flex-auth/examples/secrets-engine/README.md

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Publish secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle v1 (FLEX-WP-0021 T01, T02) secrets-engine delivered the action vocabulary T01 asked for: twelve actions read out of cli.py, not the example vocabulary. The gate earned its keep -- four would have been inferred wrongly, and revoke, the obvious thirteenth, does not exist as an action at all. It gates as deactivate, which is also reached from lifecycle deactivate. docs/secrets-engine-action-vocabulary.md records the list and the four traps. examples/secrets-engine/ carries the package, both manifests, a loadable registry snapshot, 26 fixtures, five check requests, and a README. validate -kind policy is valid with 22/22 Rego tests and 26/26 fixtures. allow_ttl is 15m, stated in the package rather than inherited from the engine default: these decisions authorize live secret operations, so the reliance window belongs where a reviewer sees it. Per FLEX-DEC-2026-004 it is authority to issue, not authority to keep using what the operation produced. destroy is the dual-control case, gated on a context.approval claim marked approved with two distinct approvers, repeated entries counting once. flex-auth checks what the claim says and deliberately does not re-derive its temporal validity, signature, or supersession -- those are approval-engine's to assert and the PEP's to verify against the live claim, per the split accepted in FLEX-DEC-2026-006. It stays in the package though its handler raises before the gate, so the rule is reviewed and fixtured before SECRETS-WP-0007-T04 opens the path. Following the FLEX-WP-0010-T02 precedent the denial ladder has no action_not_granted branch: one subject holding all twelve actions could never reach it, and a rule that cannot fail reads as control that is not there. Registering a second calling identity is the revisit trigger. Not deployed. No flex-auth-secrets-engine pin exists yet (T04), so their policy pin stays unset and fail-closed until T05. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JTbVXpEiXA7mNJVpDnEPcB Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 412054@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 3968fae1-8d59-4209-9bd6-c22594b8ab19
2026-09-06 08:02:52 +02:00
# secrets-engine example
Policy package, manifests, and fixtures for `secrets-engine`'s gated
catalog-lane operations. Opened by `FLEX-DEC-2026-005`, carried by
`FLEX-WP-0021`.
| File | What it is |
| --- | --- |
| `policy_package.md` | `secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle` v1, `allow_ttl: 15m` |
| `protected_system_manifest.yaml` | the `secret-catalog-lane` resource type and twelve actions |
| `subject_manifest.yaml` | the single `secrets-engine` service identity |
| `registry_snapshot.json` | loadable snapshot combining both manifests |
Fix the destroy rule: it was written against an invented claim shape approval-engine flagged the class one message earlier -- a contract whose examples contradict its prose gets implemented as its examples -- and yesterday's package was a fresh instance of it, committed while flagging it. The published rule required context.approval.status == "approved" and counted context.approval.approvals[].subject_id. Neither field exists. approval-engine's approval_claim.schema.json has `state` (whose operative value is `valid`, not `approved`) and carries no approver list at all. The rule was unsatisfiable: every live destroy would have denied dual_control_required no matter how good the approval was. It failed closed, so it was never a hole, but it was policy written against a shape of our own devising rather than a published one. The rule now consumes valid_now from the real claim, guarded on kind and issuer. valid_now is the summary predicate that already folds in the distinct-approver threshold, with reason_code insufficient_approvers for a claim that failed it -- so this is also the correct layering, not just the correct shape. Counting approvers here is exactly the duplication GH-DEC-2026-005 removes; the compensating property is reconstructability at the issuer under 9.6, which is approval-engine's. Recorded as a correction section in the package and the vocabulary doc rather than quietly rewritten. 25 Rego tests and 29 fixtures pass, covering insufficient_approvers, consumed, revoked, approved-but-not-yet- valid, foreign issuer, and wrong kind. Two things the package deliberately does not do, both now written down: it does not compare binding.pdp_digest, because the request digest is computed after policy evaluation and a Rego rule cannot see it; and it makes no cross-check that the claim was approved for this action and target, because the claim's binding uses approval-engine's vocabulary and no mapping between the two is published. Inventing one would silently accept a claim approved for something else. Both belong to the PEP until a mapping exists, and that is worth closing before SECRETS-WP-0007-T04 makes destroy reachable. Also swept the other published fixtures on approval-engine's reasoning. One more instance: the inner decision in examples/caring/action_authorization.json declared contract_version flex-auth.decision-record.v1 while its provenance omitted policy_package_digest, registry_snapshot_digest, and input_claim_digests -- all published contract fields since 2026-09-02. Completed. The remaining example context vocabularies are consumer-owned and match their integrations. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JTbVXpEiXA7mNJVpDnEPcB Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 412054@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 3968fae1-8d59-4209-9bd6-c22594b8ab19
2026-09-06 08:11:14 +02:00
| `policy_fixtures.yaml` | 29 fixtures — 11 allows, dual control both ways, and every denial branch |
Publish secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle v1 (FLEX-WP-0021 T01, T02) secrets-engine delivered the action vocabulary T01 asked for: twelve actions read out of cli.py, not the example vocabulary. The gate earned its keep -- four would have been inferred wrongly, and revoke, the obvious thirteenth, does not exist as an action at all. It gates as deactivate, which is also reached from lifecycle deactivate. docs/secrets-engine-action-vocabulary.md records the list and the four traps. examples/secrets-engine/ carries the package, both manifests, a loadable registry snapshot, 26 fixtures, five check requests, and a README. validate -kind policy is valid with 22/22 Rego tests and 26/26 fixtures. allow_ttl is 15m, stated in the package rather than inherited from the engine default: these decisions authorize live secret operations, so the reliance window belongs where a reviewer sees it. Per FLEX-DEC-2026-004 it is authority to issue, not authority to keep using what the operation produced. destroy is the dual-control case, gated on a context.approval claim marked approved with two distinct approvers, repeated entries counting once. flex-auth checks what the claim says and deliberately does not re-derive its temporal validity, signature, or supersession -- those are approval-engine's to assert and the PEP's to verify against the live claim, per the split accepted in FLEX-DEC-2026-006. It stays in the package though its handler raises before the gate, so the rule is reviewed and fixtured before SECRETS-WP-0007-T04 opens the path. Following the FLEX-WP-0010-T02 precedent the denial ladder has no action_not_granted branch: one subject holding all twelve actions could never reach it, and a rule that cannot fail reads as control that is not there. Registering a second calling identity is the revisit trigger. Not deployed. No flex-auth-secrets-engine pin exists yet (T04), so their policy pin stays unset and fail-closed until T05. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JTbVXpEiXA7mNJVpDnEPcB Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 412054@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 3968fae1-8d59-4209-9bd6-c22594b8ab19
2026-09-06 08:02:52 +02:00
| `check_request_*.json` | standalone requests for `POST /v1/check` |
The action vocabulary is **secrets-engine's**, delivered under
`FLEX-WP-0021-T01` and recorded in
[`../../docs/secrets-engine-action-vocabulary.md`](../../docs/secrets-engine-action-vocabulary.md).
Read that before changing any action string here.
## Verify
```bash
go run ./cmd/flex-auth validate -kind policy -file examples/secrets-engine/policy_package.md
go run ./cmd/flex-auth load-registry -file examples/secrets-engine/registry_snapshot.json
```
Fix the destroy rule: it was written against an invented claim shape approval-engine flagged the class one message earlier -- a contract whose examples contradict its prose gets implemented as its examples -- and yesterday's package was a fresh instance of it, committed while flagging it. The published rule required context.approval.status == "approved" and counted context.approval.approvals[].subject_id. Neither field exists. approval-engine's approval_claim.schema.json has `state` (whose operative value is `valid`, not `approved`) and carries no approver list at all. The rule was unsatisfiable: every live destroy would have denied dual_control_required no matter how good the approval was. It failed closed, so it was never a hole, but it was policy written against a shape of our own devising rather than a published one. The rule now consumes valid_now from the real claim, guarded on kind and issuer. valid_now is the summary predicate that already folds in the distinct-approver threshold, with reason_code insufficient_approvers for a claim that failed it -- so this is also the correct layering, not just the correct shape. Counting approvers here is exactly the duplication GH-DEC-2026-005 removes; the compensating property is reconstructability at the issuer under 9.6, which is approval-engine's. Recorded as a correction section in the package and the vocabulary doc rather than quietly rewritten. 25 Rego tests and 29 fixtures pass, covering insufficient_approvers, consumed, revoked, approved-but-not-yet- valid, foreign issuer, and wrong kind. Two things the package deliberately does not do, both now written down: it does not compare binding.pdp_digest, because the request digest is computed after policy evaluation and a Rego rule cannot see it; and it makes no cross-check that the claim was approved for this action and target, because the claim's binding uses approval-engine's vocabulary and no mapping between the two is published. Inventing one would silently accept a claim approved for something else. Both belong to the PEP until a mapping exists, and that is worth closing before SECRETS-WP-0007-T04 makes destroy reachable. Also swept the other published fixtures on approval-engine's reasoning. One more instance: the inner decision in examples/caring/action_authorization.json declared contract_version flex-auth.decision-record.v1 while its provenance omitted policy_package_digest, registry_snapshot_digest, and input_claim_digests -- all published contract fields since 2026-09-02. Completed. The remaining example context vocabularies are consumer-owned and match their integrations. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JTbVXpEiXA7mNJVpDnEPcB Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 412054@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 3968fae1-8d59-4209-9bd6-c22594b8ab19
2026-09-06 08:11:14 +02:00
25 Rego tests and 29 fixtures.
Publish secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle v1 (FLEX-WP-0021 T01, T02) secrets-engine delivered the action vocabulary T01 asked for: twelve actions read out of cli.py, not the example vocabulary. The gate earned its keep -- four would have been inferred wrongly, and revoke, the obvious thirteenth, does not exist as an action at all. It gates as deactivate, which is also reached from lifecycle deactivate. docs/secrets-engine-action-vocabulary.md records the list and the four traps. examples/secrets-engine/ carries the package, both manifests, a loadable registry snapshot, 26 fixtures, five check requests, and a README. validate -kind policy is valid with 22/22 Rego tests and 26/26 fixtures. allow_ttl is 15m, stated in the package rather than inherited from the engine default: these decisions authorize live secret operations, so the reliance window belongs where a reviewer sees it. Per FLEX-DEC-2026-004 it is authority to issue, not authority to keep using what the operation produced. destroy is the dual-control case, gated on a context.approval claim marked approved with two distinct approvers, repeated entries counting once. flex-auth checks what the claim says and deliberately does not re-derive its temporal validity, signature, or supersession -- those are approval-engine's to assert and the PEP's to verify against the live claim, per the split accepted in FLEX-DEC-2026-006. It stays in the package though its handler raises before the gate, so the rule is reviewed and fixtured before SECRETS-WP-0007-T04 opens the path. Following the FLEX-WP-0010-T02 precedent the denial ladder has no action_not_granted branch: one subject holding all twelve actions could never reach it, and a rule that cannot fail reads as control that is not there. Registering a second calling identity is the revisit trigger. Not deployed. No flex-auth-secrets-engine pin exists yet (T04), so their policy pin stays unset and fail-closed until T05. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JTbVXpEiXA7mNJVpDnEPcB Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 412054@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: 3968fae1-8d59-4209-9bd6-c22594b8ab19
2026-09-06 08:02:52 +02:00
## Not yet deployed
There is no `flex-auth-secrets-engine` pin yet (`FLEX-WP-0021-T04`), so
secrets-engine has no address to call. Their policy pin
(`SECRETS_ENGINE_AUTHORIZATION_POLICY_PACKAGE` / `_VERSION`) stays **unset and
fail-closed** until `FLEX-WP-0021-T05` hands them the published package and the
Service DNS. Do not configure it from this directory.