FLEX-WP-0008 T01-T02: tenant-engine resource/action vocabulary + policy package
docs/tenant-engine-{resource-namespace,action-vocabulary}.md: four actions
(tenant.create, tenant.role.grant, tenant.role.revoke, tenant.plan.assign)
matching tenant_engine/src/tenant_engine/authz.py's _RESOURCE_TYPES mapping
exactly. No resource_manifest.yaml -- tenant-engine's resources are created
dynamically, unlike ops-warden's fixed SSH-certificate inventory; documented
as a deliberate deviation.
examples/tenant-engine/: protected_system_manifest.yaml, subject_manifest.yaml
(one registered caller: tenant-engine's own service identity),
policy_package.md (Rego rules + embedded tests), policy_fixtures.yaml (8
allow/deny pairs), assembled registry_snapshot.json, two standalone
check_request examples, README.
Design decision made explicit in the workplan: operator/service-identity
authorization (one known subject, four known actions), not aal2+assurance +
tenant-capability-role checking -- CheckRequest carries no assurance claim
yet (TEN-WP-0003 already flagged actor as a plain request-body field, not a
real auth context), and a tenant's capability roles are the tenant's own
state, not a property of who may call tenant-engine's admin API. Revisit
once KEY-WP-0005 gives callers a real assurance-bearing identity.
Verified for real: built ./cmd/flex-auth, ran test-policy (6 tests + 8
fixtures, all pass), load-registry, check against both example requests.
Then ran a live flex-auth serve with this exact registry+policy and pointed
tenant-engine's real, unmodified FlexAuthCheckClient/FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer
at it over real HTTP: unknown subject -> 403, tenant-engine -> 201. go test
./... still green across the whole repo.
T03 (live-lookup context adapter for other protected systems) stays open --
new Go adapter package, tracked separately.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-23 23:05:57 +02:00
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id: tenant-engine
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name: Tenant Engine
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resource_types:
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- name: tenant
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scope_level: Resource
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planes:
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- Identity
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- Audit
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metadata:
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description: A tenant record (existence, onboarding grouping).
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- name: role-grant
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scope_level: Resource
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planes:
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- Identity
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- Policy
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- Audit
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metadata:
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description: A capability-role grant or revocation (PLTF/IAM/VEN/CUS).
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- name: plan-assignment
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scope_level: Resource
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planes:
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- Identity
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- Audit
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metadata:
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description: A tenant's plan/subscription assignment (by reference id).
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2026-08-16 02:46:25 +02:00
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- name: guardrail
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scope_level: Resource
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planes:
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- Policy
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- Audit
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metadata:
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description: >-
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A tenant's resolved ceiling (spend, seats, and similar limits) plus
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the provenance of that value. Not an entitlement and not a meter.
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FLEX-WP-0008 T01-T02: tenant-engine resource/action vocabulary + policy package
docs/tenant-engine-{resource-namespace,action-vocabulary}.md: four actions
(tenant.create, tenant.role.grant, tenant.role.revoke, tenant.plan.assign)
matching tenant_engine/src/tenant_engine/authz.py's _RESOURCE_TYPES mapping
exactly. No resource_manifest.yaml -- tenant-engine's resources are created
dynamically, unlike ops-warden's fixed SSH-certificate inventory; documented
as a deliberate deviation.
examples/tenant-engine/: protected_system_manifest.yaml, subject_manifest.yaml
(one registered caller: tenant-engine's own service identity),
policy_package.md (Rego rules + embedded tests), policy_fixtures.yaml (8
allow/deny pairs), assembled registry_snapshot.json, two standalone
check_request examples, README.
Design decision made explicit in the workplan: operator/service-identity
authorization (one known subject, four known actions), not aal2+assurance +
tenant-capability-role checking -- CheckRequest carries no assurance claim
yet (TEN-WP-0003 already flagged actor as a plain request-body field, not a
real auth context), and a tenant's capability roles are the tenant's own
state, not a property of who may call tenant-engine's admin API. Revisit
once KEY-WP-0005 gives callers a real assurance-bearing identity.
Verified for real: built ./cmd/flex-auth, ran test-policy (6 tests + 8
fixtures, all pass), load-registry, check against both example requests.
Then ran a live flex-auth serve with this exact registry+policy and pointed
tenant-engine's real, unmodified FlexAuthCheckClient/FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer
at it over real HTTP: unknown subject -> 403, tenant-engine -> 201. go test
./... still green across the whole repo.
T03 (live-lookup context adapter for other protected systems) stays open --
new Go adapter package, tracked separately.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-23 23:05:57 +02:00
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actions:
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- name: tenant.create
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capabilities:
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- Create
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- Audit
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planes:
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- Identity
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- Audit
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exposure_modes:
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- Metadata
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metadata:
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required_context: []
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- name: tenant.role.grant
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capabilities:
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- Grant
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- Audit
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planes:
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- Identity
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- Policy
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- Audit
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exposure_modes:
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- Metadata
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metadata:
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required_context: []
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- name: tenant.role.revoke
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capabilities:
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- Revoke
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- Audit
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planes:
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- Identity
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- Policy
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- Audit
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exposure_modes:
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- Metadata
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metadata:
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required_context: []
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- name: tenant.plan.assign
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capabilities:
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- Bind
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- Audit
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planes:
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- Identity
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- Audit
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exposure_modes:
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- Metadata
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metadata:
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required_context: []
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Authorize tenant-engine lifecycle actions (FLEX-WP-0010)
Extend the tenant-engine write-API policy package with tenant.update,
tenant.retire, and tenant.reactivate, the three actions TEN-WP-0005
introduced. Until now every lifecycle mutation resolved to deny
unknown_action, blocking TEN-WP-0005-T05 production rollout.
- policy_package.md: three actions in valid_actions and frontmatter;
CARING capabilities extended with EditAny/Archive/Restore
- protected_system_manifest.yaml, subject_manifest.yaml, and the rebuilt
registry_snapshot.json carry all seven actions
- docs/tenant-engine-action-vocabulary.md documents the HTTP surfaces
- 8 new fixture pairs and 5 new Rego tests, including action-drift
guards (tenant.retired, tenant_update -> unknown_action)
T02 decision, recorded in policy_package.md: tenant.retire does NOT get
stricter authorization yet. With one service subject and no assurance
claim in the CheckRequest there is nothing stricter to check, and a
condition the sole caller always satisfies would falsely read as
separate control. Retirement is reversible and non-destructive. Revisit
on KEY-WP-0005 assurance claims or a second operator subject.
Verified: 11/11 Rego tests, 16/16 fixtures, go test ./... green, gofmt
and go vet clean. End-to-end against a live serve with a real
tenant-engine through the unmodified FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer: update
6176c39c2f4d7b15, retire 8a801b8ee8455080, reactivate c64cf3713cecd970
all allow; unregistered actor denied unknown_subject
(59d3e99c6416be89, 403 write_denied).
Handoff revision for TEN-WP-0005-T05: package
tenant-engine.write-api.mutate v1 (ready, caring-0.4.0-rc2).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-10 20:52:10 +02:00
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- name: tenant.update
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capabilities:
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- EditAny
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- Audit
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planes:
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- Identity
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- Audit
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exposure_modes:
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- Metadata
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metadata:
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required_context: []
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- name: tenant.retire
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capabilities:
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- Archive
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- Audit
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planes:
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- Identity
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- Policy
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- Audit
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exposure_modes:
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- Metadata
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metadata:
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required_context: []
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- name: tenant.reactivate
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capabilities:
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- Restore
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- Audit
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planes:
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- Identity
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- Policy
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- Audit
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exposure_modes:
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- Metadata
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metadata:
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required_context: []
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2026-08-16 02:46:25 +02:00
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- name: tenant.guardrail.read
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capabilities:
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- View
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- Audit
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planes:
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- Policy
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- Audit
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exposure_modes:
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- Metadata
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metadata:
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required_context: []
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- name: tenant.guardrail.set
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capabilities:
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- EditAny
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- Audit
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planes:
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- Policy
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- Audit
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exposure_modes:
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- Metadata
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metadata:
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required_context: []
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FLEX-WP-0008 T01-T02: tenant-engine resource/action vocabulary + policy package
docs/tenant-engine-{resource-namespace,action-vocabulary}.md: four actions
(tenant.create, tenant.role.grant, tenant.role.revoke, tenant.plan.assign)
matching tenant_engine/src/tenant_engine/authz.py's _RESOURCE_TYPES mapping
exactly. No resource_manifest.yaml -- tenant-engine's resources are created
dynamically, unlike ops-warden's fixed SSH-certificate inventory; documented
as a deliberate deviation.
examples/tenant-engine/: protected_system_manifest.yaml, subject_manifest.yaml
(one registered caller: tenant-engine's own service identity),
policy_package.md (Rego rules + embedded tests), policy_fixtures.yaml (8
allow/deny pairs), assembled registry_snapshot.json, two standalone
check_request examples, README.
Design decision made explicit in the workplan: operator/service-identity
authorization (one known subject, four known actions), not aal2+assurance +
tenant-capability-role checking -- CheckRequest carries no assurance claim
yet (TEN-WP-0003 already flagged actor as a plain request-body field, not a
real auth context), and a tenant's capability roles are the tenant's own
state, not a property of who may call tenant-engine's admin API. Revisit
once KEY-WP-0005 gives callers a real assurance-bearing identity.
Verified for real: built ./cmd/flex-auth, ran test-policy (6 tests + 8
fixtures, all pass), load-registry, check against both example requests.
Then ran a live flex-auth serve with this exact registry+policy and pointed
tenant-engine's real, unmodified FlexAuthCheckClient/FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer
at it over real HTTP: unknown subject -> 403, tenant-engine -> 201. go test
./... still green across the whole repo.
T03 (live-lookup context adapter for other protected systems) stays open --
new Go adapter package, tracked separately.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-23 23:05:57 +02:00
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caring_profiles:
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|
- caring-0.4.0-rc2
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metadata:
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flex_auth_contract: protected-system-v0
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boundary_contract: net-kingdom/canon/standards/tenant-engine-boundary-contract_v0.1.md
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