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
kubernetes.io/metadata.name: databases
ports:
- {protocol: TCP, port: 5432}
- to:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
kubernetes.io/metadata.name: kube-system
ports:
- {protocol: UDP, port: 53}
- {protocol: TCP, port: 53}