flex-auth/docs/tenant-engine-resource-namespace.md

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FLEX-WP-0008 T01-T02: tenant-engine resource/action vocabulary + policy package docs/tenant-engine-{resource-namespace,action-vocabulary}.md: four actions (tenant.create, tenant.role.grant, tenant.role.revoke, tenant.plan.assign) matching tenant_engine/src/tenant_engine/authz.py's _RESOURCE_TYPES mapping exactly. No resource_manifest.yaml -- tenant-engine's resources are created dynamically, unlike ops-warden's fixed SSH-certificate inventory; documented as a deliberate deviation. examples/tenant-engine/: protected_system_manifest.yaml, subject_manifest.yaml (one registered caller: tenant-engine's own service identity), policy_package.md (Rego rules + embedded tests), policy_fixtures.yaml (8 allow/deny pairs), assembled registry_snapshot.json, two standalone check_request examples, README. Design decision made explicit in the workplan: operator/service-identity authorization (one known subject, four known actions), not aal2+assurance + tenant-capability-role checking -- CheckRequest carries no assurance claim yet (TEN-WP-0003 already flagged actor as a plain request-body field, not a real auth context), and a tenant's capability roles are the tenant's own state, not a property of who may call tenant-engine's admin API. Revisit once KEY-WP-0005 gives callers a real assurance-bearing identity. Verified for real: built ./cmd/flex-auth, ran test-policy (6 tests + 8 fixtures, all pass), load-registry, check against both example requests. Then ran a live flex-auth serve with this exact registry+policy and pointed tenant-engine's real, unmodified FlexAuthCheckClient/FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer at it over real HTTP: unknown subject -> 403, tenant-engine -> 201. go test ./... still green across the whole repo. T03 (live-lookup context adapter for other protected systems) stays open -- new Go adapter package, tracked separately. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-23 23:05:57 +02:00
# tenant-engine Resource Namespace
This document defines the `tenant-engine` protected-system namespace
consumed by flex-auth (`FLEX-WP-0008-T01`).
Unlike Markitect's document hierarchy or ops-warden's fixed SSH-certificate
inventory, `tenant-engine`'s resources (tenants, their role grants, their
plan assignments) are created **dynamically** — there is no fixed,
pre-registrable resource list to publish a `resource_manifest.yaml` for.
Every `CheckRequest` carries the resource identity inline
(`resource.id == tenant_id`), and the policy evaluates against `input`
directly rather than looking up a registered resource by id. This is a
deliberate, documented deviation from the ops-warden pattern, not an
omission.
## Resource Types
```text
tenant -- a tenant record (existence, grouping)
role-grant -- a capability-role grant/revocation
plan-assignment -- a tenant's plan/subscription assignment
```
All three are `scope_level: Resource`, always accessed within
`system: tenant-engine`.
## Ownership Boundary
`tenant-engine`'s own boundary contract
(`net-kingdom/canon/standards/tenant-engine-boundary-contract_v0.1.md`)
already defines these as `tenant-engine`'s owned resource kinds. This
namespace only maps that ownership into flex-auth's protected-system
vocabulary — it does not redefine ownership.
## Related
- `docs/tenant-engine-action-vocabulary.md` — the actions gated on these
resource types
- `examples/tenant-engine/` — protected-system manifest, subject manifest,
policy package, and fixtures
- `net-kingdom/docs/adr/ADR-0014-tenant-capability-roles-and-tenant-engine-ownership.md`
— the capability-role model (`PLTF`/`IAM`/`VEN`/`CUS`) these resources
carry as *tenant* state, distinct from the *operator* authorization this
namespace governs (who may call `tenant-engine`'s write API, not what a
tenant is allowed to do)