Registration: attributive, with the declared completeness_trade recorded on the receiver side rather than only in the emitter, per §9.6's requirement that the trade travel with the trail. tenants ["*"] is justified rather than inherited — tenant-engine's events carry the affected tenant, the set is every tenant including ones created later, and an explicit list would fail closed at exactly the moment a tenant is provisioned, dead-lettering the creation evidence of the tenant whose creation it is. source stays pinned exactly. Ingress ANDs namespace and pod label; a weaker evidence class is not a reason for a wider network rule. All inert until the token exists. Then the finding T04 existed to find: tenant-engine cannot deliver a single event today. envelope_for sends five required fields under other names — event_id, action, resource, observed_at, details — and omits correlation_id entirely, so normalize() raises invalid_event. Verified by running the real envelope through the real function, not by reading. Worse than an ordinary integration bug. The drain treats 400 as terminal, so the outbox row is marked handled while audit-core holds only a dead letter, which is not chained and is not custody. Lost on both sides, and since the drain is non-blocking and attributive, nothing fails loudly — a silent total loss of the stream presenting as a working integration. Taking the correction the intake invited rather than accepting a lossy record. normalize() is NOT relaxed to accept the alternate spellings: a receiver that guesses which sender key means which stored field has made the mapping its own, and the record stops being the sender's assertion. correlation_id cannot be synthesized at all — an invented one ties an event to an operation audit-core never observed. Root cause is ours. The accepted envelope was published nowhere a sender could read it; audit-backend-contract.md describes the stored record, and a sender reading it would reasonably infer exactly the names tenant-engine used. schema_version audit-core.event.v1alpha1 selects nothing here and gave a false impression of a negotiated contract. Published docs/event-envelope.md as the wire contract, including the point that a 400 means the event is not in the archive and must be treated as a defect to fix rather than a delivery outcome. T05 moved to wait: nothing to prove end to end until an event can be accepted. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Nb7Q6ZmXppNDkTWytfYqfv Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 2069992@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 167dd7f8-2a25-4be1-aa46-3b6f1a5f94c6
137 lines
5.4 KiB
Python
137 lines
5.4 KiB
Python
from pathlib import Path
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ROOT = Path(__file__).parents[1]
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def test_whitehat_ingress_is_bound_to_namespace_and_target_labels():
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documents = (ROOT / "deploy" / "networkpolicies.yaml").read_text().split("\n---\n")
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policy = next(
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document
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for document in documents
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if "name: audit-core-whitehat-ingress" in document
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)
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# Both selectors must remain in the same `from` peer. Splitting them into
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# two list items changes AND to OR and would admit every pod in either set.
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expected_peer = """ - namespaceSelector:
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matchLabels:
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kubernetes.io/metadata.name: whitehat
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podSelector:
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matchLabels:
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whitehat.security/plane: \"true\"
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whitehat.security/target: audit-core"""
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assert expected_peer in policy
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assert policy.count(" - namespaceSelector:") == 1
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assert " - {protocol: TCP, port: 8080}" in policy
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def test_approval_engine_ingress_is_bound_to_namespace_and_pod_labels():
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"""AUDIT-WP-0009-T09. A load-bearing source gets a narrow rule, not a wide one."""
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documents = (ROOT / "deploy" / "networkpolicies.yaml").read_text().split("\n---\n")
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policy = next(
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document
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for document in documents
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if "name: audit-core-approval-engine-ingress" in document
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)
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# One `from` peer holding both selectors. Two list items would be OR, and
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# would admit every pod in the approval-engine namespace plus every pod
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# anywhere carrying the app label.
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expected_peer = """ - namespaceSelector:
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matchLabels:
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kubernetes.io/metadata.name: approval-engine
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podSelector:
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matchLabels:
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app.kubernetes.io/name: approval-engine"""
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assert expected_peer in policy
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assert policy.count(" - namespaceSelector:") == 1
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assert " - {protocol: TCP, port: 8080}" in policy
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def test_user_engine_sender_ingress_is_unchanged_by_the_new_sender():
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"""glas-harness asked for user-engine's sender to stay as it is."""
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documents = (ROOT / "deploy" / "networkpolicies.yaml").read_text().split("\n---\n")
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policy = next(
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document
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for document in documents
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if "name: audit-core-sender-ingress" in document
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)
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assert "kubernetes.io/metadata.name: user-engine" in policy
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assert "approval-engine" not in policy
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def test_informed_decision_ingress_is_bound_to_namespace_and_pod_labels():
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"""AUDIT-WP-0009-T11. A second load-bearing source gets the narrow rule too."""
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documents = (ROOT / "deploy" / "networkpolicies.yaml").read_text().split("\n---\n")
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policy = next(
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document
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for document in documents
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if "name: audit-core-informed-decision-ingress" in document
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)
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expected_peer = """ - namespaceSelector:
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matchLabels:
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kubernetes.io/metadata.name: informed-decision
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podSelector:
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matchLabels:
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app.kubernetes.io/name: informed-decision"""
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assert expected_peer in policy
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assert policy.count(" - namespaceSelector:") == 1
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assert " - {protocol: TCP, port: 8080}" in policy
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def test_no_egress_to_informed_decision_is_created():
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"""The custody declaration is carried, never dereferenced.
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GH-DEC-2026-014 limit 3 is met by storing an attributable declaration, not
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by audit-core retrieving content. If an egress rule to the emitter ever
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appears, the claim in docs/informed-decision-source-registration.md that
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audit-core performs no retrieval has silently stopped being true.
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"""
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documents = (ROOT / "deploy" / "networkpolicies.yaml").read_text().split("\n---\n")
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egress = next(
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document for document in documents if "name: audit-core-egress" in document
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)
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assert "informed-decision" not in egress
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assert "approval-engine" not in egress
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# Postgres and DNS only.
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assert egress.count(" - namespaceSelector:") == 2
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def test_tenant_engine_ingress_is_bound_to_namespace_and_pod_labels():
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"""AUDIT-WP-0010-T03. Attributive is a weaker claim, not a wider rule."""
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documents = (ROOT / "deploy" / "networkpolicies.yaml").read_text().split("\n---\n")
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policy = next(
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document
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for document in documents
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if "name: audit-core-tenant-engine-ingress" in document
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)
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expected_peer = """ - namespaceSelector:
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matchLabels:
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kubernetes.io/metadata.name: tenant-engine
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podSelector:
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matchLabels:
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app.kubernetes.io/name: tenant-engine"""
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assert expected_peer in policy
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assert policy.count(" - namespaceSelector:") == 1
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def test_every_sender_has_exactly_one_ingress_rule():
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"""A fourth sender fails here rather than silently in production.
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AUDIT-WP-0010-T03 asked for this: the policy set and the registered sender
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set must move together, and neither should be able to grow alone.
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"""
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import json
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text = (ROOT / "deploy" / "networkpolicies.yaml").read_text()
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scope = json.loads((ROOT / "deploy" / "senders-scope.json").read_text())
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senders = {entry["name"] for entry in scope}
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assert senders == {
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"user-engine", "approval-engine", "informed-decision", "tenant-engine"
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}
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# user-engine's rule predates the per-sender naming convention.
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assert "name: audit-core-sender-ingress" in text
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for sender in senders - {"user-engine"}:
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assert f"name: audit-core-{sender}-ingress" in text
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