gate-house proposed (security layer model v0.3 §9.4) that audit-core own
the tamper-evident record of approvals while approval-engine owns the
operative state. Assented, with two corrections and one condition.
Correction 1: INTENT principle 6 overstated the delivered guarantee.
docs/integrity.md is authoritative — an in-database chain does not
withstand a database owner without the external chain-head attestation,
and even then it is not WORM. Principle 6 now points at that bound.
Correction 2: the chain proves alteration and truncation, not omission
at source. A suppressed revocation leaves the chain intact.
Condition: approval-engine must guarantee emission atomicity, so an
approval cannot change state without the event being durably queued in
the same transaction. Not a task audit-core can discharge for it.
Boundary: no approval-validity query will be exposed — that would be
deciding early under §6.1.
Also declares audit-core's layer (Engine, not a decision point), which
§11 requires and INTENT.md was missing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WpeL68AWHqtqPQZEXY5kFe
Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 4040362@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 4fd0fd24-2ee8-4413-bd67-43bd79ca73f1
tegwick
3177d2cee0