---
id: FLEX-WP-0008
type: workplan
title: "tenant-engine Consumer Integration"
domain: infotech
repo: flex-auth
status: finished
owner: codex
topic_slug: flex-auth
planning_priority: P1
planning_order: 80
depends_on_workplans:
  - FLEX-WP-0007
related_workplans:
  - TEN-WP-0003
  - KEY-WP-0005
created: "2026-07-23"
updated: "2026-07-23"
state_hub_workstream_id: "6341d238-fffc-4428-9265-0b6db5714e9b"
---

# FLEX-WP-0008: tenant-engine Consumer Integration

## Purpose

Make `tenant-engine` a registered protected-system consumer of flex-auth,
in both directions its boundary contract requires
(`net-kingdom/canon/standards/tenant-engine-boundary-contract_v0.1.md`):

1. **tenant-engine's writes need authorization.** `tenant-engine`'s
   `FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer` (`TEN-WP-0003`) calls `POST /v1/check` for
   every mutation (`tenant.create`, `tenant.role.grant`, `tenant.role.revoke`,
   `tenant.plan.assign`). Until a policy package exists here, every check
   resolves to `deny`/`not_applicable` — correct fail-closed behavior, but
   it means `tenant-engine` cannot actually perform any write yet. This
   workplan is what makes real `allow` decisions reachable.
2. **flex-auth's own decisions need tenant capability roles as input**, for
   any protected system whose policy depends on a tenant's `PLTF`/`IAM`/
   `VEN`/`CUS` roles (ADR-0014) at `aal2`-class decision time. flex-auth
   must call `tenant-engine`'s live-lookup endpoint
   (`GET /tenants/{id}/roles/live`) to enrich decision context, the same
   role a `context` adapter plays for any other external fact source.

Closer in shape to `FLEX-WP-0006`/`FLEX-WP-0007` (ops-warden's small,
security-lane SSH-certificate integration) than `FLEX-WP-0003` (Markitect's
document-heavy, CARING-benchmark integration) — `tenant-engine`'s resource
and action vocabulary is small and doesn't need CARING descriptor mapping.

## Task: Define tenant-engine resource and action vocabulary

```task
id: FLEX-WP-0008-T01
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "d78361e6-eb8e-4623-bed2-917538c403ca"
```

Resource types: `tenant`, `role-grant`, `plan-assignment`. Actions:
`tenant.create`, `tenant.role.grant`, `tenant.role.revoke`,
`tenant.plan.assign` — matching `TEN-WP-0003-T02`'s action-name mapping
exactly (coordinate values, don't let the two repos invent different
strings for the same action). Model on `examples/ops-warden`'s fixture
shape (`schemas/check_request.schema.json`'s `resource{id,type,system}`,
`system: "tenant-engine"`), not Markitect's.

Done when: resource/action vocabulary documented under `docs/` following
the `markitect-resource-namespace.md` / `markitect-action-vocabulary.md`
naming pattern (`tenant-engine-resource-namespace.md`,
`tenant-engine-action-vocabulary.md`).

**Done 2026-07-23:** Both docs written. One deliberate deviation from the
ops-warden template, documented in `tenant-engine-resource-namespace.md`:
no `resource_manifest.yaml` — ops-warden's SSH certificates are a fixed,
pre-registrable inventory; `tenant-engine`'s tenants are created
dynamically, so the policy evaluates `input` directly rather than looking
up a registered resource by id. Action vocabulary cross-checked against
`tenant-engine/src/tenant_engine/authz.py`'s actual
`_RESOURCE_TYPES` mapping — the four action strings and their resource
types match exactly, not just by convention.

## Task: Author and register the tenant-engine policy package

```task
id: FLEX-WP-0008-T02
status: done
priority: high
state_hub_task_id: "8a07e83b-27a2-4390-a169-51065bcf3bd6"
```

Policy: writes require an `aal2`+ assurance actor holding an appropriate
capability role for the action (e.g. `tenant.plan.assign` might require
`PLTF` or a platform-operator subject type; exact rules are a design
decision for this task, not pre-specified here — coordinate with ADR-0014's
role semantics, not invented fresh). Register in `registry/` per the
existing pattern; add fixtures (`allow`/`deny` request/response pairs)
mirroring `examples/ops-warden/check_request_allow_adm.json`.

Done when: `POST /v1/check` against a request matching `TEN-WP-0003`'s
`FlexAuthCheckClient` shape returns `allow` for an authorized actor/action
and `deny` for an unauthorized one, exercised by `main_test.go`-style
integration tests.

**Done 2026-07-23, with the design decision made explicit:** chose
**operator/service-identity authorization**, not `aal2`+assurance +
tenant-capability-role checking, for this specific policy. Reasoning,
recorded here rather than left implicit: `tenant_engine`'s `CheckRequest`
today carries no `assurance` claim at all (there's no authenticated caller
identity yet — `TEN-WP-0003`'s closure note already flagged `actor` as a
plain request-body field, not a real auth context), and a tenant's
capability roles (`PLTF`/`IAM`/`VEN`/`CUS`) are a property of the *tenant*
being written to, not of *who is allowed to call tenant-engine's admin API*
— checking the wrong one would be a category error, the same one flagged
in `docs/tenant-engine-action-vocabulary.md`. So: `examples/tenant-engine/policy_package.md`
authorizes exactly one registered service subject (`tenant-engine` itself,
`subject_manifest.yaml`) for the four known actions against
`system: "tenant-engine"`. Revisit once `KEY-WP-0005` gives callers a real
`assurance`-bearing identity to check.

Registered: `protected_system_manifest.yaml`, `subject_manifest.yaml`,
`policy_package.md` (Rego rules + embedded tests), `policy_fixtures.yaml`
(8 allow/deny pairs), assembled `registry_snapshot.json`, two standalone
`check_request_*.json` examples, `README.md`.

**Verified for real, not just written:** built the actual `flex-auth`
binary (`go build ./cmd/flex-auth`) and ran it against every artifact:
`test-policy` — all 6 Rego tests and all 8 fixtures pass; `load-registry`
loads the snapshot cleanly; `check` against both standalone request files
returns the expected `allow`/`deny`. Then went one step further than the
task's own done-criteria: ran a **live `flex-auth serve`** with this exact
registry+policy and pointed `tenant-engine`'s real, unmodified
`FlexAuthCheckClient`/`FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer` at it (`TENANT_ENGINE_FLEX_AUTH_URL`)
— `POST /tenants` with `actor="ops"` → `403 unknown_subject`; with
`actor="tenant-engine"` → `201`. Full round trip, both processes, real
HTTP, real Rego evaluation. `go test ./...` still green across the whole
`flex-auth` repo — nothing broken.

## Task: tenant-engine live-lookup context adapter

```task
id: FLEX-WP-0008-T03
status: done
priority: medium
state_hub_task_id: "20c005a4-48b7-4ac4-a345-aeaa0de06d80"
```

A context-enrichment adapter (mirrors `internal/adapters/{relationship,rule,topaz}`'s
shape) that calls `tenant-engine`'s `GET /tenants/{id}/roles/live` and
attaches the result to decision context for policies that need it — used by
*other* protected systems' policies that key off tenant capability role,
not only by tenant-engine's own policy from T02. Must fail closed: adapter
error or `tenant-engine` unavailability must not silently produce an empty
role list indistinguishable from "no roles granted" (same rule
`tenant-engine`'s own read endpoints already enforce — don't weaken it on
the consuming side).

Done when: a policy package referencing tenant capability role context
correctly denies when the adapter call fails, not just when it succeeds
with an empty result.

**Done 2026-07-23, one architectural finding recorded first:** confirmed by
reading `internal/decision/engine.go` that `Check()` has no context-adapter
hook at all, and confirmed via `cmd/flex-auth/main.go` that none of the
existing `topaz`/`relationship`/`rule` adapters are wired into the shipped
binary either — they're standalone Go packages for downstream composition,
not auto-invoked plugins. This adapter follows the same shape: Rego
evaluation is stateless and can't make an HTTP call mid-evaluation, so
`internal/adapters/tenantengine` is a **request-preparation helper** a
protected system's own request-building code calls before submitting to
`POST /v1/check` — not an engine-internal hook.

`HTTPClient.LiveRoles(ctx, tenantID) (LiveRolesResult, error)` calls
`GET {base}/tenants/{id}/roles/live`. `LiveRolesResult.Available` is the
load-bearing field: `false` on *any* failure (transport error, non-200,
malformed body) — never inferred as zero roles.
`AttachToContext(context, result)` writes `tenant_roles` **and**
`tenant_roles_available` into a `CheckRequest.Context` map; the
`Available: false` / `tenant_roles_available: false` pairing is what a
consuming policy must check before trusting `tenant_roles` at all —
documented in the package doc comment as the required Rego precondition.

9 Go tests (`http_client_test.go`, `context_test.go`): success, non-200,
malformed body, connection failure, context-timeout, empty base URL
rejected, context attachment (including nil-context and
non-clobbering-existing-fields cases). `gofmt`/`go vet`/`go build ./...`
clean; `go test ./...` still green across the whole repo.

**Verified as a real three-service chain, not a mock:** ran a live
`flex-auth serve` (T02's registry+policy) and a live `tenant-engine`
pointed at it (`TENANT_ENGINE_FLEX_AUTH_URL`), created a tenant and granted
it a `CUS` role through the real, `flex-auth`-gated write path, then called
this new Go adapter (via a throwaway `cmd/` harness, removed after use, not
committed) against the running `tenant-engine`: `roles=[CUS]
available=true` for the known tenant, `roles=[] available=false
err="status 404"` for an unknown one — the exact fail-closed distinction
this task exists to guarantee, proven end-to-end across Go → Python → Go
(via HTTP), not asserted in isolation.

## Task: Closure review

```task
id: FLEX-WP-0008-T04
status: done
priority: low
state_hub_task_id: "0c59ada6-c61b-41a3-8baa-a98e936c5690"
```

Confirm T01–T03 done; run flex-auth's existing test suite plus the new
fixtures. Note in closure: `TEN-WP-0003`'s `FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer` should
be re-verified against a real `allow` decision once this workplan's policy
package exists (it was only tested against `deny`/`not_applicable`
responses when built, since this workplan didn't exist yet). Run `statehub
fix-consistency`.

**Closed 2026-07-23.** T01–T03 done. `go test ./...` green across the whole
repo (including the new `internal/adapters/tenantengine` package);
`gofmt`/`go vet` clean.

The re-verification this task asked for happened twice, for real: in T02's
closure (a live `flex-auth serve` + `tenant-engine`'s unmodified
`FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer`, `allow` → `201`) and again in T03's closure (the
same live pair, plus a write through it, plus the new Go adapter reading
the result back) — `FlexAuthWriteAuthorizer` was never re-tested against a
mock standing in for `allow`; every `allow` assertion in this workplan came
from the real Rego engine.

**Full picture after this workplan:** `tenant-engine`'s write path is real
end-to-end (`tenant-engine` → real `flex-auth` → real `allow`/`deny`), and
any *other* protected system can now pull live tenant capability-role
context via `internal/adapters/tenantengine`, fail-closed. What's still
open, unchanged from `TEN-WP-0003`'s own closure: `KEY-WP-0005` (`key-cape`
doesn't emit IAM Profile core claims yet — the cache-read/`tenant_roles`
direction depends on it, not this workplan). This workplan's own T02 policy
(operator/service identity, not `aal2`+role) should be revisited once
`KEY-WP-0005` gives real caller assurance to check.