flex-auth/examples/tenant-engine/registry_snapshot.json

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FLEX-WP-0008 T01-T02: tenant-engine resource/action vocabulary + policy package docs/tenant-engine-{resource-namespace,action-vocabulary}.md: four actions (tenant.create, tenant.role.grant, tenant.role.revoke, tenant.plan.assign) matching tenant_engine/src/tenant_engine/authz.py's _RESOURCE_TYPES mapping exactly. No resource_manifest.yaml -- tenant-engine's resources are created dynamically, unlike ops-warden's fixed SSH-certificate inventory; documented as a deliberate deviation. examples/tenant-engine/: protected_system_manifest.yaml, subject_manifest.yaml (one registered caller: tenant-engine's own service identity), policy_package.md (Rego rules + embedded tests), policy_fixtures.yaml (8 allow/deny pairs), assembled registry_snapshot.json, two standalone check_request examples, README. Design decision made explicit in the workplan: operator/service-identity authorization (one known subject, four known actions), not aal2+assurance + tenant-capability-role checking -- CheckRequest carries no assurance claim yet (TEN-WP-0003 already flagged actor as a plain request-body field, not a real auth context), and a tenant's capability roles are the tenant's own state, not a property of who may call tenant-engine's admin API. Revisit once KEY-WP-0005 gives callers a real assurance-bearing identity. Verified for real: built ./cmd/flex-auth, ran test-policy (6 tests + 8 fixtures, all pass), load-registry, check against both example requests. Then ran a live flex-auth serve with this exact registry+policy and pointed tenant-engine's real, unmodified FlexAuthCheckClient/FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer at it over real HTTP: unknown subject -> 403, tenant-engine -> 201. go test ./... still green across the whole repo. T03 (live-lookup context adapter for other protected systems) stays open -- new Go adapter package, tracked separately. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-23 23:05:57 +02:00
{
"systems": [
{
"id": "tenant-engine",
"name": "Tenant Engine",
"resource_types": [
{
"name": "tenant",
"scope_level": "Resource",
"planes": [
"Identity",
"Audit"
],
"metadata": {
"description": "A tenant record (existence, onboarding grouping)."
}
},
{
"name": "role-grant",
"scope_level": "Resource",
"planes": [
"Identity",
"Policy",
"Audit"
],
"metadata": {
"description": "A capability-role grant or revocation (PLTF/IAM/VEN/CUS)."
}
},
{
"name": "plan-assignment",
"scope_level": "Resource",
"planes": [
"Identity",
"Audit"
],
"metadata": {
"description": "A tenant's plan/subscription assignment (by reference id)."
}
},
{
"name": "guardrail",
"scope_level": "Resource",
"planes": [
"Policy",
"Audit"
],
"metadata": {
"description": "A tenant's resolved ceiling (spend, seats, and similar limits) plus the provenance of that value. Not an entitlement and not a meter."
}
FLEX-WP-0008 T01-T02: tenant-engine resource/action vocabulary + policy package docs/tenant-engine-{resource-namespace,action-vocabulary}.md: four actions (tenant.create, tenant.role.grant, tenant.role.revoke, tenant.plan.assign) matching tenant_engine/src/tenant_engine/authz.py's _RESOURCE_TYPES mapping exactly. No resource_manifest.yaml -- tenant-engine's resources are created dynamically, unlike ops-warden's fixed SSH-certificate inventory; documented as a deliberate deviation. examples/tenant-engine/: protected_system_manifest.yaml, subject_manifest.yaml (one registered caller: tenant-engine's own service identity), policy_package.md (Rego rules + embedded tests), policy_fixtures.yaml (8 allow/deny pairs), assembled registry_snapshot.json, two standalone check_request examples, README. Design decision made explicit in the workplan: operator/service-identity authorization (one known subject, four known actions), not aal2+assurance + tenant-capability-role checking -- CheckRequest carries no assurance claim yet (TEN-WP-0003 already flagged actor as a plain request-body field, not a real auth context), and a tenant's capability roles are the tenant's own state, not a property of who may call tenant-engine's admin API. Revisit once KEY-WP-0005 gives callers a real assurance-bearing identity. Verified for real: built ./cmd/flex-auth, ran test-policy (6 tests + 8 fixtures, all pass), load-registry, check against both example requests. Then ran a live flex-auth serve with this exact registry+policy and pointed tenant-engine's real, unmodified FlexAuthCheckClient/FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer at it over real HTTP: unknown subject -> 403, tenant-engine -> 201. go test ./... still green across the whole repo. T03 (live-lookup context adapter for other protected systems) stays open -- new Go adapter package, tracked separately. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-23 23:05:57 +02:00
}
],
"actions": [
{
"name": "tenant.create",
"capabilities": [
"Create",
"Audit"
],
"planes": [
"Identity",
"Audit"
],
"exposure_modes": [
"Metadata"
],
"metadata": {
"required_context": []
}
},
{
"name": "tenant.role.grant",
"capabilities": [
"Grant",
"Audit"
],
"planes": [
"Identity",
"Policy",
"Audit"
],
"exposure_modes": [
"Metadata"
],
"metadata": {
"required_context": []
}
},
{
"name": "tenant.role.revoke",
"capabilities": [
"Revoke",
"Audit"
],
"planes": [
"Identity",
"Policy",
"Audit"
],
"exposure_modes": [
"Metadata"
],
"metadata": {
"required_context": []
}
},
{
"name": "tenant.plan.assign",
"capabilities": [
"Bind",
"Audit"
],
"planes": [
"Identity",
"Audit"
],
"exposure_modes": [
"Metadata"
],
"metadata": {
"required_context": []
}
Authorize tenant-engine lifecycle actions (FLEX-WP-0010) Extend the tenant-engine write-API policy package with tenant.update, tenant.retire, and tenant.reactivate, the three actions TEN-WP-0005 introduced. Until now every lifecycle mutation resolved to deny unknown_action, blocking TEN-WP-0005-T05 production rollout. - policy_package.md: three actions in valid_actions and frontmatter; CARING capabilities extended with EditAny/Archive/Restore - protected_system_manifest.yaml, subject_manifest.yaml, and the rebuilt registry_snapshot.json carry all seven actions - docs/tenant-engine-action-vocabulary.md documents the HTTP surfaces - 8 new fixture pairs and 5 new Rego tests, including action-drift guards (tenant.retired, tenant_update -> unknown_action) T02 decision, recorded in policy_package.md: tenant.retire does NOT get stricter authorization yet. With one service subject and no assurance claim in the CheckRequest there is nothing stricter to check, and a condition the sole caller always satisfies would falsely read as separate control. Retirement is reversible and non-destructive. Revisit on KEY-WP-0005 assurance claims or a second operator subject. Verified: 11/11 Rego tests, 16/16 fixtures, go test ./... green, gofmt and go vet clean. End-to-end against a live serve with a real tenant-engine through the unmodified FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer: update 6176c39c2f4d7b15, retire 8a801b8ee8455080, reactivate c64cf3713cecd970 all allow; unregistered actor denied unknown_subject (59d3e99c6416be89, 403 write_denied). Handoff revision for TEN-WP-0005-T05: package tenant-engine.write-api.mutate v1 (ready, caring-0.4.0-rc2). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-10 20:52:10 +02:00
},
{
"name": "tenant.update",
"capabilities": [
"EditAny",
"Audit"
],
"planes": [
"Identity",
"Audit"
],
"exposure_modes": [
"Metadata"
],
"metadata": {
"required_context": []
}
},
{
"name": "tenant.retire",
"capabilities": [
"Archive",
"Audit"
],
"planes": [
"Identity",
"Policy",
"Audit"
],
"exposure_modes": [
"Metadata"
],
"metadata": {
"required_context": []
}
},
{
"name": "tenant.reactivate",
"capabilities": [
"Restore",
"Audit"
],
"planes": [
"Identity",
"Policy",
"Audit"
],
"exposure_modes": [
"Metadata"
],
"metadata": {
"required_context": []
}
},
{
"name": "tenant.guardrail.read",
"capabilities": [
"View",
"Audit"
],
"planes": [
"Policy",
"Audit"
],
"exposure_modes": [
"Metadata"
],
"metadata": {
"required_context": []
}
},
{
"name": "tenant.guardrail.set",
"capabilities": [
"EditAny",
"Audit"
],
"planes": [
"Policy",
"Audit"
],
"exposure_modes": [
"Metadata"
],
"metadata": {
"required_context": []
}
FLEX-WP-0008 T01-T02: tenant-engine resource/action vocabulary + policy package docs/tenant-engine-{resource-namespace,action-vocabulary}.md: four actions (tenant.create, tenant.role.grant, tenant.role.revoke, tenant.plan.assign) matching tenant_engine/src/tenant_engine/authz.py's _RESOURCE_TYPES mapping exactly. No resource_manifest.yaml -- tenant-engine's resources are created dynamically, unlike ops-warden's fixed SSH-certificate inventory; documented as a deliberate deviation. examples/tenant-engine/: protected_system_manifest.yaml, subject_manifest.yaml (one registered caller: tenant-engine's own service identity), policy_package.md (Rego rules + embedded tests), policy_fixtures.yaml (8 allow/deny pairs), assembled registry_snapshot.json, two standalone check_request examples, README. Design decision made explicit in the workplan: operator/service-identity authorization (one known subject, four known actions), not aal2+assurance + tenant-capability-role checking -- CheckRequest carries no assurance claim yet (TEN-WP-0003 already flagged actor as a plain request-body field, not a real auth context), and a tenant's capability roles are the tenant's own state, not a property of who may call tenant-engine's admin API. Revisit once KEY-WP-0005 gives callers a real assurance-bearing identity. Verified for real: built ./cmd/flex-auth, ran test-policy (6 tests + 8 fixtures, all pass), load-registry, check against both example requests. Then ran a live flex-auth serve with this exact registry+policy and pointed tenant-engine's real, unmodified FlexAuthCheckClient/FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer at it over real HTTP: unknown subject -> 403, tenant-engine -> 201. go test ./... still green across the whole repo. T03 (live-lookup context adapter for other protected systems) stays open -- new Go adapter package, tracked separately. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-23 23:05:57 +02:00
}
],
"caring_profiles": [
"caring-0.4.0-rc2"
],
"metadata": {
"flex_auth_contract": "protected-system-v0",
"boundary_contract": "net-kingdom/canon/standards/tenant-engine-boundary-contract_v0.1.md"
}
}
],
"resource_manifests": [],
"tenants": [
{
"id": "tenant:platform",
"name": "Platform Tenant"
}
],
"subjects": [
{
"id": "tenant-engine",
"type": "Service",
"display_name": "tenant-engine service principal",
"organization_relation": "ServiceProvider",
"roles": [
"Operator"
],
"groups": [
"group:tenant-engine-writers",
"group:tenant-engine-readers"
],
"tenant": "tenant:platform",
"metadata": {
"description": "tenant-engine's own service identity, used for the nine write-API actions it sends to POST /v1/check (authz.FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer): tenant.create, tenant.role.grant, tenant.role.revoke, tenant.plan.assign, the lifecycle actions tenant.update, tenant.retire, tenant.reactivate, and the guardrail actions tenant.guardrail.read, tenant.guardrail.set."
}
},
{
"id": "flex-auth",
"type": "Service",
"display_name": "flex-auth service principal",
"organization_relation": "ServiceProvider",
"roles": [
"Operator"
],
"groups": [
"group:tenant-engine-readers"
FLEX-WP-0008 T01-T02: tenant-engine resource/action vocabulary + policy package docs/tenant-engine-{resource-namespace,action-vocabulary}.md: four actions (tenant.create, tenant.role.grant, tenant.role.revoke, tenant.plan.assign) matching tenant_engine/src/tenant_engine/authz.py's _RESOURCE_TYPES mapping exactly. No resource_manifest.yaml -- tenant-engine's resources are created dynamically, unlike ops-warden's fixed SSH-certificate inventory; documented as a deliberate deviation. examples/tenant-engine/: protected_system_manifest.yaml, subject_manifest.yaml (one registered caller: tenant-engine's own service identity), policy_package.md (Rego rules + embedded tests), policy_fixtures.yaml (8 allow/deny pairs), assembled registry_snapshot.json, two standalone check_request examples, README. Design decision made explicit in the workplan: operator/service-identity authorization (one known subject, four known actions), not aal2+assurance + tenant-capability-role checking -- CheckRequest carries no assurance claim yet (TEN-WP-0003 already flagged actor as a plain request-body field, not a real auth context), and a tenant's capability roles are the tenant's own state, not a property of who may call tenant-engine's admin API. Revisit once KEY-WP-0005 gives callers a real assurance-bearing identity. Verified for real: built ./cmd/flex-auth, ran test-policy (6 tests + 8 fixtures, all pass), load-registry, check against both example requests. Then ran a live flex-auth serve with this exact registry+policy and pointed tenant-engine's real, unmodified FlexAuthCheckClient/FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer at it over real HTTP: unknown subject -> 403, tenant-engine -> 201. go test ./... still green across the whole repo. T03 (live-lookup context adapter for other protected systems) stays open -- new Go adapter package, tracked separately. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-23 23:05:57 +02:00
],
"tenant": "tenant:platform",
"metadata": {
"description": "flex-auth's own service identity. Authorized only for tenant.guardrail.read so the PDP can consume ceilings without being able to change them (FLEX-WP-0014)."
FLEX-WP-0008 T01-T02: tenant-engine resource/action vocabulary + policy package docs/tenant-engine-{resource-namespace,action-vocabulary}.md: four actions (tenant.create, tenant.role.grant, tenant.role.revoke, tenant.plan.assign) matching tenant_engine/src/tenant_engine/authz.py's _RESOURCE_TYPES mapping exactly. No resource_manifest.yaml -- tenant-engine's resources are created dynamically, unlike ops-warden's fixed SSH-certificate inventory; documented as a deliberate deviation. examples/tenant-engine/: protected_system_manifest.yaml, subject_manifest.yaml (one registered caller: tenant-engine's own service identity), policy_package.md (Rego rules + embedded tests), policy_fixtures.yaml (8 allow/deny pairs), assembled registry_snapshot.json, two standalone check_request examples, README. Design decision made explicit in the workplan: operator/service-identity authorization (one known subject, four known actions), not aal2+assurance + tenant-capability-role checking -- CheckRequest carries no assurance claim yet (TEN-WP-0003 already flagged actor as a plain request-body field, not a real auth context), and a tenant's capability roles are the tenant's own state, not a property of who may call tenant-engine's admin API. Revisit once KEY-WP-0005 gives callers a real assurance-bearing identity. Verified for real: built ./cmd/flex-auth, ran test-policy (6 tests + 8 fixtures, all pass), load-registry, check against both example requests. Then ran a live flex-auth serve with this exact registry+policy and pointed tenant-engine's real, unmodified FlexAuthCheckClient/FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer at it over real HTTP: unknown subject -> 403, tenant-engine -> 201. go test ./... still green across the whole repo. T03 (live-lookup context adapter for other protected systems) stays open -- new Go adapter package, tracked separately. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-23 23:05:57 +02:00
}
}
],
"groups": [
{
"id": "group:tenant-engine-writers",
"display_name": "tenant-engine Write API Callers",
"members": [
"tenant-engine"
],
"tenant": "tenant:platform"
},
{
"id": "group:tenant-engine-readers",
"display_name": "tenant-engine Guardrail Readers",
"members": [
"flex-auth",
"tenant-engine"
],
"tenant": "tenant:platform"
FLEX-WP-0008 T01-T02: tenant-engine resource/action vocabulary + policy package docs/tenant-engine-{resource-namespace,action-vocabulary}.md: four actions (tenant.create, tenant.role.grant, tenant.role.revoke, tenant.plan.assign) matching tenant_engine/src/tenant_engine/authz.py's _RESOURCE_TYPES mapping exactly. No resource_manifest.yaml -- tenant-engine's resources are created dynamically, unlike ops-warden's fixed SSH-certificate inventory; documented as a deliberate deviation. examples/tenant-engine/: protected_system_manifest.yaml, subject_manifest.yaml (one registered caller: tenant-engine's own service identity), policy_package.md (Rego rules + embedded tests), policy_fixtures.yaml (8 allow/deny pairs), assembled registry_snapshot.json, two standalone check_request examples, README. Design decision made explicit in the workplan: operator/service-identity authorization (one known subject, four known actions), not aal2+assurance + tenant-capability-role checking -- CheckRequest carries no assurance claim yet (TEN-WP-0003 already flagged actor as a plain request-body field, not a real auth context), and a tenant's capability roles are the tenant's own state, not a property of who may call tenant-engine's admin API. Revisit once KEY-WP-0005 gives callers a real assurance-bearing identity. Verified for real: built ./cmd/flex-auth, ran test-policy (6 tests + 8 fixtures, all pass), load-registry, check against both example requests. Then ran a live flex-auth serve with this exact registry+policy and pointed tenant-engine's real, unmodified FlexAuthCheckClient/FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer at it over real HTTP: unknown subject -> 403, tenant-engine -> 201. go test ./... still green across the whole repo. T03 (live-lookup context adapter for other protected systems) stays open -- new Go adapter package, tracked separately. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-23 23:05:57 +02:00
}
],
"relationships": []
}