Enforce caller-auth on flex-auth-ops-warden (FLEX-WP-0016-T03)
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ops-warden WARDEN-WP-0031 T04 minted audience-flex-auth tokens as
system:serviceaccount:ops-warden:ops-warden and held the warn-log count.
Helm rev 2 is enforce. Live probe 200/401/403. policy.enabled is theirs.
This commit is contained in:
tegwick 2026-08-19 20:10:31 +02:00
parent f51f50ae8d
commit 249ee146ba
5 changed files with 24 additions and 12 deletions

View file

@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ type: workplan
title: "In-cluster ops-warden policy pin so policy.enabled can flip"
domain: infotech
repo: flex-auth
status: active
status: finished
owner: grok
topic_slug: netkingdom
planning_priority: P1
@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ user-engine and tenant-engine pins were not moved.
```task
id: FLEX-WP-0016-T03
status: wait
status: done
priority: medium
```
@ -103,5 +103,17 @@ the calling side; then this pin can enforce; then they set
`~/.config/warden/warden.yaml`.
Asked 2026-08-19. Cluster DNS from a warden workstation is not assumed;
they pick tunnel or port-forward. `policy.py` posts JSON with no
`Authorization` header.
they pick tunnel or port-forward.
WARDEN-WP-0031 T04 (2026-08-19): ServiceAccount `ops-warden/ops-warden`
exists; `policy.caller_auth mode: command` mints `--audience flex-auth`
per call; authenticated gate against warn held the warning count at 4
(`decision:f3f7c88f9585582a`). They asked for enforce.
**Enforce live 2026-08-19** Helm rev 2, same digest. Probe via port-forward
`:19090` with `kubectl create token ops-warden -n ops-warden --audience flex-auth`:
(1) Bearer → 200 `decision:49350f1064f674d7`;
(2) no Authorization → **401** `unauthenticated`;
(3) `resource.system=user-engine`**403** `forbidden`.
user-engine and tenant-engine pins were not moved. `policy.enabled` remains
ops-warden's flip.