flex-auth/tenancy.yaml
tegwick 1e1e077b27 Implement inbound caller authentication (ADR 0004); close T03 and T05
TokenReview-based caller identity with audience-scoped tokens and exact
resource.system to ServiceAccount bindings, per ops-warden's recommendation.
Deletes the unwired tenant-engine live-roles adapter (T03) and adds
make verify-posture (T05). Source implements A2; running digest is still A0
until promotion, so tenancy.current.A stays 0.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-18 15:22:52 +02:00

89 lines
3.2 KiB
YAML

# flex-auth tenancy posture declaration
# Framework: net-kingdom/canon/standards/tenancy-posture_v0.1.md draft-8 (§5)
# Conformance rule (§6): accuracy, not altitude. This file overclaims nothing.
# Reasoning and evidence: docs/tenancy-posture-review.md
schema_version: "0.1"
framework: netkingdom-tenancy-posture
service: flex-auth
role: policy-decision-point
tenancy:
current:
I: 1
A: 0
E: 1
P: "n/a"
R: "n/a"
V: 0
implemented:
A: 2
E: 2
target:
I: 1
A: 2
E: 2
P: "n/a"
R: "n/a"
V: 1
reviewed: "2026-08-18"
review_due: "2027-02-17"
service_class: latency-critical
permanent: [I, P, R]
gap:
I: >-
Subject and tenant arrive in the CheckRequest body, asserted by the
calling PEP. flex-auth verifies no token and holds no session. This is
I1 by §4.1's literal rule and is structurally correct for a PDP: the
decision point judges asserted claims, it cannot be the verifier of its
own inputs. Not a defect and not a target for movement.
A: >-
The running immutable digest still authenticates no caller, so current
remains A0. Source and reviewed desired manifests implement A2 with an
audience-scoped Kubernetes TokenReview choke point and exact
protected-system-to-ServiceAccount bindings. Promotion and a live
unbound-request probe remain under FLEX-WP-0011/FLEX-WP-0015-T02.
E: >-
No tenant data at rest. Tenant scoping in decisions runs through one
choke point (internal/decision/engine.go normalizeRequest and the
relationship tenant match). E2 evidence is adversarial per §13.2 and is
not yet produced. Draft-8 distinguishes implemented from evidenced, so
current remains E1 until that review exists.
P: >-
No rung applies. flex-auth holds no datastore: registry snapshot and
policy package are baked into the image and mounted read-only, and the
production Deployment runs with no --log flag. P0 is the framework's
floor and presupposes a database. Declaring P0 would be a fabrication.
R: >-
No rung applies, same reason. No tenant data is persisted in production,
so there is nothing to retain or erase. R0 ("kept indefinitely by
default") would misdescribe a service that keeps nothing.
V: >-
No restart or failover exercise establishes an availability position for
the complete decision path. The target is exercised V1 recovery, not an
inferred claim from a Deployment manifest.
provider:
capability: authorization.decision
axes:
A:
available: 3
maximum: 4
conditions:
- "A3 consumers authenticate flex-auth and observe a denial at their endpoint."
- "A4 requires the AuthZEN interface and records decision differences between PDPs."
evidence:
- "docs/tenancy-posture-review.md"
evidence:
E1:
- "internal/decision/engine.go:188"
- "internal/decision/engine.go:248"
A2:
- "internal/callerauth/auth.go"
- "internal/callerauth/auth_test.go"
- "cmd/flex-auth/main_test.go"
- "deploy/caller-auth-rbac.yaml"
- "docs/adr/0004-inbound-caller-authentication.md"
deployment: "deploy/flex-auth-user-engine.yaml, deploy/flex-auth-tenant-engine.yaml"