Add isolated ops-warden warn pin (FLEX-WP-0016); FLEX-WP-0007 stays finished

policy.enabled cannot flip against the user-engine or tenant-engine bindings. Helm release flex-auth-ops-warden rev 1 serves the production registry in warn. Workstation warden sends no caller token; enforce and the yaml flip stay ops-warden's.
2026-08-19 14:50:04 +02:00 · 2026-08-19 14:50:04 +02:00 · 259f8a20a6
commit 259f8a20a6
parent c48c696387
6 changed files with 142 additions and 2 deletions
--- a/deploy/README.md
+++ b/deploy/README.md
@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ last-known-good digest below.
 | `flex-auth-tenant-engine` *(previous)* | `sha256:1bf060e61122693ce98359c167cc5fe8bdafc84e097e090eaa71af94d0f27cbc` | nine-action policy (FLEX-WP-0014), CI-built from `f304688` |
 | `flex-auth-tenant-engine` *(previous)* | `sha256:9320df394a642eff24da8af4a0ee8886a7bb78b0f14d8ee1deeb30ea8eeeaba7` | seven-action policy, FLEX-WP-0013 restore; guardrail actions deny `unknown_action` |
 | `flex-auth-tenant-engine` *(rollback)* | `sha256:c25fc34a6cd7e64d955f8723ec70e176a583d5ae71d76280c4e2d89fba0fe0aa` | four-action policy; lifecycle actions deny `unknown_action` |
+| `flex-auth-ops-warden` | `sha256:138aa3471c46bca6e814691fa1e6520aedda3dffd743e6b09141ab433afdb64b` | **live isolated warn** — ops-warden production registry (FLEX-WP-0016), CI `main-3de72fe` |
 | `flex-auth-user-engine` | `sha256:138aa3471c46bca6e814691fa1e6520aedda3dffd743e6b09141ab433afdb64b` | **live** — caller-auth **enforce** (FLEX-WP-0015-T02), CI `main-3de72fe`, A2 probe 2026-08-19 |
 | `flex-auth-user-engine` *(previous)* | `sha256:1f5290376dc5fcf456dc7a785e394d8b90949dabecd1d3e856f38557149bb5f4` | FLEX-WP-0009-T04, nine fixtures (incl. registration-applicant) verified live 2026-08-16 |
 | `flex-auth-user-engine` *(previous)* | `sha256:a31961c45215aa6baf3bc748c6741ab703c2c8325e61aa7983a355026195e51b` | FLEX-WP-0009-T03, six fixtures verified live 2026-08-10 |
--- a/docs/workplan-planning-map.md
+++ b/docs/workplan-planning-map.md
@ -25,7 +25,8 @@ This document captures the current sequencing view for flex-auth workplans.
 | `FLEX-WP-0003` | complete | completed | `FLEX-WP-0002` | Markitect consumer integration and first CARING benchmark are complete: resource namespace, manifest import, action vocabulary, descriptor fixtures, decision fixtures, integration docs. |
 | `FLEX-WP-0004` | complete | completed | `FLEX-WP-0002`, `FLEX-WP-0005` | Delegated PDP and directory adapter boundary work is complete: Topaz adapter shape, OpenFGA/SpiceDB, OPA/Cedar, Keycloak Authorization Services, Entra/Graph/SCIM, CARING envelope preservation. |
 | `FLEX-WP-0006` | complete | finished | `FLEX-WP-0002`, `FLEX-WP-0005` | Ops-warden unblocker is complete: flex-auth publishes `ssh-certificate` / `sign` policies, fixtures, and `/v1/check` smoke evidence for the opt-in pre-sign gate shipped in ops-warden `WARDEN-WP-0007` and tracked for production in `WARDEN-WP-0009`. |
-| `FLEX-WP-0007` | complete | finished | `FLEX-WP-0006` | Production registry fixture, sync contract, runtime command, healthz coverage, real actor/IAM tests, operator tunnel reachability, and vault-backed joint smoke are complete. `policy.enabled` remains off by maturity decision until testing/production posture calls for live enforcement. |
+| `FLEX-WP-0007` | complete | finished | `FLEX-WP-0006` | Production registry fixture, sync contract, runtime command, healthz coverage, real actor/IAM tests, operator tunnel reachability, and vault-backed joint smoke are complete. `policy.enabled` remains off; the in-cluster pin that can actually serve ops-warden is FLEX-WP-0016. |
+| `FLEX-WP-0016` | P1 | active | `FLEX-WP-0007`, `FLEX-WP-0015` | Isolated in-cluster `flex-auth-ops-warden` warn pin with the production registry. Enforce and `policy.enabled` wait on ops-warden's calling side. |

 ## Dependency Notes

--- a/railiance/README.md
+++ b/railiance/README.md
@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ kubectl path; this overlay is the sanctioned shape.
 | `charts/flex-auth/` | One Deployment + Service + NetworkPolicy per release |
 | `values/tenant-engine.yaml` | Production pin for `flex-auth-tenant-engine` |
 | `values/user-engine.yaml` | Production pin for `flex-auth-user-engine` |
+| `values/ops-warden.yaml` | Isolated warn pin for ops-warden signing policy (FLEX-WP-0016) |
 | `values/stage2-canary.yaml` | Isolated canary `flex-auth-canary` (no consumer ingress) |
 | `values/stage3-production.yaml` | Stage 3 values for that same isolated canary release |
 | `tests/stage1.sh` | Local render of every values file |
--- a/tests/stage1.sh
+++ b/tests/stage1.sh
@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/.."
 python3 tests/validate_app_toml.py

 for values in values/stage1.yaml values/stage2-canary.yaml values/stage3-production.yaml \
-              values/user-engine.yaml values/tenant-engine.yaml; do
+              values/user-engine.yaml values/tenant-engine.yaml values/ops-warden.yaml; do
  echo "helm template ${values}"
  helm template flex-auth charts/flex-auth -f "${values}" --namespace flex-auth >/dev/null
 done
@ -25,6 +25,14 @@ echo "$tenant_render" | grep -A1 -- '--caller-auth-mode' | grep -Eq 'warn|enforc
 echo "$tenant_render" | grep -q 'tenant-engine=system:serviceaccount:tenant-engine:tenant-engine' \
  || { echo "tenant-engine render omits its exact binding" >&2; exit 1; }

+ops_render="$(helm template flex-auth-ops-warden charts/flex-auth -f values/ops-warden.yaml --namespace flex-auth)"
+echo "$ops_render" | grep -A1 -- '--caller-auth-mode' | grep -q warn \
+  || { echo "ops-warden first pin must be warn" >&2; exit 1; }
+echo "$ops_render" | grep -q 'ops-warden=system:serviceaccount:ops-warden:ops-warden' \
+  || { echo "ops-warden render omits its exact binding" >&2; exit 1; }
+echo "$ops_render" | grep -q production_registry_snapshot.json \
+  || { echo "ops-warden render omits the production registry" >&2; exit 1; }
+
 canary_render="$(helm template flex-auth-canary charts/flex-auth -f values/stage2-canary.yaml --namespace flex-auth)"
 if echo "$canary_render" | grep -q tokenreviews; then
  echo "isolated canary must not create TokenReview RBAC" >&2
--- a/values/ops-warden.yaml
+++ b/values/ops-warden.yaml
@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Independently rollable ops-warden signing-policy pin (FLEX-WP-0016).
+# Isolated: no in-cluster PEP namespace yet. Workstation warden sign is not a
+# Kubernetes ServiceAccount, so first mode is warn. Do not copy enforce from
+# the user-engine/tenant-engine pins.
+name: flex-auth-ops-warden
+image:
+  repository: forgejo.coulomb.social/coulomb/flex-auth
+  digest: sha256:138aa3471c46bca6e814691fa1e6520aedda3dffd743e6b09141ab433afdb64b
+args:
+  - serve
+  - --addr
+  - 0.0.0.0:8080
+  - --registry
+  - /opt/flex-auth/examples/ops-warden/production_registry_snapshot.json
+  - --policy
+  - /opt/flex-auth/examples/ops-warden/policy_package.md
+callerAuth:
+  mode: warn
+  kubernetesURL: https://10.43.0.1
+  binding: ops-warden=system:serviceaccount:ops-warden:ops-warden
+consumer:
+  isolated: true
--- a/workplans/FLEX-WP-0016-ops-warden-incluster-policy-pin.md
+++ b/workplans/FLEX-WP-0016-ops-warden-incluster-policy-pin.md
@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+---
+id: FLEX-WP-0016
+type: workplan
+title: "In-cluster ops-warden policy pin so policy.enabled can flip"
+domain: infotech
+repo: flex-auth
+status: active
+owner: grok
+topic_slug: netkingdom
+planning_priority: P1
+planning_order: 160
+depends_on_workplans:
+  - FLEX-WP-0007
+  - FLEX-WP-0015
+related_workplans:
+  - WARDEN-WP-0009
+created: "2026-08-19"
+updated: "2026-08-19"
+---
+
+# FLEX-WP-0016 - In-cluster ops-warden policy pin so policy.enabled can flip
+
+FLEX-WP-0007 is **finished**. Its repo-side artifacts, tunnel smoke, and
+vault-backed joint evidence already exist. What it deliberately deferred is
+the production `policy.enabled: true` flip.
+
+That flip is not a flex-auth kubectl of FLEX-WP-0007 leftovers. Three facts
+now make a new workplan the honest vehicle:
+
+1. FLEX-WP-0015 closed A0 on the two live pins. ops-warden's own sequencing
+   rule (ADHOC-2026-08-17-T01) was: `policy.enabled` must not flip anywhere
+   while `/v1/check` still answers unauthenticated callers. That condition
+   now holds for `flex-auth-user-engine` and `flex-auth-tenant-engine`.
+2. Those pins cannot serve ops-warden. Each has an exact
+   `resource.system` → ServiceAccount binding. A `warden sign` check with
+   `system: ops-warden` against either pin is 403, not a signing decision.
+3. There is no in-cluster ops-warden policy Service. FLEX-WP-0007 smoke used
+   a workstation runtime on `127.0.0.1:18090` via `flex-auth-coulombcore`.
+   Example `flex_auth_url` `http://flex-auth.flex-auth.svc.cluster.local:8080`
+   does not exist.
+
+## Ownership
+
+| Concern | Owner |
+| --- | --- |
+| Independently rollable in-cluster pin with the ops-warden policy package and production registry | flex-auth |
+| Workstation/CoulombCore `flex_auth_url` (tunnel or port-forward) | ops-warden / operator |
+| Calling-side identity on `warden sign` (TokenReview or later mTLS) | ops-warden, on its own schedule |
+| `policy.enabled: true` in `warden.yaml` | ops-warden operator |
+
+`warden sign` on a laptop is not a Kubernetes ServiceAccount. ADR 0004's
+choke point therefore cannot be `enforce` on this pin until ops-warden has a
+calling identity. First pin is **warn**. Enforce and the `policy.enabled`
+flip wait on that calling side.
+
+## Tasks
+
+```task
+id: FLEX-WP-0016-T01
+status: done
+priority: high
+```
+
+**Overlay pin.** Add `values/ops-warden.yaml`: same digest as the A2 pins,
+`--registry` / `--policy` for `examples/ops-warden/production_registry_snapshot.json`
+and `policy_package.md`, `callerAuth.mode: warn`, binding
+`ops-warden=system:serviceaccount:ops-warden:ops-warden`. `consumer.isolated:
+true` until there is an in-cluster PEP namespace to admit. Include it in
+`tests/stage1.sh`.
+
+Done 2026-08-19: `values/ops-warden.yaml` on digest `sha256:138aa347…`,
+warn, isolated, production registry. `tests/stage1.sh` renders it.
+
+```task
+id: FLEX-WP-0016-T02
+status: done
+priority: high
+```
+
+**Deploy warn.** `helm upgrade --install flex-auth-ops-warden` from the
+overlay. Prove `/healthz` and one allow `/v1/check` from an operator
+port-forward (isolated NetworkPolicy admits no consumer ingress). Do not
+flip `policy.enabled`.
+
+Done 2026-08-19: Helm release `flex-auth-ops-warden` rev 1, Service
+`flex-auth-ops-warden.flex-auth.svc.cluster.local:8080`. Port-forward
+`:19090` `/healthz` 200; `agt-state-hub-bridge` allow
+`decision:49350f1064f674d7`; TTL 999 deny `ttl_out_of_bounds`
+`decision:ad1620ffa431efe0`. Unauthenticated calls log
+`caller authentication warning` and still return a decision (warn).
+user-engine and tenant-engine pins were not moved.
+
+```task
+id: FLEX-WP-0016-T03
+status: wait
+priority: medium
+```
+
+**Handoff for the flip.** Tell ops-warden the Service DNS, digest, warn mode,
+and that `policy.py` currently sends no `Authorization` header. They adopt
+the calling side; then this pin can enforce; then they set
+`policy.enabled: true` with `fail_closed: true`. Flex-auth does not edit
+`~/.config/warden/warden.yaml`.
+
+Asked 2026-08-19. Cluster DNS from a warden workstation is not assumed;
+they pick tunnel or port-forward. `policy.py` posts JSON with no
+`Authorization` header.