tegwick
4c940d49ae
Apply the separate attestor identity, named-ConfigMap RBAC, attest egress and daily CronJob. Bootstrap an empty chain-head ConfigMap only because it was absent; drop the placeholder from the apply path so a later apply cannot overwrite a live head. One-shot job published a 59-event attestation; mounted readback and receiver write-denial passed. Offsite copy stays the operator path. Assistant: grok Assistant-Session: 01a0a182-bab7-7f11-b32b-d06f3af52082
234 lines
7.5 KiB
YAML
234 lines
7.5 KiB
YAML
# Default-deny plus the narrowest set of exceptions (AUDIT-WP-0005-T03).
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#
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# The receiver holds the audit trail, so reachability is part of its threat
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# model: only the declared sender may write, and only the declared operator
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# path may read.
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---
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apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
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kind: NetworkPolicy
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metadata:
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name: audit-core-default-deny
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namespace: audit-core
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spec:
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podSelector: {}
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policyTypes: [Ingress, Egress]
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# No rules: everything not permitted below is denied.
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---
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apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
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kind: NetworkPolicy
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metadata:
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name: audit-core-sender-ingress
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namespace: audit-core
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spec:
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podSelector:
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matchLabels:
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app.kubernetes.io/name: audit-core
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policyTypes: [Ingress]
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ingress:
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# user-engine is the only sender. A second sender is a deliberate change
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# here and a matching entry in AUDIT_CORE_SENDERS — the network rule and
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# the credential binding must move together.
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- from:
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- namespaceSelector:
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matchLabels:
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kubernetes.io/metadata.name: user-engine
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ports:
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- {protocol: TCP, port: 8080}
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---
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apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
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kind: NetworkPolicy
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metadata:
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name: audit-core-tenant-engine-ingress
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namespace: audit-core
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spec:
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podSelector:
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matchLabels:
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app.kubernetes.io/name: audit-core
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policyTypes: [Ingress]
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ingress:
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# AUDIT-WP-0010-T03 / AUDIT-IN-0002. Attributive mutation evidence.
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# Both selectors belong to one peer and are therefore ANDed. Attributive
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# rather than load-bearing changes what may be claimed of the stream, not
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# how narrow its reachability should be — a weaker evidence class is not a
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# reason for a wider network rule.
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- from:
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- namespaceSelector:
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matchLabels:
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kubernetes.io/metadata.name: tenant-engine
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podSelector:
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matchLabels:
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app.kubernetes.io/name: tenant-engine
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ports:
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- {protocol: TCP, port: 8080}
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---
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apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
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kind: NetworkPolicy
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metadata:
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name: audit-core-whitehat-ingress
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namespace: audit-core
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spec:
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podSelector:
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matchLabels:
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app.kubernetes.io/name: audit-core
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policyTypes: [Ingress]
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ingress:
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# Governed E2 evidence plane. Both selectors belong to one peer and are
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# therefore ANDed: only the registered audit-core probe in the dedicated
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# whitehat namespace reaches this port. Application sender authentication
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# and tenant scope remain the inner boundary.
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- from:
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- namespaceSelector:
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matchLabels:
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kubernetes.io/metadata.name: whitehat
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podSelector:
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matchLabels:
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whitehat.security/plane: "true"
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whitehat.security/target: audit-core
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ports:
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- {protocol: TCP, port: 8080}
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---
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apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
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kind: NetworkPolicy
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metadata:
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name: audit-core-approval-engine-ingress
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namespace: audit-core
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spec:
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podSelector:
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matchLabels:
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app.kubernetes.io/name: audit-core
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policyTypes: [Ingress]
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ingress:
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# AUDIT-WP-0009-T09 / AUDIT-IN-0001. Load-bearing approval evidence
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# (§9.4). Both selectors belong to one peer and are therefore ANDed:
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# only the approval-engine workload in its own namespace reaches this
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# port. Splitting them into two list items would turn AND into OR and
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# admit every pod in either set.
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#
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# Narrower than user-engine's namespace-only rule on purpose: this is a
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# new sender, and a new rule should not inherit an older rule's breadth.
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# user-engine's policy is deliberately left unchanged.
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- from:
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- namespaceSelector:
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matchLabels:
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kubernetes.io/metadata.name: approval-engine
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podSelector:
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matchLabels:
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app.kubernetes.io/name: approval-engine
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ports:
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- {protocol: TCP, port: 8080}
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---
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apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
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kind: NetworkPolicy
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metadata:
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name: audit-core-informed-decision-ingress
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namespace: audit-core
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spec:
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podSelector:
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matchLabels:
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app.kubernetes.io/name: audit-core
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policyTypes: [Ingress]
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ingress:
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# AUDIT-WP-0009-T11 / AUDIT-IN-0003. Load-bearing presentation evidence
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# under GH-DEC-2026-012 limit 3 and GH-DEC-2026-014. Both selectors belong
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# to one peer and are therefore ANDed, following the approval-engine rule
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# rather than user-engine's older namespace-only breadth.
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#
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# Note what this rule does NOT create: no egress from audit-core to
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# informed-decision. The commitment-only record's custody declaration is
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# carried, never dereferenced from here — audit-core makes no retrieval
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# call, and the egress policy below is the proof.
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- from:
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- namespaceSelector:
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matchLabels:
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kubernetes.io/metadata.name: informed-decision
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podSelector:
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matchLabels:
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app.kubernetes.io/name: informed-decision
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ports:
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- {protocol: TCP, port: 8080}
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---
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apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
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kind: NetworkPolicy
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metadata:
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name: audit-core-operator-ingress
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namespace: audit-core
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spec:
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podSelector:
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matchLabels:
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app.kubernetes.io/name: audit-core
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policyTypes: [Ingress]
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ingress:
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# Operator read path: lookup, dead letters, secret findings, stats.
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# Namespace-scoped rather than open, and still gated on a credential
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# carrying may_read — the network rule is the outer of two checks, not the
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# only one.
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- from:
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- namespaceSelector:
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matchLabels:
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railiance.io/audit-core-reader: "true"
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ports:
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- {protocol: TCP, port: 8080}
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---
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apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
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kind: NetworkPolicy
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metadata:
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name: audit-core-attest-egress
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namespace: audit-core
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spec:
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# Scoped to the attestation job by component label, so the receiver itself
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# gains nothing from this rule. The receiver must not be able to reach the
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# API server: a compromised receiver that could rewrite the chain-head
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# ConfigMap could forge its own attestation, which is the one thing the
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# separation of these two workloads exists to prevent.
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podSelector:
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matchLabels:
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app.kubernetes.io/name: audit-core
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app.kubernetes.io/component: attest
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policyTypes: [Egress]
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egress:
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- to:
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- namespaceSelector:
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matchLabels:
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kubernetes.io/metadata.name: databases
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ports:
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- {protocol: TCP, port: 5432}
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- to:
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- namespaceSelector:
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matchLabels:
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kubernetes.io/metadata.name: kube-system
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ports:
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- {protocol: UDP, port: 53}
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- {protocol: TCP, port: 53}
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# kube-apiserver. In-cluster clients use kubernetes.default.svc:443;
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# the host listener is 6443. Both, and no other ports.
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- ports:
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- {protocol: TCP, port: 443}
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- {protocol: TCP, port: 6443}
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---
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apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
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kind: NetworkPolicy
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metadata:
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name: audit-core-egress
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namespace: audit-core
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spec:
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podSelector:
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matchLabels:
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app.kubernetes.io/name: audit-core
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app.kubernetes.io/component: receiver
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policyTypes: [Egress]
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egress:
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# PostgreSQL custody store. This is the only destination the receiver needs;
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# it calls no other service.
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- to:
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- namespaceSelector:
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matchLabels:
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kubernetes.io/metadata.name: databases
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ports:
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- {protocol: TCP, port: 5432}
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- to:
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- namespaceSelector:
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matchLabels:
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kubernetes.io/metadata.name: kube-system
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ports:
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- {protocol: UDP, port: 53}
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- {protocol: TCP, port: 53}
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