fix(decision): registry facts win over caller-supplied attributes
All checks were successful
CI Smoke / host-smoke (push) Successful in 1s
CI Smoke / container-smoke (push) Successful in 3s
Build and Publish Container Image / build-and-push (push) Successful in 57s

secrets-engine's first live request rejected our allow: binding.
request_digest is computed over material they never sent, because we
enrich subject and resource from the registry before hashing. Answering
that meant reading the enrichment path, which had a worse defect in it.

Enrichment was additive-if-absent — addAttribute wrote a registry value
only where the request had no value for that key. So where a caller
supplied a key, the caller's value won and the registry's never applied.
Every registry ceiling and allowlist was advisory. Verified against the
shipped ops-warden package, each one added key on an otherwise-denied
request:

  max_ttl_hours: 99      registry says 8    -> allowed a 12h certificate
  allowed_principals     registry allowlist -> disallowed_principal bypassed
  allowed_subjects       registry allowlist -> unknown_subject bypassed

The third is the one to read twice: a subject the registry does not know
authorized itself by naming itself in the allowlist it was being checked
against.

Not remotely reachable today — the PEP builds the CheckRequest,
ops-warden sends no resource.attributes, and enforce admits one identity.
It is a defence-in-depth failure: any path that lets attacker-influenced
data into a CheckRequest field became a full policy bypass rather than a
bounded input problem. Callers sending resource.attributes is not
hypothetical; secrets-engine does it on every request.

Registry facts now win, and diagnostics.registry_overrode names every
displaced key, because a registry that silently discards a contradicting
claim hides that a caller asserted authority it did not have.

subject.type is carved out, and the reason is a finding of its own.
Making the registry win there denied every secrets-engine allow: the
registry's type is CARING vocabulary (Human, Agent, Automation, Service)
and the request's is the protected system's actor vocabulary (service,
adm, agt, atm). Two fields sharing a name; substituting one for the other
is translation rather than identity, which GH-DEC-2026-008 ruled against.
Note what surfaced it — the registry's type had been dead data since the
field existed, because the caller's value always won.

Also publishes binding.submitted_request_digest, over the request exactly
as sent. request_digest was published as the consumer replay test and
cannot be one. Nothing is lost hashing the pre-enrichment form:
enrichment is a function of the request and the snapshot, and
registry_snapshot_digest already pins the snapshot.

Existing pins do not move. All three replay fixtures' request_digest and
approval_binding_digest values are byte-identical — those requests
contradict no registry fact. A field to add, not a value to correct.

Regression tests verified failing against the old behaviour before being
kept. FLEX-DEC-2026-012; FLEX-WP-0025 carries the residual, that a policy
still cannot tell a fact from an assertion.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014aQMM1dPXaPiXVn6DwwtLd

Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 715613@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: fabd95c1-4c9e-4080-8849-8707ae025f80
This commit is contained in:
tegwick 2026-09-07 13:43:33 +02:00
parent c861d75703
commit 0bc624ba62
14 changed files with 822 additions and 34 deletions

View file

@ -31,6 +31,30 @@ go run ./cmd/flex-auth check \
Verified identical across two runs.
**Regenerated 2026-09-07 — `submitted_request_digest` added; every existing
digest unchanged.** From `FLEX-DEC-2026-012`, which `secrets-engine` found by
running against the live pin.
`request_digest` is computed over the **enriched** request — after the evaluator
overlays registry facts onto subject and resource — so it is not
consumer-computable and never was. Pin **`submitted_request_digest`** instead:
it is the digest over the request exactly as sent, and it is the §6.4.2 replay
test. `request_digest` keeps both its meaning as flex-auth's own audit-replay
identity and its exact value here — `de67324f…`, `c749ee2d…`, `c9c6e6f8…` are
unchanged, as is `approval_binding_digest` at `fa07bec…`. The enrichment
precedence changed in the same decision but these three requests contradict no
registry fact, so nothing they hash moved. **Nothing you have pinned needs
re-pinning; there is a new field to add, not an old one to correct.**
| Field | `rotate` | `destroy` | `wrong-tenant` |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `binding.submitted_request_digest` | `sha256:41c8fc08…` | `sha256:c605a9ec…` | `sha256:9aab6de9…` |
A consumer that pinned `request_digest` from these files was pinning a value it
could not have computed itself — it matched because it was copied from our
output, not derived. That is the defect `submitted_request_digest` closes: the
same assertion now has a value you can recompute from the request you sent.
**Regenerated at `v2`, 2026-09-06.** The package gained the tenant rule it had
been missing, so `provenance.policy_version` is now `v2` and
`policy_package_digest` moved from `sha256:fe0070b7…bd8c` to

View file

@ -100,19 +100,21 @@
}
},
"request_digest": "sha256:c749ee2dc3cdf927a70a3e5b27cff4d97a438d3264153b4b2e3bcacbaf82091a",
"approval_binding_digest": "sha256:fa07becfaa471394d06aee5fa3cd66352bf0cc69ef24900240489684cda8cd56"
"approval_binding_digest": "sha256:fa07becfaa471394d06aee5fa3cd66352bf0cc69ef24900240489684cda8cd56",
"submitted_request_digest": "sha256:c605a9ecd5711d0a1d59e7b29f3a16b53fd09d104dd077766f098e7bc5895435"
},
"lifetime": {
"kind": "ttl",
"ttl": "15m",
"not_before": "2026-09-06T18:35:19Z",
"expires_at": "2026-09-06T18:50:19Z"
"not_before": "2026-09-07T07:10:23Z",
"expires_at": "2026-09-07T07:25:23Z"
},
"diagnostics": {
"action": "destroy",
"matched_relationship": "",
"policy_package": "secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle",
"policy_status": "ready",
"registry_overrode": [],
"registry_resource": false,
"registry_subject": true
},
@ -126,7 +128,7 @@
"input_claim_digests": {
"context": "sha256:8b73d29ecef286d42e03d2420531d6c45219f325a7ae004c1ecfc781203a2800"
},
"decision_time": "2026-09-06T18:35:19Z"
"decision_time": "2026-09-07T07:10:23Z"
},
"caring": {
"profile": "caring-0.4.0-rc2",

View file

@ -69,19 +69,21 @@
"stage": "prod"
}
},
"request_digest": "sha256:de67324f54187055307a833235f83ced9fcd3a20952a27b3d19493ed39734345"
"request_digest": "sha256:de67324f54187055307a833235f83ced9fcd3a20952a27b3d19493ed39734345",
"submitted_request_digest": "sha256:41c8fc084e58c46554ccb6afe9943a99906e5986668c923811721f66d9b30a6a"
},
"lifetime": {
"kind": "ttl",
"ttl": "15m",
"not_before": "2026-09-06T18:35:18Z",
"expires_at": "2026-09-06T18:50:18Z"
"not_before": "2026-09-07T07:10:23Z",
"expires_at": "2026-09-07T07:25:23Z"
},
"diagnostics": {
"action": "rotate",
"matched_relationship": "",
"policy_package": "secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle",
"policy_status": "ready",
"registry_overrode": [],
"registry_resource": false,
"registry_subject": true
},
@ -92,7 +94,7 @@
"policy_version": "v2",
"policy_package_digest": "sha256:bd11c5fe77ce6439c65fea225ad6b71d2110efc5e7b5bc9b499c59cd0a53b8b4",
"registry_snapshot_digest": "sha256:f5a309bc0b36721fd6d9ad7f53eb21222162bc2eac62a0ab0802a9a1d51340bb",
"decision_time": "2026-09-06T18:35:18Z"
"decision_time": "2026-09-07T07:10:23Z"
},
"caring": {
"profile": "caring-0.4.0-rc2",

View file

@ -69,13 +69,15 @@
"stage": "prod"
}
},
"request_digest": "sha256:c9c6e6f8713266e9e95ae1443a395a3a1f965ba95469dea747645f0437bb0d20"
"request_digest": "sha256:c9c6e6f8713266e9e95ae1443a395a3a1f965ba95469dea747645f0437bb0d20",
"submitted_request_digest": "sha256:9aab6de9069e1e811a52835ca00bc5e9cb38166444df068eb60a26923b1c9175"
},
"diagnostics": {
"action": "rotate",
"matched_relationship": "",
"policy_package": "secrets-engine.catalog-lane.lifecycle",
"policy_status": "ready",
"registry_overrode": [],
"registry_resource": false,
"registry_subject": true
},
@ -86,7 +88,7 @@
"policy_version": "v2",
"policy_package_digest": "sha256:bd11c5fe77ce6439c65fea225ad6b71d2110efc5e7b5bc9b499c59cd0a53b8b4",
"registry_snapshot_digest": "sha256:f5a309bc0b36721fd6d9ad7f53eb21222162bc2eac62a0ab0802a9a1d51340bb",
"decision_time": "2026-09-06T18:35:20Z"
"decision_time": "2026-09-07T07:10:24Z"
},
"caring": {
"profile": "caring-0.4.0-rc2",