secrets-engine's first live request rejected our allow: binding. request_digest is computed over material they never sent, because we enrich subject and resource from the registry before hashing. Answering that meant reading the enrichment path, which had a worse defect in it. Enrichment was additive-if-absent — addAttribute wrote a registry value only where the request had no value for that key. So where a caller supplied a key, the caller's value won and the registry's never applied. Every registry ceiling and allowlist was advisory. Verified against the shipped ops-warden package, each one added key on an otherwise-denied request: max_ttl_hours: 99 registry says 8 -> allowed a 12h certificate allowed_principals registry allowlist -> disallowed_principal bypassed allowed_subjects registry allowlist -> unknown_subject bypassed The third is the one to read twice: a subject the registry does not know authorized itself by naming itself in the allowlist it was being checked against. Not remotely reachable today — the PEP builds the CheckRequest, ops-warden sends no resource.attributes, and enforce admits one identity. It is a defence-in-depth failure: any path that lets attacker-influenced data into a CheckRequest field became a full policy bypass rather than a bounded input problem. Callers sending resource.attributes is not hypothetical; secrets-engine does it on every request. Registry facts now win, and diagnostics.registry_overrode names every displaced key, because a registry that silently discards a contradicting claim hides that a caller asserted authority it did not have. subject.type is carved out, and the reason is a finding of its own. Making the registry win there denied every secrets-engine allow: the registry's type is CARING vocabulary (Human, Agent, Automation, Service) and the request's is the protected system's actor vocabulary (service, adm, agt, atm). Two fields sharing a name; substituting one for the other is translation rather than identity, which GH-DEC-2026-008 ruled against. Note what surfaced it — the registry's type had been dead data since the field existed, because the caller's value always won. Also publishes binding.submitted_request_digest, over the request exactly as sent. request_digest was published as the consumer replay test and cannot be one. Nothing is lost hashing the pre-enrichment form: enrichment is a function of the request and the snapshot, and registry_snapshot_digest already pins the snapshot. Existing pins do not move. All three replay fixtures' request_digest and approval_binding_digest values are byte-identical — those requests contradict no registry fact. A field to add, not a value to correct. Regression tests verified failing against the old behaviour before being kept. FLEX-DEC-2026-012; FLEX-WP-0025 carries the residual, that a policy still cannot tell a fact from an assertion. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014aQMM1dPXaPiXVn6DwwtLd Assistant: claude-code Assistant-Model: opus Assistant-Process: 715613@bnt-lap001 Assistant-Session: fabd95c1-4c9e-4080-8849-8707ae025f80
198 lines
7.1 KiB
Go
198 lines
7.1 KiB
Go
package decision_test
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import (
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"bytes"
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"testing"
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"github.com/netkingdom/flex-auth/pkg/api"
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)
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// A registry fact is an authority statement; the same key on the request is the
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// caller's proposal about itself. Enrichment once let the proposal survive, which
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// made every registry ceiling and allowlist advisory — a caller supplying
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// resource.attributes.max_ttl_hours raised its own ceiling, and one supplying
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// allowed_subjects authorized a subject the registry did not know
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// (FLEX-DEC-2026-012).
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//
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// These tests assert the registry value reaches policy on a request that
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// contradicts it. They are written against attribute keys real packages branch
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// on, because a test over an unused key would pass while the escalation stayed
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// open.
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func TestRegistryFactsOverrideCallerSuppliedAttributes(t *testing.T) {
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store := newTestStore(t)
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if err := store.ImportResourceManifest(api.ResourceManifest{
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ID: "ceilings",
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System: "test-system",
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Resources: []api.Resource{{
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ID: "resource:ceiling",
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Type: "document",
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Attributes: map[string]any{"max_ttl_hours": 8, "allowed_subjects": []any{"user:alice"}},
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}},
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}); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("ImportResourceManifest: %v", err)
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}
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engine := newTestEngineWithStore(t, store)
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decision, err := engine.Check(context.Background(), api.CheckRequest{
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Subject: api.SubjectRef{ID: "user:alice"},
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Action: "read",
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Resource: api.ResourceRef{
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ID: "resource:ceiling",
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System: "test-system",
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Attributes: map[string]any{
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"max_ttl_hours": 99,
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"allowed_subjects": []any{"user:mallory"},
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},
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},
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})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Check: %v", err)
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}
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attributes := decision.Binding.Resource.Attributes
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if got := attributes["max_ttl_hours"]; !equalJSON(t, got, 8) {
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t.Fatalf("max_ttl_hours = %v; want the registry's 8, not the caller's 99", got)
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}
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if got := attributes["allowed_subjects"]; !equalJSON(t, got, []any{"user:alice"}) {
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t.Fatalf("allowed_subjects = %v; caller displaced the registry allowlist", got)
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}
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// The override must be visible. A registry that silently discards a
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// contradicting claim hides that a caller asserted authority it did not have,
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// which is the half worth alerting on even though the decision is now correct.
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overrode, _ := decision.Diagnostics["registry_overrode"].([]string)
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if !containsAll(overrode, "resource.max_ttl_hours", "resource.allowed_subjects") {
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t.Fatalf("registry_overrode = %v; want both displaced keys named", overrode)
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}
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}
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// Tenant is a registry fact and the registry wins. subject.type deliberately does
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// NOT, and the asymmetry is the finding rather than an oversight: the registry's
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// Type is CARING vocabulary (Human, Agent, Automation, Service) while the
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// request's is the protected system's actor vocabulary (service, adm, agt, atm).
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// Two fields sharing a name. Overwriting substituted one vocabulary for the other
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// and denied every secrets-engine allow, because "Service" is not "service".
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//
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// This test pins both halves so the residual cannot be closed by accident, and so
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// a later reader sees the exclusion is reasoned. FLEX-WP-0025 separates them.
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func TestRegistryTenantWinsWhileSubjectTypeVocabularyIsPreserved(t *testing.T) {
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store := newTestStore(t)
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if err := store.ImportSubjectManifest(api.SubjectManifest{
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ID: "principals",
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Tenants: []api.Tenant{{ID: "tenant:real"}},
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Subjects: []api.Subject{{
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ID: "subject:claimant",
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Type: "human",
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Tenant: "tenant:real",
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}},
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}); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("ImportSubjectManifest: %v", err)
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}
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engine := newTestEngineWithStore(t, store)
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decision, err := engine.Check(context.Background(), api.CheckRequest{
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Tenant: "tenant:claimed",
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Subject: api.SubjectRef{ID: "subject:claimant", Type: "service", Tenant: "tenant:claimed"},
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Action: "read",
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Resource: api.ResourceRef{ID: "document:internal-note", System: "markitect-tool"},
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})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Check: %v", err)
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}
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if got := decision.Binding.Subject.Type; got != "service" {
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t.Fatalf("subject.type = %q; the caller's actor vocabulary must survive", got)
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}
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if got := decision.Binding.Subject.Tenant; got != "tenant:real" {
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t.Fatalf("subject.tenant = %q; want the registry's tenant:real", got)
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}
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}
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// An unregistered subject or resource has no facts to overlay, so what the caller
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// sent stands. That is the stated residual rather than an oversight: a policy
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// reading a key its manifest omits is consuming caller input, and no override
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// should be reported for a key nobody contradicted.
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func TestUnregisteredResourceKeepsCallerAttributesAndReportsNoOverride(t *testing.T) {
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engine := newTestEngine(t)
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decision, err := engine.Check(context.Background(), api.CheckRequest{
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Subject: api.SubjectRef{ID: "user:alice"},
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Action: "read",
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Resource: api.ResourceRef{
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ID: "document:not-in-registry",
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System: "markitect-tool",
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Attributes: map[string]any{"stage": "prod"},
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},
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})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Check: %v", err)
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}
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if got := decision.Binding.Resource.Attributes["stage"]; got != "prod" {
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t.Fatalf("stage = %v; caller attributes on an unregistered resource must survive", got)
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}
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if overrode, _ := decision.Diagnostics["registry_overrode"].([]string); len(overrode) != 0 {
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t.Fatalf("registry_overrode = %v; nothing was contradicted", overrode)
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}
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}
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func equalJSON(t *testing.T, got, want any) bool {
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t.Helper()
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left, err := json.Marshal(got)
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if err != nil {
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return false
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}
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right, err := json.Marshal(want)
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if err != nil {
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return false
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}
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return bytes.Equal(left, right)
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}
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func containsAll(values []string, wanted ...string) bool {
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for _, want := range wanted {
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found := false
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for _, value := range values {
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if value == want {
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found = true
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break
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}
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}
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if !found {
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return false
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}
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}
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return true
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}
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// binding.request_digest is computed over the ENRICHED request, so a consumer
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// recomputing it over what it sent gets a different value on every request whose
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// subject or resource the registry knows. It was published as the §6.4.2 replay
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// test for consumers, which it cannot be. submitted_request_digest is that test:
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// RequestDigest over the request exactly as received (FLEX-DEC-2026-012).
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func TestSubmittedRequestDigestIsComputableByTheConsumer(t *testing.T) {
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engine := newTestEngine(t)
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request := api.CheckRequest{
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Tenant: "tenant:platform",
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Subject: api.SubjectRef{ID: "user:alice"},
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Action: "read",
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Resource: api.ResourceRef{ID: "document:internal-note", System: "markitect-tool"},
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}
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decision, err := engine.Check(context.Background(), request)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Check: %v", err)
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}
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// The consumer holds only the request it sent. This is the whole property.
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if got, want := decision.Binding.SubmittedRequestDigest, api.RequestDigest(request); got != want {
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t.Fatalf("submitted_request_digest = %q; consumer computes %q", got, want)
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}
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// And it must genuinely differ from the enriched digest here, or the test
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// would pass on a request the registry never touched and prove nothing.
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if decision.Binding.SubmittedRequestDigest == decision.Binding.RequestDigest {
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t.Fatal("digests agree on an enriched request; the distinction is not being exercised")
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}
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}
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