CI digest sha256:1bf060e6 (main-f304688) is live. Seven pre-existing
actions still allow; guardrail.read/set match the FLEX-WP-0014 split.
user-engine pin unchanged. Rollback target is sha256:9320df39.
FLEX-WP-0014. Package tenant-engine.write-api.mutate v1 now carries
nine actions: tenant.guardrail.read and tenant.guardrail.set on
resource type guardrail, verbatim from tenant-engine's mapping.
The read/write split is used now: flex-auth may read ceilings and is
denied action_not_granted on set; tenant-engine may do both. 17/17
Rego tests and 23/23 fixtures pass. Live e2e against a real
tenant-engine FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer matches.
In source only; production still serves the seven-action 9320df39 pin.
FLEX-WP-0013. Production had been rolled back to sha256:c25fc34a
(four actions), so tenant.update / tenant.retire / tenant.reactivate
denied unknown_action. Re-pin and apply the previously-live
sha256:9320df39 image (e9911eb). Live probe after restore: all seven
actions allow; misspelled action and unknown subject still deny.
user-engine pin unchanged. TEN-WP-0006 guardrail actions not added.
T04 is done: nine fixtures including registration-applicant match the
deployed /v1/check, user-engine is on the fail-closed HTTP adapter, and
the deploy manifest now pins the live digest.
FLEX-WP-0010-T04: the deployed flex-auth-tenant-engine Deployment bakes
the policy package into its image, so production still serves the
four-action policy -- probed live, tenant.retire returns deny
unknown_action there while tenant.create allows. TEN-WP-0005-T05 is
unblocked in source but needs an image build from 8e127e5 and a rollout,
which this workplan does not scope. Stated in the workplan and in
examples/tenant-engine/README.md rather than left implied.
FLEX-WP-0009-T04: replayed all six user-engine fixtures against the
deployed flex-auth-user-engine service; all six matched expected effect
and reason, confirming the deployed failure matrix is still fail-closed.
T04 stays in progress -- the criterion also requires user-engine to
retire its local bridge, which is not flex-auth's to close.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Extend the tenant-engine write-API policy package with tenant.update,
tenant.retire, and tenant.reactivate, the three actions TEN-WP-0005
introduced. Until now every lifecycle mutation resolved to deny
unknown_action, blocking TEN-WP-0005-T05 production rollout.
- policy_package.md: three actions in valid_actions and frontmatter;
CARING capabilities extended with EditAny/Archive/Restore
- protected_system_manifest.yaml, subject_manifest.yaml, and the rebuilt
registry_snapshot.json carry all seven actions
- docs/tenant-engine-action-vocabulary.md documents the HTTP surfaces
- 8 new fixture pairs and 5 new Rego tests, including action-drift
guards (tenant.retired, tenant_update -> unknown_action)
T02 decision, recorded in policy_package.md: tenant.retire does NOT get
stricter authorization yet. With one service subject and no assurance
claim in the CheckRequest there is nothing stricter to check, and a
condition the sole caller always satisfies would falsely read as
separate control. Retirement is reversible and non-destructive. Revisit
on KEY-WP-0005 assurance claims or a second operator subject.
Verified: 11/11 Rego tests, 16/16 fixtures, go test ./... green, gofmt
and go vet clean. End-to-end against a live serve with a real
tenant-engine through the unmodified FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer: update
6176c39c2f4d7b15, retire 8a801b8ee8455080, reactivate c64cf3713cecd970
all allow; unregistered actor denied unknown_subject
(59d3e99c6416be89, 403 write_denied).
Handoff revision for TEN-WP-0005-T05: package
tenant-engine.write-api.mutate v1 (ready, caring-0.4.0-rc2).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
QONTO-WP-0004-T04. Modeled directly on examples/tenant-engine/: one
resource type (finance-snapshot), one action (finance.qonto.read),
two registered subjects (an agent-harness session identity and the
founder's human identity), and a Rego policy gating on
resource.system + action + subject.type + tenant match. Tenant
capability-role/plan liveness (VEN/CUS) is deliberately NOT encoded
here -- that's qonto-assistant's separate tenant-engine live-lookup
check, per this package's own scope note.
Verified: flex-auth test-policy (6 rego tests + 6 fixtures, all pass),
load-registry, and CLI check for both an allow and a deny case. Also
verified end-to-end over real HTTP: a live flex-auth serve loaded with
this exact registry+policy, hit by qonto-assistant's actual
FlexAuthCheckClient (not a mock) -- allow for tenant:friendly:binky,
deny (wrong_tenant) for a mismatched tenant.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
docs/tenant-engine-{resource-namespace,action-vocabulary}.md: four actions
(tenant.create, tenant.role.grant, tenant.role.revoke, tenant.plan.assign)
matching tenant_engine/src/tenant_engine/authz.py's _RESOURCE_TYPES mapping
exactly. No resource_manifest.yaml -- tenant-engine's resources are created
dynamically, unlike ops-warden's fixed SSH-certificate inventory; documented
as a deliberate deviation.
examples/tenant-engine/: protected_system_manifest.yaml, subject_manifest.yaml
(one registered caller: tenant-engine's own service identity),
policy_package.md (Rego rules + embedded tests), policy_fixtures.yaml (8
allow/deny pairs), assembled registry_snapshot.json, two standalone
check_request examples, README.
Design decision made explicit in the workplan: operator/service-identity
authorization (one known subject, four known actions), not aal2+assurance +
tenant-capability-role checking -- CheckRequest carries no assurance claim
yet (TEN-WP-0003 already flagged actor as a plain request-body field, not a
real auth context), and a tenant's capability roles are the tenant's own
state, not a property of who may call tenant-engine's admin API. Revisit
once KEY-WP-0005 gives callers a real assurance-bearing identity.
Verified for real: built ./cmd/flex-auth, ran test-policy (6 tests + 8
fixtures, all pass), load-registry, check against both example requests.
Then ran a live flex-auth serve with this exact registry+policy and pointed
tenant-engine's real, unmodified FlexAuthCheckClient/FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer
at it over real HTTP: unknown subject -> 403, tenant-engine -> 201. go test
./... still green across the whole repo.
T03 (live-lookup context adapter for other protected systems) stays open --
new Go adapter package, tracked separately.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add production_registry_snapshot.json from ops-warden inventory with CI
coverage for real actors, IAM subject binding, ttl_out_of_bounds, and
unknown_actor_resource. Extend serve contract tests with /healthz and
publish the registry sync contract for operator deployment.
Completes FLEX-WP-0005 T05 and closes the Foundations and Topaz
Alignment workstream.
docs/iam-profile-consumption.md captures flex-auth's input surface
against NetKingdom IAM Profile v0.1:
- boundary (flex-auth consumes verified claims; upstream layer
validates signatures and audiences)
- normalized input envelope (matches Markitect's EnterpriseIdentity)
- required, recommended, and tolerated claim variations
- role-claim location union (top-level / realm_access / resource_access)
- scope encoding (string vs array)
- principal-type detection (human / service / emergency)
- group-overage and freshness expectations
- production vs local-development handling
examples/claims/ ships five contract fixtures:
- key-cape-lightweight.yaml (profile minimum)
- keycloak-heavy.yaml (full variation set + MFA)
- service-account.yaml (svc-* hub-to-hub)
- emergency.yaml (break-glass with incident metadata)
- keycloak-group-overage.yaml (Entra-style hasgroups: true)
All fixtures parse as valid YAML. They become contract tests for the
standalone evaluator (FLEX-WP-0002 P2.4) and the Topaz adapter
(FLEX-WP-0004 T01); both code paths must produce identical normalized
envelopes for the same fixture.
FLEX-WP-0005 workstream marked status=done in this file and completed
in the State Hub. FLEX-WP-0002 is now fully unblocked.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Dotfile was missed by the previous git add — bundle/.manifest is the
OPA bundle root manifest Topaz consults to know which Rego packages
belong in the bundle.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes FLEX-WP-0005 T04. Validates ADR-003's commitment to shape the
standalone core for cheap Topaz adapter work.
Spike output:
- docs/topaz-mapping-spike.md — vocabulary map (subject, group, tenant,
knowledge_base, document, plus parent / owner_team / reader / steward /
member relations), Rego module shape, decision envelope, wire-protocol
ranking (gRPC primary, REST fallback, embedding rejected), schema
restatement recommendation, implications for FLEX-WP-0002 / 0004.
- examples/topaz/ — runnable docker-compose deploying Topaz with the
flex-auth-shaped manifest. seed and probe one-shots cover three
scenarios: alice (steward) allow, bob (group→reader) allow, eve
(outsider) deny. End-to-end green on 2026-05-16:
probe: steward-allow OK (check=true)
probe: reader-allow OK (check=true)
probe: outsider-deny OK (check=false)
probe: all checks passed
Key findings recorded as Implementation Notes in the spike doc:
- Rego input contract bridging (Topaz raw shape ↔ flex-auth canonical
shape) is adapter scope, not core scope.
- Topaz identity objects are a Topaz convention; the adapter
materializes them at directory import time.
- Directory-only permission resolution is sufficient for the common
case; Rego is reserved for context-dependent decisions.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes FLEX-WP-0005 T03. Shape pinned against the Markitect-side emitter
in markitect-tool/src/markitect_tool/policy/enterprise.py (FlexAuthResource
+ FlexAuthResourceManifest dataclasses, MKTT-WP-0014).
Artifacts:
- schemas/resource_manifest.schema.json (JSON Schema draft 2020-12)
- examples/markitect/resource_manifest.yaml (mirrors markitect-tool's
example; metadata.flex_auth_contract = resource-registration-v0)
- pkg/api/resource_manifest.go (Go type with json + yaml tags, plus
FlexAuthContractV0 const)
- pkg/api/resource_manifest_test.go (golden parse of the example +
minimal-fields round-trip)
First external dep: gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1. SBOM ingested into State Hub
(2 entries) — repo last_sbom_at now non-null. Makefile sbom target gains
a GOPATH/bin fallback so it works without ~/go/bin on PATH.
Interface change published to State Hub (a4a5293e-…) and inbox-notified
markitect-tool. The change is additive — Markitect's existing emitter
matches the pinned schema exactly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Pre-implementation assessment and boundary review
(docs/pre-implementation-assessment.md) lead to three ADRs:
- ADR-001 Go + repo skeleton
- ADR-002 Rego-in-Markdown policy package format
- ADR-003 Topaz-aligned MVP (Topaz spike moves into foundations)
New workplan FLEX-WP-0005 (Foundations and Topaz Alignment) is inserted
between WP-0001 (done) and WP-0002 (core). WP-0002 pins Rego-in-Markdown
for P2.3; WP-0004 P4.1 refocused from Topaz evaluation to Topaz adapter.
Go skeleton at repo root: cmd/flex-auth + internal/{registry,policy,
decision,audit,adapters} + pkg/api + Makefile + .golangci.yml + GitHub
Actions CI. make ci green locally; bin/flex-auth --version works.
INTENT/SCOPE cite the NetKingdom IAM Profile and add the ops-warden /
ops-bridge disjoint-surface clarifications.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
