Authorize tenant-engine lifecycle actions (FLEX-WP-0010)
Extend the tenant-engine write-API policy package with tenant.update, tenant.retire, and tenant.reactivate, the three actions TEN-WP-0005 introduced. Until now every lifecycle mutation resolved to deny unknown_action, blocking TEN-WP-0005-T05 production rollout. - policy_package.md: three actions in valid_actions and frontmatter; CARING capabilities extended with EditAny/Archive/Restore - protected_system_manifest.yaml, subject_manifest.yaml, and the rebuilt registry_snapshot.json carry all seven actions - docs/tenant-engine-action-vocabulary.md documents the HTTP surfaces - 8 new fixture pairs and 5 new Rego tests, including action-drift guards (tenant.retired, tenant_update -> unknown_action) T02 decision, recorded in policy_package.md: tenant.retire does NOT get stricter authorization yet. With one service subject and no assurance claim in the CheckRequest there is nothing stricter to check, and a condition the sole caller always satisfies would falsely read as separate control. Retirement is reversible and non-destructive. Revisit on KEY-WP-0005 assurance claims or a second operator subject. Verified: 11/11 Rego tests, 16/16 fixtures, go test ./... green, gofmt and go vet clean. End-to-end against a live serve with a real tenant-engine through the unmodified FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer: update 6176c39c2f4d7b15, retire 8a801b8ee8455080, reactivate c64cf3713cecd970 all allow; unregistered actor denied unknown_subject (59d3e99c6416be89, 403 write_denied). Handoff revision for TEN-WP-0005-T05: package tenant-engine.write-api.mutate v1 (ready, caring-0.4.0-rc2). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@ -12,8 +12,19 @@ repos, not independently invented.
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| `tenant.role.grant` | `POST /tenants/{id}/roles/grant` | `role-grant` | `allow`, `deny` |
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| `tenant.role.revoke` | `POST /tenants/{id}/roles/revoke` | `role-grant` | `allow`, `deny` |
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| `tenant.plan.assign` | `POST /tenants/{id}/plan` | `plan-assignment` | `allow`, `deny` |
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| `tenant.update` | `PATCH /tenants/{id}` | `tenant` | `allow`, `deny` |
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| `tenant.retire` | `POST /tenants/{id}/retire` | `tenant` | `allow`, `deny` |
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| `tenant.reactivate` | `POST /tenants/{id}/reactivate` | `tenant` | `allow`, `deny` |
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These are the only four actions `tenant-engine` sends to `POST /v1/check` —
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The last three are the tenant lifecycle actions added by `FLEX-WP-0010` for
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`TEN-WP-0005`. They are three actions rather than one `tenant.write` because
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tenant-engine separated them so policy *can* permit renaming a tenant without
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thereby permitting retiring it. Under the current single-operator model all
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three resolve identically — the separation is a seam for later, and the
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reasoning for not yet treating `tenant.retire` more strictly is recorded in
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`examples/tenant-engine/policy_package.md`.
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These are the only seven actions `tenant-engine` sends to `POST /v1/check` —
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its `FlexAuthCheckClient` (`TEN-WP-0003`) never sends anything else, and
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`tenant-engine`'s reads (`/roles`, `/roles/live`) are never gated through
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flex-auth at all; they're `tenant-engine`'s own cache-read and live-lookup
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@ -24,7 +35,10 @@ endpoints, consumed *by* `key-cape` and `flex-auth` respectively.
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`tenant-engine`'s capability roles (`PLTF`/`IAM`/`VEN`/`CUS`, ADR-0014) are
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**tenant** state — what a tenant is allowed to do on the platform. This
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vocabulary governs a different question: which **operator/service
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subjects** are allowed to call `tenant-engine`'s admin API at all. The two
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subjects** are allowed to call `tenant-engine`'s admin API at all. The
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lifecycle actions do not change that boundary: `tenant.retire` asks whether
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*this caller* may retire a tenant, not what a *retired tenant* may still do —
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the latter is tenant state that tenant-engine enforces itself. The two
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must not be conflated — a policy package that checked a *caller's* action
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against a *tenant's* capability roles would be checking the wrong thing.
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See `examples/tenant-engine/policy_package.md`'s Rules section for how the
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