2026-09-06 08:14:14 +02:00
{
fix(secrets-engine): v2 adds the tenant rule v1 never had
secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle v1 contained no reference to
input.tenant — not in well_formed, not in the denial ladder, not in a
test. A rotate on lane:glas-primary under tenant:coulomb returned allow
against the deployed package (decision:066e629bbf0c0924).
Found while answering glas-harness's tenant-alignment request, which had
asked for wrong-tenant denial evidence. There was none to return.
Three covers failed the same way: every one of the 29 fixtures carried
tenant:platform, so the suite could not report on the field; T02's own
gate named "wrong-tenant deny" and was recorded done unmet; and the
engine hashes tenant into request_digest but never compares it. Four
other published packages carry the branch — this one was the outlier.
v2 adds wrong_tenant above wrong_system, three Rego tests and three
fixtures (28/28, 32/32). The absent-tenant test caught a second defect
in the first draft: a bare input.tenant != comparison is undefined on a
missing key, so the branch dropped and the ladder reported the wrong
rung. request_tenant := object.get(input, "tenant", "") fixes it.
v2 supersedes rather than amends v1 because the defect failed open: a
consumer pinned to _VERSION=v1 would keep receiving allows with no
signal the rule beneath the version string had changed. The earlier
dual-control correction stayed at v1 because it denied everything.
Replay envelopes regenerated at v2; both request_digest values are
byte-identical, so secrets-engine's digest join needs no re-pinning.
The sweep this prompted found tenant-engine unscoped on tenant as well —
deployed, and verified allowing tenant:coulomb. Not the same fix: its
request tenant names the target rather than the caller, so a constant
would break it. Recorded and carried by FLEX-WP-0022 rather than patched
unilaterally.
FLEX-WP-0021 closes at T05; the pin still serves v1 until a redeploy.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014aQMM1dPXaPiXVn6DwwtLd
Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 715613@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: fabd95c1-4c9e-4080-8849-8707ae025f80
2026-09-06 20:38:45 +02:00
"id" : "decision:414734bb30381ff7" ,
2026-09-06 08:14:14 +02:00
"contract_version" : "flex-auth.decision-record.v1" ,
"request_id" : "check:secrets-engine-rotate" ,
"effect" : "allow" ,
"reason" : "catalog_lane_policy_matched" ,
fix(secrets-engine): v2 adds the tenant rule v1 never had
secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle v1 contained no reference to
input.tenant — not in well_formed, not in the denial ladder, not in a
test. A rotate on lane:glas-primary under tenant:coulomb returned allow
against the deployed package (decision:066e629bbf0c0924).
Found while answering glas-harness's tenant-alignment request, which had
asked for wrong-tenant denial evidence. There was none to return.
Three covers failed the same way: every one of the 29 fixtures carried
tenant:platform, so the suite could not report on the field; T02's own
gate named "wrong-tenant deny" and was recorded done unmet; and the
engine hashes tenant into request_digest but never compares it. Four
other published packages carry the branch — this one was the outlier.
v2 adds wrong_tenant above wrong_system, three Rego tests and three
fixtures (28/28, 32/32). The absent-tenant test caught a second defect
in the first draft: a bare input.tenant != comparison is undefined on a
missing key, so the branch dropped and the ladder reported the wrong
rung. request_tenant := object.get(input, "tenant", "") fixes it.
v2 supersedes rather than amends v1 because the defect failed open: a
consumer pinned to _VERSION=v1 would keep receiving allows with no
signal the rule beneath the version string had changed. The earlier
dual-control correction stayed at v1 because it denied everything.
Replay envelopes regenerated at v2; both request_digest values are
byte-identical, so secrets-engine's digest join needs no re-pinning.
The sweep this prompted found tenant-engine unscoped on tenant as well —
deployed, and verified allowing tenant:coulomb. Not the same fix: its
request tenant names the target rather than the caller, so a constant
would break it. Recorded and carried by FLEX-WP-0022 rather than patched
unilaterally.
FLEX-WP-0021 closes at T05; the pin still serves v1 until a redeploy.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014aQMM1dPXaPiXVn6DwwtLd
Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 715613@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: fabd95c1-4c9e-4080-8849-8707ae025f80
2026-09-06 20:38:45 +02:00
"matched_policy_version" : "v2" ,
2026-09-06 08:14:14 +02:00
"matched_rule" : "catalog_lane_policy_matched" ,
"resource" : {
"id" : "lane:glas-primary" ,
"type" : "secret-catalog-lane" ,
"system" : "secrets-engine" ,
"tenant" : "tenant:platform" ,
"attributes" : {
"auth_targets" : [ ] ,
"fields" : [
"password"
] ,
"policy_targets" : [ ] ,
"stage" : "prod"
}
} ,
"subject" : {
"id" : "secrets-engine" ,
"type" : "service" ,
"tenant" : "tenant:platform" ,
"attributes" : {
"description" : "secrets-engine's own service identity, the single calling identity for the twelve gated catalog-lane actions it sends to POST /v1/check. Because it is the only subject, the package has no action_not_granted branch (FLEX-WP-0021-T02); registering a second identity is the revisit trigger." ,
"display_name" : "secrets-engine service principal" ,
"groups" : [
"group:secrets-engine-lane-operators"
] ,
"organization_relation" : "ServiceProvider" ,
"roles" : [
"Operator"
]
}
} ,
"binding" : {
"tenant" : "tenant:platform" ,
"subject" : {
"id" : "secrets-engine" ,
"type" : "service" ,
"tenant" : "tenant:platform" ,
"attributes" : {
"description" : "secrets-engine's own service identity, the single calling identity for the twelve gated catalog-lane actions it sends to POST /v1/check. Because it is the only subject, the package has no action_not_granted branch (FLEX-WP-0021-T02); registering a second identity is the revisit trigger." ,
"display_name" : "secrets-engine service principal" ,
"groups" : [
"group:secrets-engine-lane-operators"
] ,
"organization_relation" : "ServiceProvider" ,
"roles" : [
"Operator"
]
}
} ,
"action" : "rotate" ,
"resource" : {
"id" : "lane:glas-primary" ,
"type" : "secret-catalog-lane" ,
"system" : "secrets-engine" ,
"tenant" : "tenant:platform" ,
"attributes" : {
"auth_targets" : [ ] ,
"fields" : [
"password"
] ,
"policy_targets" : [ ] ,
"stage" : "prod"
}
} ,
"request_digest" : "sha256:de67324f54187055307a833235f83ced9fcd3a20952a27b3d19493ed39734345"
} ,
"lifetime" : {
"kind" : "ttl" ,
"ttl" : "15m" ,
fix(secrets-engine): v2 adds the tenant rule v1 never had
secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle v1 contained no reference to
input.tenant — not in well_formed, not in the denial ladder, not in a
test. A rotate on lane:glas-primary under tenant:coulomb returned allow
against the deployed package (decision:066e629bbf0c0924).
Found while answering glas-harness's tenant-alignment request, which had
asked for wrong-tenant denial evidence. There was none to return.
Three covers failed the same way: every one of the 29 fixtures carried
tenant:platform, so the suite could not report on the field; T02's own
gate named "wrong-tenant deny" and was recorded done unmet; and the
engine hashes tenant into request_digest but never compares it. Four
other published packages carry the branch — this one was the outlier.
v2 adds wrong_tenant above wrong_system, three Rego tests and three
fixtures (28/28, 32/32). The absent-tenant test caught a second defect
in the first draft: a bare input.tenant != comparison is undefined on a
missing key, so the branch dropped and the ladder reported the wrong
rung. request_tenant := object.get(input, "tenant", "") fixes it.
v2 supersedes rather than amends v1 because the defect failed open: a
consumer pinned to _VERSION=v1 would keep receiving allows with no
signal the rule beneath the version string had changed. The earlier
dual-control correction stayed at v1 because it denied everything.
Replay envelopes regenerated at v2; both request_digest values are
byte-identical, so secrets-engine's digest join needs no re-pinning.
The sweep this prompted found tenant-engine unscoped on tenant as well —
deployed, and verified allowing tenant:coulomb. Not the same fix: its
request tenant names the target rather than the caller, so a constant
would break it. Recorded and carried by FLEX-WP-0022 rather than patched
unilaterally.
FLEX-WP-0021 closes at T05; the pin still serves v1 until a redeploy.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014aQMM1dPXaPiXVn6DwwtLd
Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 715613@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: fabd95c1-4c9e-4080-8849-8707ae025f80
2026-09-06 20:38:45 +02:00
"not_before" : "2026-09-06T18:35:18Z" ,
"expires_at" : "2026-09-06T18:50:18Z"
2026-09-06 08:14:14 +02:00
} ,
"diagnostics" : {
"action" : "rotate" ,
"matched_relationship" : "" ,
"policy_package" : "secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle" ,
"policy_status" : "ready" ,
"registry_resource" : false ,
"registry_subject" : true
} ,
"provenance" : {
"evaluator" : "flex-auth/local" ,
"mode" : "standalone" ,
"policy_package" : "secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle" ,
fix(secrets-engine): v2 adds the tenant rule v1 never had
secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle v1 contained no reference to
input.tenant — not in well_formed, not in the denial ladder, not in a
test. A rotate on lane:glas-primary under tenant:coulomb returned allow
against the deployed package (decision:066e629bbf0c0924).
Found while answering glas-harness's tenant-alignment request, which had
asked for wrong-tenant denial evidence. There was none to return.
Three covers failed the same way: every one of the 29 fixtures carried
tenant:platform, so the suite could not report on the field; T02's own
gate named "wrong-tenant deny" and was recorded done unmet; and the
engine hashes tenant into request_digest but never compares it. Four
other published packages carry the branch — this one was the outlier.
v2 adds wrong_tenant above wrong_system, three Rego tests and three
fixtures (28/28, 32/32). The absent-tenant test caught a second defect
in the first draft: a bare input.tenant != comparison is undefined on a
missing key, so the branch dropped and the ladder reported the wrong
rung. request_tenant := object.get(input, "tenant", "") fixes it.
v2 supersedes rather than amends v1 because the defect failed open: a
consumer pinned to _VERSION=v1 would keep receiving allows with no
signal the rule beneath the version string had changed. The earlier
dual-control correction stayed at v1 because it denied everything.
Replay envelopes regenerated at v2; both request_digest values are
byte-identical, so secrets-engine's digest join needs no re-pinning.
The sweep this prompted found tenant-engine unscoped on tenant as well —
deployed, and verified allowing tenant:coulomb. Not the same fix: its
request tenant names the target rather than the caller, so a constant
would break it. Recorded and carried by FLEX-WP-0022 rather than patched
unilaterally.
FLEX-WP-0021 closes at T05; the pin still serves v1 until a redeploy.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014aQMM1dPXaPiXVn6DwwtLd
Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 715613@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: fabd95c1-4c9e-4080-8849-8707ae025f80
2026-09-06 20:38:45 +02:00
"policy_version" : "v2" ,
"policy_package_digest" : "sha256:bd11c5fe77ce6439c65fea225ad6b71d2110efc5e7b5bc9b499c59cd0a53b8b4" ,
2026-09-06 08:14:14 +02:00
"registry_snapshot_digest" : "sha256:f5a309bc0b36721fd6d9ad7f53eb21222162bc2eac62a0ab0802a9a1d51340bb" ,
fix(secrets-engine): v2 adds the tenant rule v1 never had
secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle v1 contained no reference to
input.tenant — not in well_formed, not in the denial ladder, not in a
test. A rotate on lane:glas-primary under tenant:coulomb returned allow
against the deployed package (decision:066e629bbf0c0924).
Found while answering glas-harness's tenant-alignment request, which had
asked for wrong-tenant denial evidence. There was none to return.
Three covers failed the same way: every one of the 29 fixtures carried
tenant:platform, so the suite could not report on the field; T02's own
gate named "wrong-tenant deny" and was recorded done unmet; and the
engine hashes tenant into request_digest but never compares it. Four
other published packages carry the branch — this one was the outlier.
v2 adds wrong_tenant above wrong_system, three Rego tests and three
fixtures (28/28, 32/32). The absent-tenant test caught a second defect
in the first draft: a bare input.tenant != comparison is undefined on a
missing key, so the branch dropped and the ladder reported the wrong
rung. request_tenant := object.get(input, "tenant", "") fixes it.
v2 supersedes rather than amends v1 because the defect failed open: a
consumer pinned to _VERSION=v1 would keep receiving allows with no
signal the rule beneath the version string had changed. The earlier
dual-control correction stayed at v1 because it denied everything.
Replay envelopes regenerated at v2; both request_digest values are
byte-identical, so secrets-engine's digest join needs no re-pinning.
The sweep this prompted found tenant-engine unscoped on tenant as well —
deployed, and verified allowing tenant:coulomb. Not the same fix: its
request tenant names the target rather than the caller, so a constant
would break it. Recorded and carried by FLEX-WP-0022 rather than patched
unilaterally.
FLEX-WP-0021 closes at T05; the pin still serves v1 until a redeploy.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014aQMM1dPXaPiXVn6DwwtLd
Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 715613@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: fabd95c1-4c9e-4080-8849-8707ae025f80
2026-09-06 20:38:45 +02:00
"decision_time" : "2026-09-06T18:35:18Z"
2026-09-06 08:14:14 +02:00
} ,
"caring" : {
"profile" : "caring-0.4.0-rc2" ,
"conformance_findings" : [
{
"code" : "CARING-DESCRIPTOR-MISSING" ,
"severity" : "warning" ,
"message" : "no CARING descriptor matched the request" ,
"fields" : [
"caring_context"
]
}
]
}
}
