FLEX-WP-0008 T01-T02: tenant-engine resource/action vocabulary + policy package
docs/tenant-engine-{resource-namespace,action-vocabulary}.md: four actions
(tenant.create, tenant.role.grant, tenant.role.revoke, tenant.plan.assign)
matching tenant_engine/src/tenant_engine/authz.py's _RESOURCE_TYPES mapping
exactly. No resource_manifest.yaml -- tenant-engine's resources are created
dynamically, unlike ops-warden's fixed SSH-certificate inventory; documented
as a deliberate deviation.
examples/tenant-engine/: protected_system_manifest.yaml, subject_manifest.yaml
(one registered caller: tenant-engine's own service identity),
policy_package.md (Rego rules + embedded tests), policy_fixtures.yaml (8
allow/deny pairs), assembled registry_snapshot.json, two standalone
check_request examples, README.
Design decision made explicit in the workplan: operator/service-identity
authorization (one known subject, four known actions), not aal2+assurance +
tenant-capability-role checking -- CheckRequest carries no assurance claim
yet (TEN-WP-0003 already flagged actor as a plain request-body field, not a
real auth context), and a tenant's capability roles are the tenant's own
state, not a property of who may call tenant-engine's admin API. Revisit
once KEY-WP-0005 gives callers a real assurance-bearing identity.
Verified for real: built ./cmd/flex-auth, ran test-policy (6 tests + 8
fixtures, all pass), load-registry, check against both example requests.
Then ran a live flex-auth serve with this exact registry+policy and pointed
tenant-engine's real, unmodified FlexAuthCheckClient/FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer
at it over real HTTP: unknown subject -> 403, tenant-engine -> 201. go test
./... still green across the whole repo.
T03 (live-lookup context adapter for other protected systems) stays open --
new Go adapter package, tracked separately.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-23 23:05:57 +02:00
{
"systems" : [
{
"id" : "tenant-engine" ,
"name" : "Tenant Engine" ,
"resource_types" : [
{
"name" : "tenant" ,
"scope_level" : "Resource" ,
"planes" : [
"Identity" ,
"Audit"
] ,
"metadata" : {
"description" : "A tenant record (existence, onboarding grouping)."
}
} ,
{
"name" : "role-grant" ,
"scope_level" : "Resource" ,
"planes" : [
"Identity" ,
"Policy" ,
"Audit"
] ,
"metadata" : {
"description" : "A capability-role grant or revocation (PLTF/IAM/VEN/CUS)."
}
} ,
{
"name" : "plan-assignment" ,
"scope_level" : "Resource" ,
"planes" : [
"Identity" ,
"Audit"
] ,
"metadata" : {
"description" : "A tenant's plan/subscription assignment (by reference id)."
}
}
] ,
"actions" : [
{
"name" : "tenant.create" ,
"capabilities" : [
"Create" ,
"Audit"
] ,
"planes" : [
"Identity" ,
"Audit"
] ,
"exposure_modes" : [
"Metadata"
] ,
"metadata" : {
"required_context" : [ ]
}
} ,
{
"name" : "tenant.role.grant" ,
"capabilities" : [
"Grant" ,
"Audit"
] ,
"planes" : [
"Identity" ,
"Policy" ,
"Audit"
] ,
"exposure_modes" : [
"Metadata"
] ,
"metadata" : {
"required_context" : [ ]
}
} ,
{
"name" : "tenant.role.revoke" ,
"capabilities" : [
"Revoke" ,
"Audit"
] ,
"planes" : [
"Identity" ,
"Policy" ,
"Audit"
] ,
"exposure_modes" : [
"Metadata"
] ,
"metadata" : {
"required_context" : [ ]
}
} ,
{
"name" : "tenant.plan.assign" ,
"capabilities" : [
"Bind" ,
"Audit"
] ,
"planes" : [
"Identity" ,
"Audit"
] ,
"exposure_modes" : [
"Metadata"
] ,
"metadata" : {
"required_context" : [ ]
}
Authorize tenant-engine lifecycle actions (FLEX-WP-0010)
Extend the tenant-engine write-API policy package with tenant.update,
tenant.retire, and tenant.reactivate, the three actions TEN-WP-0005
introduced. Until now every lifecycle mutation resolved to deny
unknown_action, blocking TEN-WP-0005-T05 production rollout.
- policy_package.md: three actions in valid_actions and frontmatter;
CARING capabilities extended with EditAny/Archive/Restore
- protected_system_manifest.yaml, subject_manifest.yaml, and the rebuilt
registry_snapshot.json carry all seven actions
- docs/tenant-engine-action-vocabulary.md documents the HTTP surfaces
- 8 new fixture pairs and 5 new Rego tests, including action-drift
guards (tenant.retired, tenant_update -> unknown_action)
T02 decision, recorded in policy_package.md: tenant.retire does NOT get
stricter authorization yet. With one service subject and no assurance
claim in the CheckRequest there is nothing stricter to check, and a
condition the sole caller always satisfies would falsely read as
separate control. Retirement is reversible and non-destructive. Revisit
on KEY-WP-0005 assurance claims or a second operator subject.
Verified: 11/11 Rego tests, 16/16 fixtures, go test ./... green, gofmt
and go vet clean. End-to-end against a live serve with a real
tenant-engine through the unmodified FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer: update
6176c39c2f4d7b15, retire 8a801b8ee8455080, reactivate c64cf3713cecd970
all allow; unregistered actor denied unknown_subject
(59d3e99c6416be89, 403 write_denied).
Handoff revision for TEN-WP-0005-T05: package
tenant-engine.write-api.mutate v1 (ready, caring-0.4.0-rc2).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-10 20:52:10 +02:00
} ,
{
"name" : "tenant.update" ,
"capabilities" : [
"EditAny" ,
"Audit"
] ,
"planes" : [
"Identity" ,
"Audit"
] ,
"exposure_modes" : [
"Metadata"
] ,
"metadata" : {
"required_context" : [ ]
}
} ,
{
"name" : "tenant.retire" ,
"capabilities" : [
"Archive" ,
"Audit"
] ,
"planes" : [
"Identity" ,
"Policy" ,
"Audit"
] ,
"exposure_modes" : [
"Metadata"
] ,
"metadata" : {
"required_context" : [ ]
}
} ,
{
"name" : "tenant.reactivate" ,
"capabilities" : [
"Restore" ,
"Audit"
] ,
"planes" : [
"Identity" ,
"Policy" ,
"Audit"
] ,
"exposure_modes" : [
"Metadata"
] ,
"metadata" : {
"required_context" : [ ]
}
FLEX-WP-0008 T01-T02: tenant-engine resource/action vocabulary + policy package
docs/tenant-engine-{resource-namespace,action-vocabulary}.md: four actions
(tenant.create, tenant.role.grant, tenant.role.revoke, tenant.plan.assign)
matching tenant_engine/src/tenant_engine/authz.py's _RESOURCE_TYPES mapping
exactly. No resource_manifest.yaml -- tenant-engine's resources are created
dynamically, unlike ops-warden's fixed SSH-certificate inventory; documented
as a deliberate deviation.
examples/tenant-engine/: protected_system_manifest.yaml, subject_manifest.yaml
(one registered caller: tenant-engine's own service identity),
policy_package.md (Rego rules + embedded tests), policy_fixtures.yaml (8
allow/deny pairs), assembled registry_snapshot.json, two standalone
check_request examples, README.
Design decision made explicit in the workplan: operator/service-identity
authorization (one known subject, four known actions), not aal2+assurance +
tenant-capability-role checking -- CheckRequest carries no assurance claim
yet (TEN-WP-0003 already flagged actor as a plain request-body field, not a
real auth context), and a tenant's capability roles are the tenant's own
state, not a property of who may call tenant-engine's admin API. Revisit
once KEY-WP-0005 gives callers a real assurance-bearing identity.
Verified for real: built ./cmd/flex-auth, ran test-policy (6 tests + 8
fixtures, all pass), load-registry, check against both example requests.
Then ran a live flex-auth serve with this exact registry+policy and pointed
tenant-engine's real, unmodified FlexAuthCheckClient/FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer
at it over real HTTP: unknown subject -> 403, tenant-engine -> 201. go test
./... still green across the whole repo.
T03 (live-lookup context adapter for other protected systems) stays open --
new Go adapter package, tracked separately.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-23 23:05:57 +02:00
}
] ,
"caring_profiles" : [
"caring-0.4.0-rc2"
] ,
"metadata" : {
"flex_auth_contract" : "protected-system-v0" ,
"boundary_contract" : "net-kingdom/canon/standards/tenant-engine-boundary-contract_v0.1.md"
}
}
] ,
"resource_manifests" : [ ] ,
"tenants" : [
{
"id" : "tenant:platform" ,
"name" : "Platform Tenant"
}
] ,
"subjects" : [
{
"id" : "tenant-engine" ,
"type" : "Service" ,
"display_name" : "tenant-engine service principal" ,
"organization_relation" : "ServiceProvider" ,
"roles" : [
"Operator"
] ,
"groups" : [
"group:tenant-engine-writers"
] ,
"tenant" : "tenant:platform" ,
"metadata" : {
Authorize tenant-engine lifecycle actions (FLEX-WP-0010)
Extend the tenant-engine write-API policy package with tenant.update,
tenant.retire, and tenant.reactivate, the three actions TEN-WP-0005
introduced. Until now every lifecycle mutation resolved to deny
unknown_action, blocking TEN-WP-0005-T05 production rollout.
- policy_package.md: three actions in valid_actions and frontmatter;
CARING capabilities extended with EditAny/Archive/Restore
- protected_system_manifest.yaml, subject_manifest.yaml, and the rebuilt
registry_snapshot.json carry all seven actions
- docs/tenant-engine-action-vocabulary.md documents the HTTP surfaces
- 8 new fixture pairs and 5 new Rego tests, including action-drift
guards (tenant.retired, tenant_update -> unknown_action)
T02 decision, recorded in policy_package.md: tenant.retire does NOT get
stricter authorization yet. With one service subject and no assurance
claim in the CheckRequest there is nothing stricter to check, and a
condition the sole caller always satisfies would falsely read as
separate control. Retirement is reversible and non-destructive. Revisit
on KEY-WP-0005 assurance claims or a second operator subject.
Verified: 11/11 Rego tests, 16/16 fixtures, go test ./... green, gofmt
and go vet clean. End-to-end against a live serve with a real
tenant-engine through the unmodified FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer: update
6176c39c2f4d7b15, retire 8a801b8ee8455080, reactivate c64cf3713cecd970
all allow; unregistered actor denied unknown_subject
(59d3e99c6416be89, 403 write_denied).
Handoff revision for TEN-WP-0005-T05: package
tenant-engine.write-api.mutate v1 (ready, caring-0.4.0-rc2).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-10 20:52:10 +02:00
"description" : "tenant-engine's own service identity, used for the seven write-API actions it sends to POST /v1/check (authz.FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer): tenant.create, tenant.role.grant, tenant.role.revoke, tenant.plan.assign, and the lifecycle actions tenant.update, tenant.retire, tenant.reactivate."
FLEX-WP-0008 T01-T02: tenant-engine resource/action vocabulary + policy package
docs/tenant-engine-{resource-namespace,action-vocabulary}.md: four actions
(tenant.create, tenant.role.grant, tenant.role.revoke, tenant.plan.assign)
matching tenant_engine/src/tenant_engine/authz.py's _RESOURCE_TYPES mapping
exactly. No resource_manifest.yaml -- tenant-engine's resources are created
dynamically, unlike ops-warden's fixed SSH-certificate inventory; documented
as a deliberate deviation.
examples/tenant-engine/: protected_system_manifest.yaml, subject_manifest.yaml
(one registered caller: tenant-engine's own service identity),
policy_package.md (Rego rules + embedded tests), policy_fixtures.yaml (8
allow/deny pairs), assembled registry_snapshot.json, two standalone
check_request examples, README.
Design decision made explicit in the workplan: operator/service-identity
authorization (one known subject, four known actions), not aal2+assurance +
tenant-capability-role checking -- CheckRequest carries no assurance claim
yet (TEN-WP-0003 already flagged actor as a plain request-body field, not a
real auth context), and a tenant's capability roles are the tenant's own
state, not a property of who may call tenant-engine's admin API. Revisit
once KEY-WP-0005 gives callers a real assurance-bearing identity.
Verified for real: built ./cmd/flex-auth, ran test-policy (6 tests + 8
fixtures, all pass), load-registry, check against both example requests.
Then ran a live flex-auth serve with this exact registry+policy and pointed
tenant-engine's real, unmodified FlexAuthCheckClient/FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer
at it over real HTTP: unknown subject -> 403, tenant-engine -> 201. go test
./... still green across the whole repo.
T03 (live-lookup context adapter for other protected systems) stays open --
new Go adapter package, tracked separately.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-23 23:05:57 +02:00
}
}
] ,
"groups" : [
{
"id" : "group:tenant-engine-writers" ,
"display_name" : "tenant-engine Write API Callers" ,
"members" : [
"tenant-engine"
] ,
"tenant" : "tenant:platform"
}
] ,
"relationships" : [ ]
}