flex-auth/examples
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fix(decision): registry facts win over caller-supplied attributes
secrets-engine's first live request rejected our allow: binding.
request_digest is computed over material they never sent, because we
enrich subject and resource from the registry before hashing. Answering
that meant reading the enrichment path, which had a worse defect in it.

Enrichment was additive-if-absent — addAttribute wrote a registry value
only where the request had no value for that key. So where a caller
supplied a key, the caller's value won and the registry's never applied.
Every registry ceiling and allowlist was advisory. Verified against the
shipped ops-warden package, each one added key on an otherwise-denied
request:

  max_ttl_hours: 99      registry says 8    -> allowed a 12h certificate
  allowed_principals     registry allowlist -> disallowed_principal bypassed
  allowed_subjects       registry allowlist -> unknown_subject bypassed

The third is the one to read twice: a subject the registry does not know
authorized itself by naming itself in the allowlist it was being checked
against.

Not remotely reachable today — the PEP builds the CheckRequest,
ops-warden sends no resource.attributes, and enforce admits one identity.
It is a defence-in-depth failure: any path that lets attacker-influenced
data into a CheckRequest field became a full policy bypass rather than a
bounded input problem. Callers sending resource.attributes is not
hypothetical; secrets-engine does it on every request.

Registry facts now win, and diagnostics.registry_overrode names every
displaced key, because a registry that silently discards a contradicting
claim hides that a caller asserted authority it did not have.

subject.type is carved out, and the reason is a finding of its own.
Making the registry win there denied every secrets-engine allow: the
registry's type is CARING vocabulary (Human, Agent, Automation, Service)
and the request's is the protected system's actor vocabulary (service,
adm, agt, atm). Two fields sharing a name; substituting one for the other
is translation rather than identity, which GH-DEC-2026-008 ruled against.
Note what surfaced it — the registry's type had been dead data since the
field existed, because the caller's value always won.

Also publishes binding.submitted_request_digest, over the request exactly
as sent. request_digest was published as the consumer replay test and
cannot be one. Nothing is lost hashing the pre-enrichment form:
enrichment is a function of the request and the snapshot, and
registry_snapshot_digest already pins the snapshot.

Existing pins do not move. All three replay fixtures' request_digest and
approval_binding_digest values are byte-identical — those requests
contradict no registry fact. A field to add, not a value to correct.

Regression tests verified failing against the old behaviour before being
kept. FLEX-DEC-2026-012; FLEX-WP-0025 carries the residual, that a policy
still cannot tell a fact from an assertion.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014aQMM1dPXaPiXVn6DwwtLd

Assistant: claude-code
Assistant-Model: opus
Assistant-Process: 715613@bnt-lap001
Assistant-Session: fabd95c1-4c9e-4080-8849-8707ae025f80
2026-09-07 13:43:33 +02:00
..
caring Add schemaguard; correct check_request subject.type against shipped reality 2026-09-06 14:21:28 +02:00
claims Align IAM Profile consumption with v0.2 2026-05-22 14:35:30 +02:00
markitect Add Markitect check fixtures 2026-05-17 06:32:05 +02:00
ops-warden feat(policy): adopt security zone stances 2026-08-22 15:17:13 +02:00
qonto-assistant Register qonto-assistant as a protected system (finance.qonto.read) 2026-07-24 00:19:26 +02:00
railiance-platform feat(policy): add credential grant authorization package 2026-08-23 13:59:03 +02:00
secrets-engine fix(decision): registry facts win over caller-supplied attributes 2026-09-07 13:43:33 +02:00
tenant-engine Record tenant-engine guardrail pin and handoff caveats 2026-08-16 10:07:31 +02:00
topaz Implement Topaz adapter 2026-05-17 06:58:04 +02:00
user-engine Close FLEX-WP-0009 with live user-engine policy evidence 2026-08-16 01:16:23 +02:00
README.md FLEX-WP-0006: implement ops-warden signing gate policy 2026-06-23 21:17:42 +02:00

examples/

Runnable examples used both as documentation and as test fixtures.

Expected layout (filled in across FLEX-WP-0002 / FLEX-WP-0003 / FLEX-WP-0005):

examples/
  claims/                  # key-cape lightweight-mode and Keycloak heavy-mode
                           # claim envelopes (P5.5)
  caring/                  # executable CARING descriptor, request,
                           # decision, registry, and audit fixtures (P2.1)
  markitect/               # FlexAuthResourceManifest fixtures, decision
                           # fixtures, and Rego-in-Markdown policy packages
  ops-warden/              # SSH certificate signing policy-gate fixtures
                           # for ops-warden policy.enabled smoke checks
  topaz/                   # docker-compose + sample directory and policy
                           # for the Topaz alignment spike (P5.4)
  policies/                # generic Rego-in-Markdown packages used by
                           # the standalone core tests