tenant-engine named the relation in TEN-DEC-2026-002: `tenant` is the target
tenant record and always equals `resource.id`; the write API is cross-tenant
by design and `tenant.guardrail.read` does not differ. v2 carried no tenant
rule and a constant fixture tenant, so the deliberate scope and an omitted
rule were indistinguishable.
tenant-engine.write-api.mutate v3 (FLEX-DEC-2026-016):
- allowed requires tenant_is_target; a mismatch or absent tenant is denied
tenant_not_target (object.get, so an absent key names the right cause).
- the cross-tenant scope is stated in the package and quantified by
test_tenant_never_changes_effect over every action, three subjects and
four tenants, with guards against passing by denying everything.
- fixtures rotate tenant across four tenants; five cross-tenant allows and
two tenant_not_target denies added (42 fixtures, 33 tests, all pass).
- user-engine's tenant:platform exclusion is named as a fixed-record rule,
not a subject/tenant relation, and tested separately.
Closes FLEX-WP-0022 (T01, T02 done). Also records TEN-IN-0004 and
SECRETS-IN-0002 on FLEX-WP-0020 and acknowledges the GH-DEC-2026-017
replies on FLEX-WP-0030-T04.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 63291@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 8bd77868-ca68-4f49-bb1e-d539ecc0d703
docs/tenant-engine-{resource-namespace,action-vocabulary}.md: four actions
(tenant.create, tenant.role.grant, tenant.role.revoke, tenant.plan.assign)
matching tenant_engine/src/tenant_engine/authz.py's _RESOURCE_TYPES mapping
exactly. No resource_manifest.yaml -- tenant-engine's resources are created
dynamically, unlike ops-warden's fixed SSH-certificate inventory; documented
as a deliberate deviation.
examples/tenant-engine/: protected_system_manifest.yaml, subject_manifest.yaml
(one registered caller: tenant-engine's own service identity),
policy_package.md (Rego rules + embedded tests), policy_fixtures.yaml (8
allow/deny pairs), assembled registry_snapshot.json, two standalone
check_request examples, README.
Design decision made explicit in the workplan: operator/service-identity
authorization (one known subject, four known actions), not aal2+assurance +
tenant-capability-role checking -- CheckRequest carries no assurance claim
yet (TEN-WP-0003 already flagged actor as a plain request-body field, not a
real auth context), and a tenant's capability roles are the tenant's own
state, not a property of who may call tenant-engine's admin API. Revisit
once KEY-WP-0005 gives callers a real assurance-bearing identity.
Verified for real: built ./cmd/flex-auth, ran test-policy (6 tests + 8
fixtures, all pass), load-registry, check against both example requests.
Then ran a live flex-auth serve with this exact registry+policy and pointed
tenant-engine's real, unmodified FlexAuthCheckClient/FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer
at it over real HTTP: unknown subject -> 403, tenant-engine -> 201. go test
./... still green across the whole repo.
T03 (live-lookup context adapter for other protected systems) stays open --
new Go adapter package, tracked separately.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
