approval-engine suggested a conformance check after the examples-contradict-
prose class hit a third repository -- theirs. Fifteen lines, they said, and
it would have caught our caring fixture and our provenance omission. Worth
stealing, so we stole it.
internal/schemaguard validates published examples against published schemas.
It implements only the JSON Schema subset these schemas use, and the property
that makes it trustworthy is that an unrecognised keyword FAILS rather than
skips: a validator that silently approves what it does not understand invites
reliance it cannot support. It found three things on first run.
ONE, AND THE LARGEST: check_request.schema.json pointed subject.type at
CARING's subject_type enum (Human, Service, ...), and no consumer sends that
vocabulary. user-engine sends human, tenant-engine and secrets-engine send
service, and ops-warden sends adm/agt/atm -- an actor-type vocabulary CARING
does not model at all. Our published schema declared three live integrations
non-conformant. A rule that outlaws shipped correct behaviour is the rule
that is wrong, so the $ref is replaced with an opaque non-empty string and a
description saying why. CARING's enum remains correct where it belongs: the
registry's subject_manifest.yaml, where Service is right.
TWO: policy_package_note, which this session added to the caring example's
decision provenance, is undeclared under additionalProperties:false. Our own
annotation broke the conformance it was annotating. Moved to the envelope's
outer provenance.
THREE: the secrets-engine fixtures carried partial approval-claims, missing
binding, freshness and validity. A partial claim in a fixture is how a
consumer learns the wrong shape -- the same mechanism that produced the
destroy defect. They are now complete and valid against approval-engine's
schema, including the now-required binding.pdp_digest, and a test validates
them against that schema when the sibling repo is present.
The destroy replay fixture is regenerated accordingly and the replay README's
pinned digests updated, since a stale digest table is the same defect wearing
a different hat.
Closed the binding-mapping open item. approval-engine declined to publish a
vocabulary mapping and their reasoning is better than the request: a PIP
asserting secrets.kv.destroy MEANS destroy would author semantics over two
vocabularies it owns neither of, and a wrong mapping silently accepts a claim
approved for a different action. pdp_digest is the mapping precisely because
it does not translate. It is now always present and nullable, so the destroy
gate is pdp_digest non-null and equal, enforced at the PEP.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JTbVXpEiXA7mNJVpDnEPcB
Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 412054@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: 3968fae1-8d59-4209-9bd6-c22594b8ab19
Close the remaining PDP obligations: mechanical layer declaration check,
registry-snapshot digest in provenance, explicit allow TTL, per-input-class
freshness deadlines, and the published decision-record contract. Document
the canonical request digest as the §6.4.2 replay test.
Assistant: grok
Assistant-Session: 01a06256-fb71-7102-b3a9-27e6734257d0
TokenReview-based caller identity with audience-scoped tokens and exact
resource.system to ServiceAccount bindings, per ops-warden's recommendation.
Deletes the unwired tenant-engine live-roles adapter (T03) and adds
make verify-posture (T05). Source implements A2; running digest is still A0
until promotion, so tenancy.current.A stays 0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
internal/adapters/tenantengine: HTTPClient.LiveRoles() calls tenant-engine's
GET /tenants/{id}/roles/live. LiveRolesResult.Available is the load-bearing
field -- false on any transport error, non-200, or malformed body, never
inferred as zero roles. AttachToContext() writes both tenant_roles and
tenant_roles_available into a CheckRequest.Context map; a consuming Rego
policy must check tenant_roles_available before trusting tenant_roles.
Architectural finding recorded in the workplan: engine.go's Check() has no
context-adapter hook, and none of the existing topaz/relationship/rule
adapters are wired into cmd/flex-auth either -- they're standalone packages
for downstream composition. This adapter is a request-preparation helper a
protected system's own request-building code calls before POST /v1/check,
not an engine-internal hook, matching that precedent exactly.
9 Go tests; gofmt/vet/build clean; go test ./... green repo-wide.
Verified as a real three-service chain: live flex-auth serve + live
tenant-engine, created a tenant and granted it a CUS role through the real
flex-auth-gated write path, then read it back through this adapter (via a
throwaway harness, not committed) -- known tenant: roles=[CUS]
available=true; unknown tenant: roles=[] available=false err="status 404".
FLEX-WP-0008 closed: T01-T04 all done. tenant-engine's write path is now
real end-to-end; any other protected system can pull live tenant capability
role context, fail-closed. Remaining open item unchanged from TEN-WP-0003:
KEY-WP-0005 (key-cape's IAM Profile core-claims gap).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Pre-implementation assessment and boundary review
(docs/pre-implementation-assessment.md) lead to three ADRs:
- ADR-001 Go + repo skeleton
- ADR-002 Rego-in-Markdown policy package format
- ADR-003 Topaz-aligned MVP (Topaz spike moves into foundations)
New workplan FLEX-WP-0005 (Foundations and Topaz Alignment) is inserted
between WP-0001 (done) and WP-0002 (core). WP-0002 pins Rego-in-Markdown
for P2.3; WP-0004 P4.1 refocused from Topaz evaluation to Topaz adapter.
Go skeleton at repo root: cmd/flex-auth + internal/{registry,policy,
decision,audit,adapters} + pkg/api + Makefile + .golangci.yml + GitHub
Actions CI. make ci green locally; bin/flex-auth --version works.
INTENT/SCOPE cite the NetKingdom IAM Profile and add the ops-warden /
ops-bridge disjoint-surface clarifications.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
