secrets-engine's first live request rejected our allow: binding.
request_digest is computed over material they never sent, because we
enrich subject and resource from the registry before hashing. Answering
that meant reading the enrichment path, which had a worse defect in it.
Enrichment was additive-if-absent — addAttribute wrote a registry value
only where the request had no value for that key. So where a caller
supplied a key, the caller's value won and the registry's never applied.
Every registry ceiling and allowlist was advisory. Verified against the
shipped ops-warden package, each one added key on an otherwise-denied
request:
max_ttl_hours: 99 registry says 8 -> allowed a 12h certificate
allowed_principals registry allowlist -> disallowed_principal bypassed
allowed_subjects registry allowlist -> unknown_subject bypassed
The third is the one to read twice: a subject the registry does not know
authorized itself by naming itself in the allowlist it was being checked
against.
Not remotely reachable today — the PEP builds the CheckRequest,
ops-warden sends no resource.attributes, and enforce admits one identity.
It is a defence-in-depth failure: any path that lets attacker-influenced
data into a CheckRequest field became a full policy bypass rather than a
bounded input problem. Callers sending resource.attributes is not
hypothetical; secrets-engine does it on every request.
Registry facts now win, and diagnostics.registry_overrode names every
displaced key, because a registry that silently discards a contradicting
claim hides that a caller asserted authority it did not have.
subject.type is carved out, and the reason is a finding of its own.
Making the registry win there denied every secrets-engine allow: the
registry's type is CARING vocabulary (Human, Agent, Automation, Service)
and the request's is the protected system's actor vocabulary (service,
adm, agt, atm). Two fields sharing a name; substituting one for the other
is translation rather than identity, which GH-DEC-2026-008 ruled against.
Note what surfaced it — the registry's type had been dead data since the
field existed, because the caller's value always won.
Also publishes binding.submitted_request_digest, over the request exactly
as sent. request_digest was published as the consumer replay test and
cannot be one. Nothing is lost hashing the pre-enrichment form:
enrichment is a function of the request and the snapshot, and
registry_snapshot_digest already pins the snapshot.
Existing pins do not move. All three replay fixtures' request_digest and
approval_binding_digest values are byte-identical — those requests
contradict no registry fact. A field to add, not a value to correct.
Regression tests verified failing against the old behaviour before being
kept. FLEX-DEC-2026-012; FLEX-WP-0025 carries the residual, that a policy
still cannot tell a fact from an assertion.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014aQMM1dPXaPiXVn6DwwtLd
Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 715613@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: fabd95c1-4c9e-4080-8849-8707ae025f80
secrets-engine confirmed T03, and re-verifying against the regenerated
destroy fixture found something neither repository can fix alone: a
pdp_digest recorded at issue time can never equal the request_digest of a
request that carries the claim in its context, because the claim is part
of the context that is hashed. Embedding the claim changes the very
digest the claim would need to name.
Not fixture staleness. It holds for every dual-control request whose
claim travels in context -- the shape GH-DEC-2026-008 had just ruled
mandatory. Left unresolved that ruling was unimplementable for exactly
the case it was written for, and destroy would have been permanently
un-allowable in production, failing closed forever on a check that could
never pass.
flex-auth owns the canonical request digest, so the fix is ours.
binding.approval_binding_digest is the same material with
context.approval removed, emitted only when a claim was carried. An
approval issued against a claim-free Check records that Check's
request_digest; the claim-bearing request reproduces it here.
DELIBERATELY ADDITIVE, and the reason matters. The tempting fix is to
drop context.approval from request_digest entirely. That is wrong:
request_digest is the replay identity, and two requests differing only in
which approval was presented must not share one, because their decisions
differ -- one allows, the other denies dual_control_required. Collapsing
them would let an allow obtained with a valid claim be replayed against a
request carrying none. So request_digest still covers the claim and still
moves; approval_binding_digest deliberately does not, and is documented
as not a replay identity. The tests assert the two functions DISAGREE on
a claim-bearing request, which is approval-engine's formulation of how to
defend a distinction that looks like duplication.
The fixture now demonstrates the property rather than asserting it: its
claim's pdp_digest equals the envelope's approval_binding_digest with
pdp_path true, and changing the claim's contents moved request_digest
while leaving approval_binding_digest untouched. Two files a consumer can
diff.
Also picked up approval-engine's new required binding.pdp_path via the
cross-repo schema test added yesterday -- which is the test doing exactly
what it was built for, one day later.
T03 is done. secrets-engine's own digest-material defect, which our two
real envelopes caught, is recorded in the workplan.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JTbVXpEiXA7mNJVpDnEPcB
Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 412054@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 3968fae1-8d59-4209-9bd6-c22594b8ab19
approval-engine suggested a conformance check after the examples-contradict-
prose class hit a third repository -- theirs. Fifteen lines, they said, and
it would have caught our caring fixture and our provenance omission. Worth
stealing, so we stole it.
internal/schemaguard validates published examples against published schemas.
It implements only the JSON Schema subset these schemas use, and the property
that makes it trustworthy is that an unrecognised keyword FAILS rather than
skips: a validator that silently approves what it does not understand invites
reliance it cannot support. It found three things on first run.
ONE, AND THE LARGEST: check_request.schema.json pointed subject.type at
CARING's subject_type enum (Human, Service, ...), and no consumer sends that
vocabulary. user-engine sends human, tenant-engine and secrets-engine send
service, and ops-warden sends adm/agt/atm -- an actor-type vocabulary CARING
does not model at all. Our published schema declared three live integrations
non-conformant. A rule that outlaws shipped correct behaviour is the rule
that is wrong, so the $ref is replaced with an opaque non-empty string and a
description saying why. CARING's enum remains correct where it belongs: the
registry's subject_manifest.yaml, where Service is right.
TWO: policy_package_note, which this session added to the caring example's
decision provenance, is undeclared under additionalProperties:false. Our own
annotation broke the conformance it was annotating. Moved to the envelope's
outer provenance.
THREE: the secrets-engine fixtures carried partial approval-claims, missing
binding, freshness and validity. A partial claim in a fixture is how a
consumer learns the wrong shape -- the same mechanism that produced the
destroy defect. They are now complete and valid against approval-engine's
schema, including the now-required binding.pdp_digest, and a test validates
them against that schema when the sibling repo is present.
The destroy replay fixture is regenerated accordingly and the replay README's
pinned digests updated, since a stale digest table is the same defect wearing
a different hat.
Closed the binding-mapping open item. approval-engine declined to publish a
vocabulary mapping and their reasoning is better than the request: a PIP
asserting secrets.kv.destroy MEANS destroy would author semantics over two
vocabularies it owns neither of, and a wrong mapping silently accepts a claim
approved for a different action. pdp_digest is the mapping precisely because
it does not translate. It is now always present and nullable, so the destroy
gate is pdp_digest non-null and equal, enforced at the PEP.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JTbVXpEiXA7mNJVpDnEPcB
Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 412054@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 3968fae1-8d59-4209-9bd6-c22594b8ab19
approval-engine filed APPROVAL-IN-0002: secrets-engine built its PEP
validator against our ActionAuthorization schema, pointed it at
GET /v1/approvals/{id}/claim, and it rejects every response. Both
envelopes declare schema_version 0.1, so it fails late and reads like an
approval-engine outage rather than a contract mismatch.
FLEX-DEC-2026-006 accepts the deferral and argues against flex-auth's own
proposal. The composed object had the PIP republish our decision, which
crosses the same layer boundary we invoked to decline authentication
evidence and to win section 17's schema. The claim-plus-DecisionEnvelope
split drops no check; each verification lands on the layer that owns it.
approval-engine asked, before the decision, whether the open G3 finding
argues for ratifying now. It does not: G3 is already closed the other
way. FLEX-WP-0019 added lifetime to the DecisionEnvelope itself, required
on every allow by schema conditional, published 2026-09-02. The trigger
resolved by adding a field rather than by composition, so the decision
stands alone and needs no bundle.
The provenance.authority == state-hub constant is our defect and is
fixed at source. It came from examples/caring/action_authorization.json,
which contradicted the same contract's ownership section. That fixture
now names approval-engine as the approval fact's authority and flex-auth
as the decision's, and its stale secrets-engine.lifecycle pin is
corrected to the reserved coordinate from FLEX-DEC-2026-005.
The contract doc and schema are marked deferred-not-withdrawn so no
other consumer builds a validator against them. The execute-time half is
untouched: /v1/check, binding, the canonical digest, and
flex-auth.decision-record.v1 stay published.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JTbVXpEiXA7mNJVpDnEPcB
Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 412054@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 3968fae1-8d59-4209-9bd6-c22594b8ab19
Close the remaining PDP obligations: mechanical layer declaration check,
registry-snapshot digest in provenance, explicit allow TTL, per-input-class
freshness deadlines, and the published decision-record contract. Document
the canonical request digest as the §6.4.2 replay test.
Assistant: grok
Assistant-Session: 01a06256-fb71-7102-b3a9-27e6734257d0
Closes FLEX-WP-0005 T03. Shape pinned against the Markitect-side emitter
in markitect-tool/src/markitect_tool/policy/enterprise.py (FlexAuthResource
+ FlexAuthResourceManifest dataclasses, MKTT-WP-0014).
Artifacts:
- schemas/resource_manifest.schema.json (JSON Schema draft 2020-12)
- examples/markitect/resource_manifest.yaml (mirrors markitect-tool's
example; metadata.flex_auth_contract = resource-registration-v0)
- pkg/api/resource_manifest.go (Go type with json + yaml tags, plus
FlexAuthContractV0 const)
- pkg/api/resource_manifest_test.go (golden parse of the example +
minimal-fields round-trip)
First external dep: gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1. SBOM ingested into State Hub
(2 entries) — repo last_sbom_at now non-null. Makefile sbom target gains
a GOPATH/bin fallback so it works without ~/go/bin on PATH.
Interface change published to State Hub (a4a5293e-…) and inbox-notified
markitect-tool. The change is additive — Markitect's existing emitter
matches the pinned schema exactly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Pre-implementation assessment and boundary review
(docs/pre-implementation-assessment.md) lead to three ADRs:
- ADR-001 Go + repo skeleton
- ADR-002 Rego-in-Markdown policy package format
- ADR-003 Topaz-aligned MVP (Topaz spike moves into foundations)
New workplan FLEX-WP-0005 (Foundations and Topaz Alignment) is inserted
between WP-0001 (done) and WP-0002 (core). WP-0002 pins Rego-in-Markdown
for P2.3; WP-0004 P4.1 refocused from Topaz evaluation to Topaz adapter.
Go skeleton at repo root: cmd/flex-auth + internal/{registry,policy,
decision,audit,adapters} + pkg/api + Makefile + .golangci.yml + GitHub
Actions CI. make ci green locally; bin/flex-auth --version works.
INTENT/SCOPE cite the NetKingdom IAM Profile and add the ops-warden /
ops-bridge disjoint-surface clarifications.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
