Plan tenant-engine lifecycle policy actions
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TEN-WP-0005 added tenant.update / tenant.retire / tenant.reactivate to
tenant-engine's write API. FLEX-WP-0008's policy package predates them, so
every lifecycle mutation resolves to deny unknown_action -- correct
fail-closed, but it blocks TEN-WP-0005-T05 rollout and USER-WP-0021.

Requested by tenant-engine; action strings taken verbatim from the live
_RESOURCE_TYPES mapping.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
tegwick 2026-08-10 20:11:30 +02:00
parent 8fc5a1a582
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---
id: FLEX-WP-0010
type: workplan
title: "Authorize tenant-engine lifecycle actions"
domain: infotech
repo: flex-auth
status: ready
owner: codex
topic_slug: netkingdom
planning_priority: P1
planning_order: 100
depends_on_workplans:
- FLEX-WP-0008
related_workplans:
- TEN-WP-0005
- USER-WP-0021
created: "2026-08-10"
updated: "2026-08-10"
---
# FLEX-WP-0010 - Authorize tenant-engine lifecycle actions
Extend the existing `tenant-engine` policy package (FLEX-WP-0008-T02) with the
three tenant lifecycle actions `TEN-WP-0005` introduced. Until they exist here,
every lifecycle mutation resolves to `deny` with `unknown_action` — correct
fail-closed behaviour, not a defect, but it means tenant-engine's new update
and retirement endpoints cannot perform a single write in production.
**Requested by:** `tenant-engine` (TEN-WP-0005, T01T04 complete and merged).
**Blocks:** `TEN-WP-0005-T05` (production rollout), and through it
`USER-WP-0021` (user-engine platform operator UI/API).
## Requirements from tenant-engine
Three new actions, all on the existing `tenant` resource type, all against
`system: "tenant-engine"`:
| Action | Resource type | HTTP surface |
|---|---|---|
| `tenant.update` | `tenant` | `PATCH /tenants/{tenant_id}` |
| `tenant.retire` | `tenant` | `POST /tenants/{tenant_id}/retire` |
| `tenant.reactivate` | `tenant` | `POST /tenants/{tenant_id}/reactivate` |
These strings are already live in
`tenant-engine/src/tenant_engine/authz.py`'s `_RESOURCE_TYPES` mapping —
they are the exact values `FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer` sends. Match them
verbatim; do not let the two repos invent different strings for the same
action (the coordination rule FLEX-WP-0008-T01 already established).
The `CheckRequest` shape is unchanged from FLEX-WP-0008: same
`FlexAuthCheckClient`, same `subject_type: "service"`, `resource_id` =
`tenant_id`. No new request fields, no schema change.
**Why three actions rather than one `tenant.write`:** tenant-engine
deliberately separated them so policy *can* permit an operator to rename a
tenant without thereby permitting them to retire it. Consumer contract:
`tenant-engine/docs/tenant-lifecycle-api.md`.
**Honest caveat on what this buys today:** under FLEX-WP-0008-T02's current
model there is exactly one known operator (the `tenant-engine` service
identity) and no `assurance` claim, so all three actions will resolve
identically once added. The separation is a seam for later, not
differentiated authorization now. Adding the actions is what unblocks
production; differentiating them is T02 below, and may well close as "not
yet, and here is why".
## T01 - Extend the policy package with the lifecycle actions
```task
id: FLEX-WP-0010-T01
status: todo
priority: high
```
Add `tenant.update`, `tenant.retire`, and `tenant.reactivate` to
`examples/tenant-engine/policy_package.md`'s `valid_actions` set and to the
frontmatter `actions:` list. Extend the `caring.capabilities` list if the
existing vocabulary (`Create`/`Grant`/`Revoke`/`Bind`/`Audit`) does not
already cover an update/retire/reactivate shape — a judgement call for this
repo, not pre-specified here.
Update `examples/tenant-engine/subject_manifest.yaml`'s subject metadata
description, which currently enumerates the original four actions.
Update `docs/tenant-engine-action-vocabulary.md` with the three actions, their
resource type, and the HTTP surface each gates. Keep the existing note that
this policy governs *who may call tenant-engine's admin API*, not a tenant's
own `PLTF`/`IAM`/`VEN`/`CUS` capability roles — the lifecycle actions do not
change that boundary and should not be read as doing so.
Rebuild `examples/tenant-engine/registry_snapshot.json`.
Done when `valid_actions` carries all seven actions and the vocabulary doc
and subject manifest no longer describe only four.
## T02 - Decide whether retirement warrants stricter authorization
```task
id: FLEX-WP-0010-T02
status: todo
priority: medium
```
`tenant.retire` is the highest-consequence action in the set: it suspends a
tenant's ability to receive new capability grants and plan changes across the
whole platform. Decide whether it should require anything `tenant.update` does
not — a distinct subject, group, or (once available) assurance level.
Record the decision with its reasoning, in the style of FLEX-WP-0008-T02's
closure note. "No, not until `KEY-WP-0005` gives callers a real
`assurance`-bearing identity to check" is a perfectly good outcome — the point
is that the decision is explicit and recorded rather than defaulted into by
treating all seven actions as interchangeable.
Note that retirement is **reversible** by design (`tenant.reactivate`), and
that tenant-engine hard-deletes nothing — so the blast radius of a wrongly
allowed retirement is recoverable, which is legitimate input to this decision.
Done when the decision and its reasoning are recorded in
`policy_package.md`, and implemented if the answer is "yes, stricter".
## T03 - Fixtures and verification
```task
id: FLEX-WP-0010-T03
status: todo
priority: high
```
Add `allow`/`deny` fixture pairs to
`examples/tenant-engine/policy_fixtures.yaml` for each of the three actions,
mirroring the existing eight pairs' shape. Cover at minimum: authorized
service subject → `allow`; unknown subject → `deny unknown_subject`; and a
misspelled lifecycle action → `deny unknown_action` (the case that guards
against the two repos drifting apart on action strings).
Verify the way FLEX-WP-0008-T02 did, against the real binary rather than in
isolation: `go build ./cmd/flex-auth`, then `test-policy` (all Rego tests and
fixtures), `load-registry`, and `check` against standalone request files.
Then close the loop end-to-end, which is what `TEN-WP-0005-T05` actually needs
evidence of: run a live `flex-auth serve` with this registry and point a real
`tenant-engine` at it (`TENANT_ENGINE_FLEX_AUTH_URL`), then exercise
`PATCH /tenants/{id}`, `POST .../retire`, and `POST .../reactivate` through
the unmodified `FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer`. tenant-engine's lifecycle endpoints
require `Idempotency-Key` and `If-Match` headers — read the record first and
echo its `ETag` back; `tenant-engine/docs/tenant-lifecycle-api.md` has the
call shapes.
Done when all three lifecycle mutations return a real `allow` from the real
Rego engine over real HTTP, `go test ./...` is green across the repo, and
`gofmt`/`go vet` are clean.
## T04 - Closure and handoff
```task
id: FLEX-WP-0010-T04
status: todo
priority: low
```
Confirm T01T03. Run `statehub fix-consistency`. Notify `tenant-engine` that
`TEN-WP-0005-T05` is unblocked, naming the policy revision — T05's own
done-criteria require the handoff to name the authorization policy revision
alongside the immutable image and API version.