The detection half audit-core argued up to a MUST and then could not support. Two registered sources were waiting on it. T04, heartbeats. A heartbeat is an ordinary event — same envelope, same append-only custody, same chain, no special table. Deliberate: a heartbeat stored outside the chain would be the one record here that could be back-dated. Declared per class rather than per source, because a per-source heartbeat from a mixed-volume emitter is satisfied by its chattiest class and says nothing about the quiet, security-relevant one, which is the only reason heartbeats exist. Not the §17 cadence schema T05 waits on: cadence describes expected rate, this says how often a source promises to say "nothing to report" for a class that may legitimately be silent. no_heartbeat_since_registration is its own finding kind rather than a skip — it is the case most likely to be a broken integration and the one a naive "compare against last seen" implementation silently drops. Grace widens the window so one late run does not flap; it never removes a finding. T06, reconciliation. Counts, never payloads. The awkward part is that every registered sender holds may_read: false, which taken literally makes the §9.6 reconciliation obligation undischargeable by every source actually registered. Resolved by observing that a source asking how many of its own events we hold is not reading the archive — it learns nothing it did not itself emit. So the surface is scoped to the caller's own sources and tenants and returns no payloads; anything wider stays behind may_read and full tenant scope. Another source's counts return 403 rather than an empty count, because a zero would read as "we hold none of yours" — a false answer to a question about completeness. No default window, since a count whose bounds the caller did not choose is not comparable to anything the caller computed. T07, the findings surface. /v1/stream-findings, following the dead-letter and secret-finding conventions: may_read plus full tenant scope, since findings span every sender and carry no tenant key to filter on. The bound is on every response rather than in a document nobody opens beside it. A missing heartbeat is not proof of suppression, and agreement on counts proves neither completeness nor that any event occurred. Both controls cover loss, outage, drain failure and accident; neither covers a source lying about itself, and where the emitter is compromised both agree with it. Closing that needs an observer independent of the emitter, which §16 put outside our scope. The scope overlay may shorten a heartbeat interval or add a class, never lengthen or remove one — same asymmetry as evidence_kind, and for the same reason: a ConfigMap refresh must not widen the window in which a suppressed class goes unnoticed without anyone deciding to. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Nb7Q6ZmXppNDkTWytfYqfv Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 2069992@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 167dd7f8-2a25-4be1-aa46-3b6f1a5f94c6
437 lines
16 KiB
Python
437 lines
16 KiB
Python
"""Durable SQLite audit backend.
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Implements the idempotent backend contract for single-node deployments and for
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development. Production custody moves to PostgreSQL under AUDIT-WP-0005; this
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backend stays the development and test implementation and defines the
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behaviour the Postgres backend must match.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import json
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import sqlite3
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import threading
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from datetime import datetime, timezone
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from audit_core.stream_findings import HEARTBEAT_ACTION
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from audit_core.interface import (
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AcceptResult,
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AuditEvent,
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BackendUnavailableError,
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EventConflictError,
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EventValidationError,
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RetentionPolicy,
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validate_event,
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)
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from audit_core.integrity import (
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GENESIS,
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ChainRow,
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attestation_from_report,
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chain_link,
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verify_rows,
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)
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_SCHEMA = """
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CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS events (
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event_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
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payload_hash TEXT NOT NULL,
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accepted_at TEXT NOT NULL,
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correlation_id TEXT,
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tenant TEXT NOT NULL,
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record TEXT NOT NULL,
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chain_hash TEXT,
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chain_prev TEXT
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);
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CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS events_correlation_idx ON events (correlation_id);
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CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS events_tenant_idx ON events (tenant);
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CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS dead_letters (
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id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
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event_id TEXT,
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received_at TEXT NOT NULL,
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sender TEXT,
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reason TEXT NOT NULL,
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payload_hash TEXT NOT NULL,
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payload TEXT,
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payload_withheld INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0
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);
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CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS dead_letters_event_idx ON dead_letters (event_id);
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-- Counted per field path, not merely per event: the point is to stop senders
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-- emitting secret-shaped fields, and that needs the offending path named.
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CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS secret_findings (
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sender TEXT NOT NULL,
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source TEXT NOT NULL,
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action TEXT NOT NULL,
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field_path TEXT NOT NULL,
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outcome TEXT NOT NULL,
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persisted INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
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occurrences INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
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first_seen TEXT NOT NULL,
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last_seen TEXT NOT NULL,
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PRIMARY KEY (sender, source, action, field_path, outcome)
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);
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"""
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# Rejection reasons whose payload must never be persisted. Storing the body of
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# an event rejected *for containing secret-shaped material* would write that
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# material into the audit store — the precise outcome the rejection prevents.
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WITHHOLD_PAYLOAD_REASONS = frozenset({"secret_shaped_field"})
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class SQLiteAuditBackend:
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"""Store audit events in SQLite with idempotent accept semantics.
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Configured for durability rather than speed: WAL journalling, ``synchronous
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= FULL`` so an acknowledged write has reached disk, and a busy timeout so
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concurrent writers wait instead of raising immediately.
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"""
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def __init__(self, path: str, retention_days: int | None = None, busy_timeout_ms: int = 5000) -> None:
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self.path = path
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self.retention_days = retention_days
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self.busy_timeout_ms = int(busy_timeout_ms)
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# One connection per thread. A shared connection lets concurrent
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# statements interleave, which was observed to let two callers both
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# believe they were the first to accept the same event.
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self._local = threading.local()
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with self._connect_raw() as setup:
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setup.executescript(_SCHEMA)
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self._ensure_chain_columns(setup)
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def _connect_raw(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
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try:
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db = sqlite3.connect(self.path, isolation_level=None)
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db.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode = WAL")
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db.execute("PRAGMA synchronous = FULL")
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db.execute(f"PRAGMA busy_timeout = {self.busy_timeout_ms}")
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return db
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except sqlite3.Error as exc:
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raise BackendUnavailableError(f"cannot open audit store: {exc}") from exc
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@property
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def db(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
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conn = getattr(self._local, "conn", None)
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if conn is None:
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conn = self._local.conn = self._connect_raw()
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return conn
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@property
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def retention_policy(self) -> RetentionPolicy:
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return RetentionPolicy(
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custody_class="development",
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retention_days=self.retention_days,
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immutable=False,
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tamper_evidence=False,
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durable=True,
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)
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def emit(self, event: AuditEvent) -> str:
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"""Persist an event, generating no idempotency guarantee."""
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return self.accept(event, payload_hash=_record_hash(event)).reference
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def accept(self, event: AuditEvent, payload_hash: str) -> AcceptResult:
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try:
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validate_event(event)
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except EventValidationError:
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raise
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reference = f"audit:{event.event_id}"
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details = event.details if isinstance(event.details, dict) else {}
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db = self.db
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try:
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# BEGIN IMMEDIATE takes the write lock up front, so the insert and
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# the follow-up read are one atomic pair. Without it, two callers
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# racing on the same event id can both be told they were first.
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db.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
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except sqlite3.Error as exc:
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raise BackendUnavailableError(str(exc)) from exc
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try:
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head = db.execute(
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"SELECT chain_hash FROM events "
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"ORDER BY accepted_at DESC, event_id DESC LIMIT 1"
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).fetchone()
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previous = head[0] if head and head[0] else GENESIS
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link = chain_link(previous, payload_hash, event.event_id)
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inserted = db.execute(
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"""
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INSERT INTO events
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(event_id, payload_hash, accepted_at, correlation_id, tenant, record,
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chain_hash, chain_prev)
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VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
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ON CONFLICT(event_id) DO NOTHING
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RETURNING event_id
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""",
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(
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event.event_id,
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payload_hash,
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datetime.now(timezone.utc).replace(microsecond=0).isoformat(),
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str(details.get("correlation_id") or "") or None,
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event.tenant,
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json.dumps(event.as_record(), sort_keys=True),
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link,
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previous,
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),
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).fetchone()
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existing = None
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if inserted is None:
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existing = db.execute(
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"SELECT payload_hash FROM events WHERE event_id = ?", (event.event_id,)
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).fetchone()
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db.execute("COMMIT")
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except sqlite3.Error as exc:
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_rollback(db)
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raise BackendUnavailableError(str(exc)) from exc
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except BaseException:
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_rollback(db)
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raise
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if inserted is not None:
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return AcceptResult(duplicate=False, reference=reference)
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if existing is None:
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# The row vanished between the insert and the read inside one
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# transaction, which should be impossible. Retryable rather than
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# guessed at.
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raise BackendUnavailableError("event disappeared during accept")
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if existing[0] != payload_hash:
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raise EventConflictError(
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f"event_id {event.event_id} already held with a different payload"
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)
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return AcceptResult(duplicate=True, reference=reference)
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# --- operator read surface (AUDIT-WP-0004-T05) --------------------------
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def get(self, event_id: str) -> dict | None:
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"""Return one stored event record, or None."""
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row = self._query(
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"SELECT record, accepted_at FROM events WHERE event_id = ?", (event_id,)
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)
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if not row:
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return None
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return {"accepted_at": row[0][1], **json.loads(row[0][0])}
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def by_correlation(self, correlation_id: str, limit: int = 100) -> list[dict]:
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"""Return every stored event carrying ``correlation_id``, oldest first."""
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rows = self._query(
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"SELECT record, accepted_at FROM events WHERE correlation_id = ? "
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"ORDER BY accepted_at, event_id LIMIT ?",
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(correlation_id, int(limit)),
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)
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return [{"accepted_at": at, **json.loads(rec)} for rec, at in rows]
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def event_counts(
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self, source: str, since: str, until: str, tenant: str | None = None
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) -> list[dict]:
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"""Per-class counts for one source over a bounded window.
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AUDIT-WP-0009-T06. Counts only — never payloads. A reconciliation
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answer that carried records would turn a completeness check into a read
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surface, and a source does not gain the right to read the archive by
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emitting into it.
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"""
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sql = (
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"SELECT json_extract(record, '$.action') AS action, count(*) "
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"FROM events WHERE json_extract(record, '$.source') = ? "
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"AND accepted_at >= ? AND accepted_at < ?"
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)
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params: tuple = (source, since, until)
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if tenant is not None:
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sql += " AND tenant = ?"
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params += (tenant,)
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sql += " GROUP BY action ORDER BY action"
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return [{"class": action, "count": count} for action, count in self._query(sql, params)]
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def last_heartbeats(self, source: str) -> dict[str, str]:
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"""Most recent heartbeat per class for one source."""
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rows = self._query(
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"SELECT json_extract(record, '$.details.data.class') AS cls, "
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"max(accepted_at) FROM events "
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"WHERE json_extract(record, '$.source') = ? "
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"AND json_extract(record, '$.action') = ? "
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"GROUP BY cls",
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(source, HEARTBEAT_ACTION),
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)
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return {cls: at for cls, at in rows if cls}
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def record_rejection(
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self,
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*,
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event_id: str | None,
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reason: str,
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payload_hash: str,
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sender: str | None = None,
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payload: str | None = None,
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) -> None:
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"""Record a rejected event so it is visible to an operator.
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A rejection is not a silent drop: the sender dead-letters the event and
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somebody has to be able to see why. The payload is withheld when the
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rejection reason implies it carries secret-shaped material.
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"""
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withheld = reason in WITHHOLD_PAYLOAD_REASONS
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try:
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self.db.execute(
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"INSERT INTO dead_letters "
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"(event_id, received_at, sender, reason, payload_hash, payload, payload_withheld) "
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"VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)",
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(
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event_id,
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datetime.now(timezone.utc).replace(microsecond=0).isoformat(),
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sender,
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reason,
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payload_hash,
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None if withheld else payload,
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1 if withheld else 0,
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),
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)
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except sqlite3.Error as exc:
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raise BackendUnavailableError(str(exc)) from exc
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def dead_letters(self, limit: int = 100) -> list[dict]:
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"""Return recent rejections, newest first."""
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rows = self._query(
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"SELECT event_id, received_at, sender, reason, payload_hash, payload, "
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"payload_withheld FROM dead_letters ORDER BY id DESC LIMIT ?",
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(int(limit),),
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)
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return [
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{
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"event_id": r[0],
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"received_at": r[1],
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"sender": r[2],
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"reason": r[3],
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"payload_hash": r[4],
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"payload": r[5],
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"payload_withheld": bool(r[6]),
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}
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for r in rows
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]
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def count_secret_findings(
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self, *, sender: str, source: str, action: str, outcome: str, findings
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) -> None:
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"""Increment the per-path counter for each finding.
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Written durably rather than held in memory: these counters exist to
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drive a fix in the sending service, and that work outlives a pod
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restart.
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"""
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now = datetime.now(timezone.utc).replace(microsecond=0).isoformat()
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try:
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for finding in findings:
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self.db.execute(
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"""
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INSERT INTO secret_findings
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(sender, source, action, field_path, outcome, persisted,
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occurrences, first_seen, last_seen)
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VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, 1, ?, ?)
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ON CONFLICT(sender, source, action, field_path, outcome)
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DO UPDATE SET occurrences = occurrences + 1, last_seen = excluded.last_seen
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""",
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(
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sender, source, action, finding.path, outcome,
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1 if finding.in_persisted_data else 0, now, now,
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),
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)
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except sqlite3.Error as exc:
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raise BackendUnavailableError(str(exc)) from exc
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def secret_findings(self, limit: int = 100) -> list[dict]:
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"""Return secret-shaped field counters, most frequent first."""
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rows = self._query(
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"SELECT sender, source, action, field_path, outcome, persisted, "
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"occurrences, first_seen, last_seen FROM secret_findings "
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"ORDER BY occurrences DESC, last_seen DESC LIMIT ?",
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(int(limit),),
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)
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return [
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{
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"sender": r[0], "source": r[1], "action": r[2], "field_path": r[3],
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"outcome": r[4], "persisted": bool(r[5]), "occurrences": r[6],
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"first_seen": r[7], "last_seen": r[8],
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}
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for r in rows
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]
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def _query(self, sql: str, params: tuple) -> list:
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try:
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return self.db.execute(sql, params).fetchall()
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except sqlite3.Error as exc:
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raise BackendUnavailableError(str(exc)) from exc
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def verify_chain(self, attestation: dict | None = None):
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rows = self._query(
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"SELECT event_id, payload_hash, chain_hash, chain_prev, accepted_at "
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"FROM events ORDER BY accepted_at, event_id",
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(),
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)
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return verify_rows(
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[
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ChainRow(
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event_id=r[0],
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payload_hash=r[1],
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chain_hash=r[2] or "",
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chain_prev=r[3] or "",
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accepted_at=r[4],
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)
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for r in rows
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],
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attestation=attestation,
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)
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def attest_chain(self) -> dict:
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return attestation_from_report(self.verify_chain())
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def _ensure_chain_columns(self, db: sqlite3.Connection) -> None:
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cols = {row[1] for row in db.execute("PRAGMA table_info(events)")}
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if "chain_hash" not in cols:
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db.execute("ALTER TABLE events ADD COLUMN chain_hash TEXT")
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if "chain_prev" not in cols:
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db.execute("ALTER TABLE events ADD COLUMN chain_prev TEXT")
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missing = db.execute(
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"SELECT event_id, payload_hash FROM events "
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"WHERE chain_hash IS NULL OR chain_prev IS NULL "
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"ORDER BY accepted_at, event_id"
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).fetchall()
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if not missing:
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return
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prev = GENESIS
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# Recompute the whole chain so a partial backfill cannot fork.
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for event_id, payload_hash in db.execute(
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"SELECT event_id, payload_hash FROM events ORDER BY accepted_at, event_id"
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):
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link = chain_link(prev, payload_hash, event_id)
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db.execute(
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"UPDATE events SET chain_prev = ?, chain_hash = ? WHERE event_id = ?",
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(prev, link, event_id),
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)
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prev = link
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def health(self) -> None:
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"""Raise :class:`BackendUnavailableError` if the store is unusable."""
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try:
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self.db.execute("SELECT 1 FROM events LIMIT 1").fetchone()
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except sqlite3.Error as exc:
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raise BackendUnavailableError(str(exc)) from exc
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def close(self) -> None:
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"""Close this thread's connection, if it has one."""
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conn = getattr(self._local, "conn", None)
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if conn is not None:
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conn.close()
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self._local.conn = None
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def _rollback(db: sqlite3.Connection) -> None:
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try:
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db.execute("ROLLBACK")
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except sqlite3.Error:
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pass
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def _record_hash(event: AuditEvent) -> str:
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import hashlib
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return hashlib.sha256(
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json.dumps(event.as_record(), sort_keys=True).encode("utf-8")
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).hexdigest()
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