docs: retain provider setup delivery owner intake
Assistant: codex Assistant-Model: gpt-6-astra Assistant-Session: 01a15374-f59f-7a31-86d2-d23b5d2ed181
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---
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id: EMAIL-IN-0001
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kind: intake
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title: "Support the provider-owned single-use password-setup delivery handoff"
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status: open
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flavor: implementation
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origin: cross-repo
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origin_ref: USER-WP-0035-T02
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priority: high
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owner: email-connect
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repo: email-connect
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requested_by: user-engine
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created: "2026-10-11"
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updated: "2026-10-11"
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related: [NET-IN-0005, EMAIL-WP-0004, EMAIL-WP-0008]
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---
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USER-WP-0035-T02 needs delivery of the identity-provisioner's setup link to the
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intended person. EMAIL-WP-0004 supplies the mail service and EMAIL-WP-0008 supplies
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scoped invitation/verification callers. They do not supply this template:
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`callers.TEMPLATES` and `transactional.ALLOWED_EVENTS` permit only
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`family_member.invited` and `family_invitation.resent`; `/v1/send` renders an
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invitation URL. Neither registration-verification mail nor Authelia reset SMTP
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is this provider setup grant. Do not reinterpret an invitation event to bypass
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that class boundary.
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Prepare an owner-supported fixed template and recipient-bound transport contract
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with the NetKingdom issuer (NET-IN-0005), then return its exact implementation
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work record and public capability/adapter contract. This is owner preparation,
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not a request for another founder choice or a founder-ready command. Keep the
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current caller/template/binding scope unchanged until the owner has reviewed
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its precise extension; use existing custody/delivery interfaces rather than a
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shared administrative token.
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The contract must bind the authenticated caller, intended tenant/client,
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provider identity and authoritative recipient, provider issue/expiry and stable
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request identity. Prefer issuer-to-mail delivery with an opaque receipt to User
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Engine. A secret setup URL/handle may cross only the reviewed delivery boundary;
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it must never enter user-engine's domain outbox, event bus, work records,
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receipts, prompts, logs, arbitrary subjects/bodies or caller-supplied redirects.
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Fixed destination/origin admission, payload bounds and redirect refusal belong
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to that contract. Do not assume the existing invitation template accepts it.
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Reuse the existing suppression/idempotency/uncertain-outcome behavior. Distinguish
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confirmed non-acceptance, accepted, uncertain and terminal rejection without
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reissuing a grant or duplicating mail on timeout/restart. Emit opaque non-secret
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request/provider references and the exact evidence ceiling. SMTP acceptance,
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mailbox delivery, intended-person acknowledgement and password completion remain
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separate observations; none supplies authorization or identity proof by itself.
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Acceptance needs synthetic failure/expiry/replay/recipient-mismatch/restart
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checks followed by an explicitly scoped owner-reviewed live send and private
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intended-person receipt. No live recipient, message, token or grant was used in
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this intake. Return a workplan/task ID before USER-WP-0035-T02 replaces its
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`blocked_on: message-from:email-connect` qualifier with exact dependencies.
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