# Action-bound authorization contract

Status: **execute-time request binding is implemented and published.** The
composed `ActionAuthorization` object in this document is **deferred, not
withdrawn** — see "Deferral of the composed object" below. Do not build a
validator against it.

Date: 2026-08-23 (deferral recorded 2026-09-06, `FLEX-DEC-2026-006`)

## Ownership and endpoints

flex-auth owns authorization evaluation and the canonical request/decision
vocabulary. A protected system obtains a current decision from:

```text
POST /v1/check
```

The response now includes `binding`, the exact normalized subject, action,
resource, context, and full SHA-256 request digest evaluated by the policy.
How that digest is computed, what is excluded, and when replay is permitted
are in [`canonical-request-digest.md`](canonical-request-digest.md). Consumers
must compare structured fields; `reason`, `diagnostics`, titles, and other
prose are never an authorization contract.

The decision envelope itself is the published PDP contract
[`decision-record-contract.md`](decision-record-contract.md).

`approval-engine` owns the durable approval object, authenticated approval
evidence, storage, supersession, consumption, and availability. State Hub
decision records are coordination and provenance evidence; they are not the
runtime approval authority. Production consumers must not infer action binding
or dual control from State Hub prose or a free-form `decided_by` value.

## Deferral of the composed object

`ActionAuthorization` was never ratified. `GH-DEC-2026-003` (2026-08-29) named
`approval-engine`'s **approval-claim** as the step-1 artifact, and flex-auth
accepts that split (`FLEX-DEC-2026-006`):

- **Step 1 — approval fact:** `approval-engine`'s approval-claim, served from
  `GET /v1/approvals/{id}/claim`. `approval-engine` is its authority.
- **Step 2 — decision:** flex-auth's `DecisionEnvelope`, with exact
  `CheckRequest` match via `binding.request_digest` and the policy pin.

A PEP validates **across both**. No check from the composed object is dropped;
each one lands on the layer that owns it. The composed object would have had
the PIP republish flex-auth's decision, which is the part that was wrong.

The `PROPOSED` framing below is retained as the record of what was proposed.
It is not a contract, and a consumer that validates a `GET /v1/approvals/{id}/claim`
response against it will reject every response — both envelopes declare
`schema_version: 0.1`, so the mismatch surfaces late and reads like an
`approval-engine` outage. That is exactly what happened to secrets-engine.

## Durable object (deferred — proposed, never ratified)

[`../schemas/action_authorization.schema.json`](../schemas/action_authorization.schema.json)
defines the proposed `ActionAuthorization` storage and transport object. It
combines:

- a canonical UUID and explicit lifecycle status;
- one complete `CheckRequest` containing the actor, action, resource, exact
  target attributes, stage, purpose, and other policy inputs;
- a bounded validity window;
- approval count and individual approval evidence;
- the flex-auth `DecisionEnvelope` whose structured binding and digest match
  that request.

The schema is generic. For secrets-engine, use this profile:

| Requirement | Canonical field |
| --- | --- |
| catalog id | `request.resource.id` |
| stage | `request.resource.attributes.stage` |
| lifecycle operation | `request.action` |
| exact secret fields | `request.resource.attributes.fields` |
| policy/auth targets | `request.resource.attributes.policy_targets` / `auth_targets` |
| requesting actor | `request.subject` |
| purpose | `request.context.purpose` |
| execution window | `validity.not_before` / `validity.expires_at` |
| dual control | `approvals.required_count` and distinct `entries[].subject_id` |

Array values that express exact targets are sets: producers sort and de-duplicate
them before evaluation; consumers require exact set equality. Wildcards are
policy inputs and should be denied for destructive production actions.

## Required verification

A production consumer may execute only when all of the following hold:

1. The durable object resolves from `approval-engine`, its canonical authority;
   an outage fails the action closed.
2. `status` is `approved`, `superseded_by` is absent, and the current time is
   inside the validity window.
3. The caller's proposed action exactly matches `request`, including resource
   id, system, stage, target sets, actor, and purpose.
4. `decision.effect` is `allow`; `decision.binding` matches the request and its
   digest; the policy package/version are accepted for the deployment.
5. Approval entries contain at least `required_count` distinct authenticated
   subjects. Repeated entries from one subject count once.

Local fixtures, CCR labels, workplan ids, prose, and a caller-supplied flex-auth
decision id are provenance only. They cannot unlock a production action.

**State Hub is never the authority here.** A validator must not require
`provenance.authority == "state-hub"`, or accept it as evidence. State Hub
decision records are coordination and provenance evidence, as the Ownership
section above states. The authority of the approval fact is `approval-engine`;
the authority of the decision is flex-auth. The stale `"authority": "state-hub"`
value in `examples/caring/action_authorization.json` was the source of that
constant and is corrected.

## Outage and supersession semantics

- `approval-engine` unreachable: privileged live
  action denied; read-only inspection and dry-run may continue with a clear
  non-authoritative status.
- flex-auth unavailable when a fresh decision is required: privileged live
  action denied. A previously stored decision is usable only inside its bounded
  validity window and only if the authoritative lifecycle object can still be
  checked for supersession or revocation.
- `superseded`, `expired`, `revoked`, `denied`, or unknown status: deny.
- `superseded_by` present regardless of status: deny and resolve the replacement
  explicitly; never follow it silently during execution.

## Remaining external work

`approval-engine` needs a structured object/endpoint capable of storing this
schema or equivalent fields, authenticated approval entries, atomic
supersession, and single-consumption semantics. Until that lands and the
consumer proof passes, secrets-engine is correct to keep live destructive
actions disabled. The standalone evaluator and the Topaz, relationship, rule,
and Keycloak delegated adapter boundaries now all populate the same binding.