tegwick
c4016a70d5
informed-decision is the browser-facing approver surface; GH-DEC-2026-012 limit 3 makes its evidence copy the one that must reach audit-core independently of the emitter, because there the actor being audited and the evidence source are the same component. Registration accepted on every proposed field — exact source, ["tenant:platform"], write true, read false, load-bearing, secret_policy redact. Prepared and inert: the scope overlay applies only to a sender the Secret already carries, asserted by test rather than by reading. Ingress ANDs namespace and pod label in one peer, following approval-engine rather than user-engine's older breadth. Gate House asked whether the record shape can carry a source-held-content declaration with a retrieval expectation, and asked for a straight answer rather than a rule the storage cannot meet. Both halves, which must travel together: It CAN carry the declaration. data is stored verbatim into details.data and hash-chained, so content_exists and custody need no schema change and become as tamper-evident as the commitment they accompany. It CANNOT detect non-production. audit-core performs no retrieval and its egress permits Postgres and DNS only. Detection happens at retrieval, by the reviewer; the stored declaration is what turns a blank into a failure attributable to the named custodian. Residual stated rather than left to be found: a custodian that never held the content can emit a false content_exists. audit-core validates the declaration's shape, never its truth — the same class as omission at source, and not closed by the chain, by attestation, or by T04/T06. A test asserts no egress to the emitter exists, because that claim silently stops being true if one appears. Cadence: reconciliation plus heartbeat is right for a mixed-volume source, with both scoped per class rather than per source — a per-source heartbeat is satisfied by the high-volume presentation stream and says nothing about a quiet month of dispositions. Bound: a compromised emitter suppresses the event and its own count together. Also recorded: commitment-only satisfies non-alteration and never reconstructability, in this repo's documents as in theirs; and tenant provenance under GH-DEC-2026-013 lands in the registration record, not the envelope, since audit-core checks a value the credential may write rather than resolving an identity claim. No secret was created and no production manifest applied. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Nb7Q6ZmXppNDkTWytfYqfv Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 2069992@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 167dd7f8-2a25-4be1-aa46-3b6f1a5f94c6 |
||
|---|---|---|
| .. | ||
| audit-core.yaml | ||
| clustersecretstore.yaml | ||
| externalsecret-senders.yaml | ||
| externalsecrets.yaml | ||
| migrate-job.yaml | ||
| networkpolicies.yaml | ||
| README.md | ||
| senders-scope.json | ||
| senders-scope.yaml | ||
railiance01 package
Target: railiance01 only. The workstation kubeconfig that talks to that API
is the k3s-api-railiance01 tunnel (local port 16444).
~/.kube/config-hosteurope currently points at 16443 (coulombcore); rewrite
the server port or export a copy before applying.
Apply order is documented in docs/operator-runbook.md. Do not apply the
Deployment until:
- The image digest is pinned (currently
sha256:c2fe39a0…from commitabd22fa). - Secrets
audit-core-database,audit-core-database-migrate, andaudit-core-sendersexist. ConfigMapaudit-core-senders-scopeis applied (deploy/senders-scope.yaml) before the Deployment mounts it. - Job
audit-core-migratehas completed.
make image-build
make deploy-dry-run