audit-core/tests/test_ingestion.py
tegwick 576caa2665
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Redact secret-shaped fields by default, countable per field path
AUDIT-WP-0004-T04, closing the workplan.

Decision (Bernd): default to redaction, allow rejection per sender. Losing an
audit record over one field is worse than storing it masked, but a
higher-assurance channel must be able to refuse rather than mask. secret_policy
is set per sender identity in AUDIT_CORE_SENDERS and defaults to redact.

Detection now covers the whole payload at any depth, including lists, rather
than only the top level of data. Under redaction the value is masked and the
key is preserved: dropping the key would hide that the sender transmitted the
field at all, which is exactly what an operator needs in order to stop it. The
stored record carries details.redaction with policy and affected paths, so a
reader never has to infer whether what they see is what was sent.

Idempotency is unaffected - the payload hash is taken over the original request
body, so redaction is deterministic and a resubmission still reconciles as a
duplicate.

Both outcomes are counted durably by sender, source, action and field path,
exposed at GET /v1/secret-findings. Per-path aggregation is the point: the
actionable unit is "stop emitting data.auth.token on membership.added", not
"there were 47 redactions". Counters survive restart because the fix they drive
lives in another service.

Contract doc updated to match. Tests 46 -> 50. WP-0004 is finished.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-10 16:02:22 +02:00

402 lines
15 KiB
Python

import io
import json
import pytest
from audit_core.ingestion import IngestionApplication
from audit_core.interface import BackendUnavailableError, RetentionPolicy
from audit_core.mock_file_backend import MockFileAuditBackend
from audit_core.sqlite_backend import SQLiteAuditBackend
def invoke(app, payload, *, token="opaque", key="evt-1", method="POST",
path="/v1/events", body=None, length=None):
raw = body if body is not None else json.dumps(payload).encode()
environ = {
"PATH_INFO": path,
"REQUEST_METHOD": method,
"CONTENT_LENGTH": str(len(raw)) if length is None else length,
"wsgi.input": io.BytesIO(raw),
"HTTP_AUTHORIZATION": f"Bearer {token}",
}
if key is not None:
environ["HTTP_IDEMPOTENCY_KEY"] = key
result = {}
out = b"".join(app(environ, lambda status, headers: result.update(status=status)))
return result["status"], (json.loads(out) if out else {})
def event(**overrides):
base = {
"id": "evt-1",
"type": "membership.added",
"source": "user-engine",
"subject": "membership-1",
"tenant": "tenant:friendly:binky",
"correlation_id": "corr-1",
"occurred_at": "2026-08-09T00:00:00+00:00",
"data": {"membership_id": "membership-1"},
}
base.update(overrides)
return base
@pytest.fixture
def app(tmp_path):
return IngestionApplication(SQLiteAuditBackend(str(tmp_path / "events.db")), "opaque")
# --- backend contract (T01) -------------------------------------------------
def test_refuses_a_non_durable_backend():
"""The development file backend must never become the production sink."""
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="not durable"):
IngestionApplication(MockFileAuditBackend(base_dir="/tmp/unused"), "opaque")
def test_readiness_reports_custody_class(app):
status, body = invoke(app, None, path="/readyz", method="GET", body=b"")
assert status.startswith("200")
assert body["durable"] is True
assert body["custody_class"] == "development"
def test_accepted_events_are_durable_across_reopen(tmp_path):
path = str(tmp_path / "events.db")
first = IngestionApplication(SQLiteAuditBackend(path), "opaque")
assert invoke(first, event())[0].startswith("202")
reopened = IngestionApplication(SQLiteAuditBackend(path), "opaque")
status, body = invoke(reopened, event())
assert status.startswith("200") and body["status"] == "duplicate"
# --- idempotency and conflict (T01, T02) ------------------------------------
def test_accepts_once_and_replays_idempotently(app):
assert invoke(app, event())[0].startswith("202")
status, body = invoke(app, event())
assert status.startswith("200") and body["status"] == "duplicate"
def test_same_id_different_payload_is_a_conflict(app):
assert invoke(app, event())[0].startswith("202")
status, body = invoke(app, event(subject="membership-2"))
assert status.startswith("409")
assert body["error"] == "event_id_conflict"
# --- authentication (T02) ---------------------------------------------------
def test_rejects_wrong_credential(app):
assert invoke(app, event(), token="wrong")[0].startswith("401")
def test_non_ascii_credential_is_unauthorized_not_a_crash(app):
"""compare_digest raises TypeError on non-ASCII str; that is a 401."""
assert invoke(app, event(), token="wröng")[0].startswith("401")
# --- validation (T02, T07) --------------------------------------------------
@pytest.mark.parametrize("payload,expected", [
(event(source="somewhere-else"), "source_not_allowed"),
(event(occurred_at="2026-08-09T00:00:00"), "timestamp_missing_timezone"),
(event(occurred_at="not-a-date"), "invalid_timestamp"),
(event(tenant=""), "invalid_event"),
])
def test_rejects_bad_events(app, payload, expected):
status, body = invoke(app, payload)
assert status.startswith("400")
assert body["error"] == expected
def test_rejects_mismatched_idempotency_key(app):
status, body = invoke(app, event(), key="other")
assert status.startswith("400")
assert body["error"] == "idempotency_key_mismatch"
def test_rejects_malformed_json(app):
assert invoke(app, None, body=b"{not json")[0].startswith("400")
def test_rejects_empty_body(app):
status, body = invoke(app, None, body=b"")
assert status.startswith("400")
assert body["error"] == "empty_body"
def test_rejects_oversized_body(app):
status, body = invoke(app, None, body=b"x", length=str(512 * 1024))
assert status.startswith("400")
assert body["error"] == "payload_too_large"
def test_rejects_truncated_body(app):
status, body = invoke(app, None, body=b"{}", length="500")
assert status.startswith("400")
assert body["error"] == "truncated_body"
# --- routing (T07) ----------------------------------------------------------
@pytest.mark.parametrize("path,method", [
("/nope", "POST"),
("/nope", "GET"),
("/v1/events", "DELETE"),
])
def test_unknown_routes_are_not_found(app, path, method):
assert invoke(app, event(), path=path, method=method)[0].startswith("404")
def test_healthz_needs_no_credential(app):
status, _ = invoke(app, None, path="/healthz", method="GET", body=b"", token="wrong")
assert status.startswith("200")
# --- failure handling (T02) -------------------------------------------------
class _BrokenBackend:
@property
def retention_policy(self):
return RetentionPolicy("archive", 3650, True, True, durable=True)
def emit(self, event):
raise BackendUnavailableError("down")
def accept(self, event, payload_hash):
raise BackendUnavailableError("down")
class _ExplodingBackend(_BrokenBackend):
def accept(self, event, payload_hash):
raise RuntimeError("unexpected")
def test_backend_unavailable_is_retryable_503():
status, body = invoke(IngestionApplication(_BrokenBackend(), "opaque"), event())
assert status.startswith("503")
assert body["error"] == "backend_unavailable"
def test_unexpected_backend_error_still_returns_a_response():
"""No request path may terminate without calling start_response."""
status, body = invoke(IngestionApplication(_ExplodingBackend(), "opaque"), event())
assert status.startswith("500")
assert body["error"] == "internal_error"
# --- concurrency (T01) ------------------------------------------------------
def test_concurrent_duplicates_produce_exactly_one_record(tmp_path):
"""Racing submissions of one event: one acceptance, one custody record.
This is the assertion the whole service rests on, so it is exercised rather
than assumed. An earlier single-connection implementation passed every
serial test while letting two callers both be told they were first.
"""
import threading
backend = SQLiteAuditBackend(str(tmp_path / "race.db"))
app = IngestionApplication(backend, "opaque")
outcomes: list[str] = []
lock = threading.Lock()
barrier = threading.Barrier(16)
def submit():
barrier.wait()
status, body = invoke(app, event())
with lock:
outcomes.append(body.get("status", status))
threads = [threading.Thread(target=submit) for _ in range(16)]
for t in threads:
t.start()
for t in threads:
t.join()
assert outcomes.count("accepted") == 1, outcomes
assert outcomes.count("duplicate") == 15, outcomes
stored = backend.db.execute("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM events").fetchone()[0]
assert stored == 1
# --- sender identity binding (T03) ------------------------------------------
from audit_core.senders import SenderIdentity, SenderRegistry # noqa: E402
def bound_app(tmp_path, **kw):
identity = SenderIdentity(
name="user-engine",
tokens=kw.get("tokens", ("opaque",)),
sources=frozenset(kw.get("sources", {"user-engine"})),
tenants=frozenset(kw.get("tenants", {"tenant:friendly:binky"})),
may_read=kw.get("may_read", False),
secret_policy=kw.get("secret_policy", "redact"),
)
backend = SQLiteAuditBackend(str(tmp_path / "bound.db"))
return IngestionApplication(backend, SenderRegistry([identity])), backend
def test_credential_may_not_claim_another_tenant(tmp_path):
"""The property WP-0003 recorded as done but never implemented."""
app, _ = bound_app(tmp_path)
assert invoke(app, event())[0].startswith("202")
status, body = invoke(app, event(tenant="tenant:coulomb"))
assert status.startswith("400")
assert body["error"] == "tenant_not_allowed"
def test_credential_may_not_claim_another_source(tmp_path):
app, _ = bound_app(tmp_path)
status, body = invoke(app, event(source="issue-core"))
assert status.startswith("400")
assert body["error"] == "source_not_allowed"
def test_rotation_accepts_both_tokens(tmp_path):
"""Rotation must not need a delivery gap."""
app, _ = bound_app(tmp_path, tokens=("current", "next"))
assert invoke(app, event(), token="current")[0].startswith("202")
assert invoke(app, event(id="evt-2"), key="evt-2", token="next")[0].startswith("202")
assert invoke(app, event(id="evt-3"), key="evt-3", token="retired")[0].startswith("401")
def test_sender_credential_cannot_read_the_trail_back(tmp_path):
app, _ = bound_app(tmp_path, may_read=False)
assert invoke(app, event())[0].startswith("202")
status, body = invoke(app, None, path="/v1/events/evt-1", method="GET", body=b"")
assert status.startswith("403")
assert body["error"] == "read_forbidden"
# --- operator read surface (T05) --------------------------------------------
def test_lookup_by_event_id_and_correlation(app):
assert invoke(app, event())[0].startswith("202")
assert invoke(app, event(id="evt-2", correlation_id="corr-1"), key="evt-2")[0].startswith("202")
status, body = invoke(app, None, path="/v1/events/evt-1", method="GET", body=b"")
assert status.startswith("200")
assert body["event_id"] == "evt-1"
assert body["tenant"] == "tenant:friendly:binky"
status, body = invoke_query(app, "correlation_id=corr-1")
assert status.startswith("200")
assert {e["event_id"] for e in body["events"]} == {"evt-1", "evt-2"}
def invoke_query(app, query, token="opaque"):
environ = {
"PATH_INFO": "/v1/events",
"REQUEST_METHOD": "GET",
"QUERY_STRING": query,
"CONTENT_LENGTH": "0",
"wsgi.input": io.BytesIO(b""),
"HTTP_AUTHORIZATION": f"Bearer {token}",
}
result = {}
out = b"".join(app(environ, lambda status, headers: result.update(status=status)))
return result["status"], (json.loads(out) if out else {})
def test_unknown_event_id_is_not_found(app):
status, _ = invoke(app, None, path="/v1/events/nope", method="GET", body=b"")
assert status.startswith("404")
def test_correlation_lookup_requires_a_correlation_id(app):
status, body = invoke_query(app, "")
assert status.startswith("400")
assert body["error"] == "correlation_id_required"
def test_rejected_events_appear_as_dead_letters(app):
assert invoke(app, event(source="issue-core"))[0].startswith("400")
status, body = invoke(app, None, path="/v1/dead-letters", method="GET", body=b"")
assert status.startswith("200")
entry = body["dead_letters"][0]
assert entry["reason"] == "source_not_allowed"
assert entry["event_id"] == "evt-1"
assert entry["payload"] is not None
def test_secret_rejection_withholds_the_payload(tmp_path):
"""Storing the body of an event rejected for carrying secret-shaped
material would write that material into the audit store."""
app, _ = bound_app(tmp_path, secret_policy="reject", may_read=True)
assert invoke(app, event(data={"password": "hunter2"}))[0].startswith("400")
_, body = invoke(app, None, path="/v1/dead-letters", method="GET", body=b"")
entry = body["dead_letters"][0]
assert entry["reason"] == "secret_shaped_field"
assert entry["payload_withheld"] is True
assert entry["payload"] is None
assert entry["payload_hash"]
# --- redaction policy (T04) -------------------------------------------------
def test_default_policy_redacts_and_accepts(app):
"""Default is redact: losing the whole audit record over one field is
worse than storing it with that field masked."""
status, _ = invoke(app, event(data={"membership_id": "m-1", "auth_token": "s3cret"}))
assert status.startswith("202")
_, record = invoke(app, None, path="/v1/events/evt-1", method="GET", body=b"")
assert record["details"]["data"]["auth_token"] == "[redacted]"
assert record["details"]["data"]["membership_id"] == "m-1"
# The record must admit it was modified.
assert record["details"]["redaction"]["policy"] == "redact"
assert record["details"]["redaction"]["paths"] == ["data.auth_token"]
def test_reject_policy_is_available_per_sender(tmp_path):
app, _ = bound_app(tmp_path, secret_policy="reject")
status, body = invoke(app, event(data={"password": "x"}))
assert status.startswith("400")
assert body["error"] == "secret_shaped_field"
def test_nested_and_listed_secrets_are_redacted(app):
payload = event(data={"items": [{"api_secret": "a"}, {"ok": 1}], "n": {"private_key": "k"}})
assert invoke(app, payload)[0].startswith("202")
_, record = invoke(app, None, path="/v1/events/evt-1", method="GET", body=b"")
data = record["details"]["data"]
assert data["items"][0]["api_secret"] == "[redacted]"
assert data["items"][1]["ok"] == 1
assert data["n"]["private_key"] == "[redacted]"
assert set(record["details"]["redaction"]["paths"]) == {
"data.items[0].api_secret", "data.n.private_key",
}
def test_findings_are_counted_by_path_for_both_outcomes(tmp_path):
"""Counters name the field to fix, not just a total."""
app, backend = bound_app(tmp_path, may_read=True)
for i in range(3):
invoke(app, event(id=f"e{i}", data={"auth_token": "x"}), key=f"e{i}")
strict, _ = bound_app(tmp_path, secret_policy="reject")
invoke(strict, event(id="r1", data={"auth_token": "x"}), key="r1")
_, body = invoke(app, None, path="/v1/secret-findings", method="GET", body=b"")
rows = {(r["outcome"], r["field_path"]): r for r in body["secret_findings"]}
assert rows[("redacted", "data.auth_token")]["occurrences"] == 3
assert rows[("redacted", "data.auth_token")]["action"] == "membership.added"
assert rows[("redacted", "data.auth_token")]["source"] == "user-engine"
assert rows[("redacted", "data.auth_token")]["persisted"] is True
assert rows[("rejected", "data.auth_token")]["occurrences"] == 1
def test_counters_survive_restart(tmp_path):
"""The counters drive a fix in the sending service; that work outlives a
pod restart, so they are durable rather than in-memory."""
path = str(tmp_path / "counters.db")
first = IngestionApplication(SQLiteAuditBackend(path), "opaque")
invoke(first, event(data={"auth_token": "x"}))
reopened = IngestionApplication(SQLiteAuditBackend(path), "opaque")
_, body = invoke(reopened, None, path="/v1/secret-findings", method="GET", body=b"")
assert body["secret_findings"][0]["occurrences"] == 1