tegwick
c4016a70d5
informed-decision is the browser-facing approver surface; GH-DEC-2026-012 limit 3 makes its evidence copy the one that must reach audit-core independently of the emitter, because there the actor being audited and the evidence source are the same component. Registration accepted on every proposed field — exact source, ["tenant:platform"], write true, read false, load-bearing, secret_policy redact. Prepared and inert: the scope overlay applies only to a sender the Secret already carries, asserted by test rather than by reading. Ingress ANDs namespace and pod label in one peer, following approval-engine rather than user-engine's older breadth. Gate House asked whether the record shape can carry a source-held-content declaration with a retrieval expectation, and asked for a straight answer rather than a rule the storage cannot meet. Both halves, which must travel together: It CAN carry the declaration. data is stored verbatim into details.data and hash-chained, so content_exists and custody need no schema change and become as tamper-evident as the commitment they accompany. It CANNOT detect non-production. audit-core performs no retrieval and its egress permits Postgres and DNS only. Detection happens at retrieval, by the reviewer; the stored declaration is what turns a blank into a failure attributable to the named custodian. Residual stated rather than left to be found: a custodian that never held the content can emit a false content_exists. audit-core validates the declaration's shape, never its truth — the same class as omission at source, and not closed by the chain, by attestation, or by T04/T06. A test asserts no egress to the emitter exists, because that claim silently stops being true if one appears. Cadence: reconciliation plus heartbeat is right for a mixed-volume source, with both scoped per class rather than per source — a per-source heartbeat is satisfied by the high-volume presentation stream and says nothing about a quiet month of dispositions. Bound: a compromised emitter suppresses the event and its own count together. Also recorded: commitment-only satisfies non-alteration and never reconstructability, in this repo's documents as in theirs; and tenant provenance under GH-DEC-2026-013 lands in the registration record, not the envelope, since audit-core checks a value the credential may write rather than resolving an identity claim. No secret was created and no production manifest applied. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Nb7Q6ZmXppNDkTWytfYqfv Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 2069992@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 167dd7f8-2a25-4be1-aa46-3b6f1a5f94c6
37 lines
602 B
JSON
37 lines
602 B
JSON
[
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{
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"name": "user-engine",
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"sources": [
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"user-engine"
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],
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"tenants": [
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"*"
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],
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"may_write": true,
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"may_read": false
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},
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{
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"name": "approval-engine",
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"sources": [
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"approval-engine"
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],
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"tenants": [
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"tenant:platform"
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],
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"may_write": true,
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"may_read": false,
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"evidence_kind": "load-bearing"
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},
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{
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"name": "informed-decision",
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"sources": [
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"informed-decision"
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],
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"tenants": [
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"tenant:platform"
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],
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"may_write": true,
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"may_read": false,
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"evidence_kind": "load-bearing"
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}
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]
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