audit-core/deploy/senders-scope.yaml
tegwick bbe8c15494
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fix(admission): restrict approval audit sender to the platform tenant
Assistant: codex
Assistant-Model: gpt-5.6-luna
Assistant-Session: 01a07ff8-19d0-7820-b4d0-1353833cb7fc
2026-09-08 17:01:41 +02:00

39 lines
1.3 KiB
YAML

# Non-secret sender scope (AUDIT-WP-0006-T05). Tokens stay in Secret
# audit-core-senders. This ConfigMap is the authority for tenants/sources
# so an ExternalSecret refresh cannot revert user-engine to a single tenant.
# Keep in lockstep with deploy/senders-scope.json.
#
# The overlay only ever applies to a sender the Secret already carries, so an
# entry here for a sender with no token yet is inert. That is what makes the
# approval-engine entry safe to land ahead of its credential.
#
# evidence_kind may be raised here (attributive -> load-bearing) but never
# lowered: a ConfigMap refresh must not be able to drop a source's §9.6
# atomicity and detection obligations without anyone deciding to.
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: ConfigMap
metadata:
name: audit-core-senders-scope
namespace: audit-core
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: audit-core
data:
senders-scope.json: |
[
{
"name": "user-engine",
"sources": ["user-engine"],
"tenants": ["*"],
"may_write": true,
"may_read": false
},
{
"name": "approval-engine",
"sources": ["approval-engine"],
"tenants": ["tenant:platform"],
"may_write": true,
"may_read": false,
"evidence_kind": "load-bearing"
}
]