flex-auth/examples/tenant-engine/check_request_allow_guardrail_set.json

{
  "id": "check:tenant-engine-guardrail-set-writer",
  "tenant": "tenant:friendly:binky",
  "subject": {
    "id": "tenant-engine",
    "type": "service"
  },
  "action": "tenant.guardrail.set",
  "resource": {
    "id": "tenant:friendly:binky",
    "type": "guardrail",
    "system": "tenant-engine"
  },
  "context": {}
}
Authorize tenant-engine guardrail read and set actions FLEX-WP-0014. Package tenant-engine.write-api.mutate v1 now carries nine actions: tenant.guardrail.read and tenant.guardrail.set on resource type guardrail, verbatim from tenant-engine's mapping. The read/write split is used now: flex-auth may read ceilings and is denied action_not_granted on set; tenant-engine may do both. 17/17 Rego tests and 23/23 fixtures pass. Live e2e against a real tenant-engine FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer matches. In source only; production still serves the seven-action 9320df39 pin. 2026-08-16 02:46:25 +02:00			`{`
			`"id": "check:tenant-engine-guardrail-set-writer",`
			`"tenant": "tenant:friendly:binky",`
			`"subject": {`
			`"id": "tenant-engine",`
			`"type": "service"`
			`},`
			`"action": "tenant.guardrail.set",`
			`"resource": {`
State tenant-engine's tenant relation in the write-api package, v3. tenant-engine named the relation in TEN-DEC-2026-002: `tenant` is the target tenant record and always equals `resource.id`; the write API is cross-tenant by design and `tenant.guardrail.read` does not differ. v2 carried no tenant rule and a constant fixture tenant, so the deliberate scope and an omitted rule were indistinguishable. tenant-engine.write-api.mutate v3 (FLEX-DEC-2026-016): - allowed requires tenant_is_target; a mismatch or absent tenant is denied tenant_not_target (object.get, so an absent key names the right cause). - the cross-tenant scope is stated in the package and quantified by test_tenant_never_changes_effect over every action, three subjects and four tenants, with guards against passing by denying everything. - fixtures rotate tenant across four tenants; five cross-tenant allows and two tenant_not_target denies added (42 fixtures, 33 tests, all pass). - user-engine's tenant:platform exclusion is named as a fixed-record rule, not a subject/tenant relation, and tested separately. Closes FLEX-WP-0022 (T01, T02 done). Also records TEN-IN-0004 and SECRETS-IN-0002 on FLEX-WP-0020 and acknowledges the GH-DEC-2026-017 replies on FLEX-WP-0030-T04. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 63291@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 8bd77868-ca68-4f49-bb1e-d539ecc0d703 2026-09-21 07:39:57 +02:00			`"id": "tenant:friendly:binky",`
Authorize tenant-engine guardrail read and set actions FLEX-WP-0014. Package tenant-engine.write-api.mutate v1 now carries nine actions: tenant.guardrail.read and tenant.guardrail.set on resource type guardrail, verbatim from tenant-engine's mapping. The read/write split is used now: flex-auth may read ceilings and is denied action_not_granted on set; tenant-engine may do both. 17/17 Rego tests and 23/23 fixtures pass. Live e2e against a real tenant-engine FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer matches. In source only; production still serves the seven-action 9320df39 pin. 2026-08-16 02:46:25 +02:00			`"type": "guardrail",`
			`"system": "tenant-engine"`
			`},`
			`"context": {}`
			`}`